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HAS THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS REVERSED 
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW DATA 
Robert Leonardi 
Introduction 
One of the most significant trends of the past thirty years in regional development 
has been the reduction in socioeconomic disparities between the developed and the 
less developed regions of the European Union (EU). At the beginning of 1989 when 
the Cohesion Policy was launched and the first cycle of Structural Funds resources 
allocated (1989–1993) to pursue the aim of bridging regional disparities, vast 
sections of the European ‘periphery’ that included the regions in southern Europe 
but also Ireland and the north and west of the UK, were below the EU mean of 75% 
in terms of the average GDP per capita as measured by PPS (Purchasing Power 
Standard). Yet, by the end of the third programmatic cycle (2000–2006) of the 
Structural Funds most of the less developed regions had moved beyond that 75% 
threshold. Ireland existed completely from Objective 1 or the Convergence objective 
in 2000; Spain’s original thirteen less developed regions were cut to one for the new 
planning cycle of 2014–2020; Portugal’s original seven regions requiring special 
assistance have been reduced to three; in 1989 Italy had eight regions in Objective 
1 and now that number has been whittled down to four; Greece began participating 
in the Cohesion Policy with the entire country (i.e., thirteen regions) eligible for 
socioeconomic assistance and in the 2014–2020 cycle the total of eligible regions 
will have been cut by nine leaving four with special assistance; and in the UK only 
western part of Wales continues to receive special consideration by the Cohesion 
Policy. A similar trend emerged in the eastern part of Germany and in the new 
Member States in Central and Eastern Europe during and immediately after their 
accession to the EU in 2004.  
However, after 2008 the socioeconomic crisis that has hit most of Europe places 
into question this convergence trend in Southern Europe and in many of the new 
Member States in Eastern Europe. As Member States struggle to balance budgets; 
re-establish confidence in the viability of their economies; and return their 
economies to a process of growth – the prospect on the horizon for the near future 
seems to be the opposite of what we have seen up to 2007 – that is, divergence – and 
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the emergence of a new centre-periphery dynamics in which the growth rates 
registered in the periphery have difficulty in keeping up with the growth trends in 
the core areas of Europe. 
This paper investigates the theoretical issues and empirical trends that emerged 
with the creation of the Single Market and the associated Cohesion Policy. What in 
effect happened after 1989 when the Cohesion Policy was initiated and when the 
Single Market programme was implemented? In addition, we will look at the impact 
of the Single Currency during the period 2000–2007. 
These results will be contrasted with what has happened after 2008 to the 
prospects for growth following the financial and economic crisis and how the crisis 
has or has not been taken into account in the formulation of the next cycle of Cohe-
sion Policy for 2014–2020. The three research questions which are addressedhere 
deal with: (1) what were the expectations in the creation of the Single Market and 
Single Currency and have these expectations been supported by the empirical re-
sults; (2) how has the new Cohesion Policy taken into account the economic and 
financial crisis of 2009–2013; and (3) what needs to be done to make the new Cohe-
sion Policy more respondent to the crisis?  
The Literature on the Impact of the Single Market 
on Peripheral Economies 
Most of the literature before 1993 when the Single Market came into effect, dealt 
primarily with the ‘projected’ results (e.g. Padoa-Schioppa Report 1987, Cecchini 
Report 1988, Baldwin 1989) or the impact of the Single Market based on a set of 
contradictory assumptions. Few empirical studies existed on the overall impact of 
market liberalisation and integration in Europe as a result of European integration 
under the Common Market programme or the general post-WWII trend of opening 
up European markets. The major exception was the work of Molle et al. (1980) and 
Barrow and Sala-i-Martin (1991). 
It was only after 1993 that the focus of attention changed to take into account 
what had actually happened in response to the creation of the Single Market. After 
1993 more focused empirical studies emerged on how the Single Market was 
impacting growth, employment, competition and regional disparities. The question 
posed by most observers was whether the Single Market represented a further stage 
in the opening of markets in Europe after what had happened in the post-war period 
and the beginning of European integration with the European Coal and Steel 
Community (1951) and European Common Market (1957) or whether the Single 
Market represented a radical departure from what had happened before.  
Though the thinking behind the creation of the Single Market broke new ground 
in terms of European politics and polices, for many of the leading figures in the 
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European Community it represented instead the logical next step in building on the 
achievements of the Common Market and the Customs Union. The Single Market 
proposed to go beyond the elimination of customs duties and tariffs on goods and to 
move on to the elimination of all of the ‘non-tariff’ barriers to the free flow of the 
factors of production: capital, labour and technology. Thus, in his introduction to the 
Cecchini Report, Jacques Delors stated that the objective of creating a large and truly 
unified economic area in Europe by 1992 was formidable but it promised to provide 
substantial benefits: 
“This large market without frontiers, because of its size and because of the 
possibilities that it offers for scientific, technical and commercial cooperation, gives 
a unique opportunity to our industry to improve its competitivity. It will also 
increase growth and employment and contribute to a better balance in the world 
economy” (1988: xi). 
Aside from the economic objectives, Delors argued that attention also had to be 
placed on improving the Community’s economic and social ‘dimension’ in providing 
an increase in resources to combat long-term and youth unemployment, spur rural 
development, help underdeveloped regional economies, and ameliorate industrial 
restructuring problems. Concern for economic and social cohesion had been a con-
stant feature in the process of European integration, but with the creation of the 
Single Market it was transformed into a vital issue of concern for the political, eco-
nomic and social stability of the post 1992 period. While the formation of the Single 
Market offered the promise of a significant increase in the output of the Community 
as a whole, the political viability of the project also required that the distribution of 
its benefits be perceived as fair by the constituent states and regions (Leonardi 
1993a, De la Fuente and Vives 1995).  
In 1989 the Delors Report on economic and monetary union provided the 
theoretical and political underpinning of the Single Market and Single Currency 
programmes. The Report pointed out both the positive as well as negative impacts 
of the Single Market on core versus peripheral areas.  
“Historical experience suggests... that in the absence of countervailing policies, 
the overall impact on peripheral regions could be negative. Transport costs and 
economies of scale would tend to favour a shift in economic activity away from less 
developed regions, especially if they were at the periphery of the Community, to the 
highly developed areas at its centre. The economic and monetary union would have 
to encourage and guide structural adjustment which would help poorer regions to 
catch up with the wealthier ones” (CEC 1989, p. 22). 
It is historically significant to note that the Community’s initial view on the im-
pact on the less developed areas on the part of the Single Market and Single Currency 
was not completely optimistic. In fact, the prevailing view in the Commission was 
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that the impact would be negative in nature. Paul Krugman (1987) in his contribu-
tion to the Padoa-Schioppa Report pointed out some of the negative consequences 
that might emerge from further market integration: increases in unemployment, 
agglomeration effects in particular industries, national competition/conflict over 
the rescue of national champions, uneven distribution of the gains from trade, 
management of migration flows, and lack in coordination of monetary policies. Thus, 
the expectation was that through market integration there would be a significant 
divergence of economic performance and wellbeing of the core vis-a-vis the 
peripheral areas. In other words, the fear was that the convergence of national and 
regional economies documented by Molle et al. (1980) during the 1950–70 period 
would be sacrificed to the strengthening of the core areas. It was feared that market 
integration: economic growth and job creation would take place in the core areas to 
the detriment of the peripheral ones. According to the Delors Report (1988) the 
Single Market was not viable from a political and social point of view without a 
parallel policy capable of absorbing the expected negative shocks of market integra-
tion on peripheral underdeveloped areas.  
To avoid such an outcome it was felt that a pro-active regional policy could serve 
to alleviate the negative impact of opening the market on less developed areas and 
help to restructure regional economies so that the least developed and peripheral 
regions could participate in the beneficial aspects of economic integration. In this 
manner, the Community would help to promote the forces of convergence against 
those pushing toward divergence. This approach to cohesion policy has been 
consistently reconfirmed from 1989 to the present (e.g. Monti 2010).  
Lord Cockfield, the coordinator of the Commission’s White Paper on the Single 
Market (1985) admitted that in 1985 the 1992 Single Market programme repre-
sented “an act of faith – confidence in the present and faith in the future – that we – 
the Community – embarked on this task”, but with the publication of the Cecchini 
Report: 
“...we are able for the first time to see the precise measure of what we are going 
to achieve. Now we have the hard evidence, the confirmation of what those who are 
engaged in building Europe have always known: that the failure to achieve a single 
market has been costing European industry millions in unnecessary costs and lost 
opportunities; that the completion of the Internal Market will provide the economic 
context for the regeneration of European industry in both goods and services; and 
that it will give a permanent boost to the prosperity of the people of Europe and 
indeed of the world as a whole” (Cecchini1988, xiii). 
Aside from the official expressions of optimism on the Commission’s 1992 pro-
gramme, there was not a broad consensus among policy makers or scholars on what 
would be the concrete benefits for all Member States and regions. As illustrated by 
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the analyses contained in the Padoa-Schioppa (1987)1; Cecchini (1988) and 
Emerson (1990) reports, the expectation was that the realisation of the Single 
Market would have a negative impact on employment and competition and, espe-
cially, on the prospects for development of the less developed and peripheral areas. 
Much of the optimistic prediction on the overall impact of the Single Market 
generated by the official reports was based on classical general equilibrium theories, 
such as those developed by Solow (1956) that foresaw a gradual trickledown effect 
originating in the core areas and gradually extending itself to the peripheral regions. 
However, since the mid-1950s there was an expanding body of literature based on 
centre-periphery theory (e.g. Myrdal 1957, Holland 1976) that produced much more 
pessimistic scenarios on the impact of integrating markets. The tenants of centre-
periphery theory were negative in their predictions of the consequences for less 
developed areas produced by market integration.  
Thus, the expectations associated with core-periphery theory were that the 
relative position of the periphery would erode over time to the benefit of the core 
areas. The basic theoretical foundation in predicting what would happen to under-
developed areas in an integrating market were spelled out by Gunnar Myrdal in 
1957 in his widely read Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped Regions. The con-
cept of ‘backwash effects’ was further elaborated by Stuart Holland in 1976 and 
1980. Based on this approach, a number of books appearing at the end of the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s – that is, at the time that Greece, Portugal and Spain were 
preparing to enter into the Community – warned of the dire consequences of further 
enlargement and greater economic integration for the new members from southern 
Europe. These scholars argued that further integration would prove to be funda-
mentally damaging to the growth potentials of the peripheral economies (Seers, 
Schaffer and Kiljunen 1979, Williams 1984; Hudson – Lewis 1985, Hadjimichalis 
1987). Italy’s Mezzogiorno regions were also added to the list of ‘net losers’ in the 
prospect of further European economic integration (Carello 1989). 
The few dissenting voices to this cacophony of pessimism were provided by the 
authors of two empirical studies of how regional disparities had fared between 1950 
and 1970 – that is, by Molle, van Holst and Smit (1980) and by Barrow and Sala-i-
Martin (1991). Barro and Sala-i-Martin analyzed the empirical results over the 
period between 1970 and 1990, and therefore built upon the data previously 
analyzed by Molle et al. in their 1980 publication. The latter argued that the data for 
                                                                        
1 See Annex E (p. 162–164) that reports an increased divergence of national GDP/p.c. scores in 
Europe after the impact of the initial 1973 oil crisis: The Report went on to state that “In the 1960s 
there was relative convergence in real GDP per capita between countries, but since the first energy 
crisis in 1973, this trend seems to have come to a stop and the gaps have been stabilized or slightly 
increased” (p. 162).   
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the first nine Member States – the original six plus Denmark, Ireland and the UK – 
showed that the gap between rich and poor regions had not increased during the 
course of the reintegration of the European economies in the post-war period. In 
fact, the authors found that disparities had instead decreased in a consistent manner 
at both the national and regional levels: 
“We have examined whether regions with similar growth rates also had other 
characteristics in common, such as their type of location within the EC. From the 
centre-periphery theory it might have been expected, for example, that integration 
would have the effect of making regions along the inner borders of the Community 
of the Six grow faster, and peripheral regions slower than average in the period 
1960–70. The outcome of the analysis shows no such thing” (p. 161).2 
In a similar manner the Barro and Sala-i-Martin study concerned itself with what 
happened in large, integrating economies – such as those in the U.S., Japan, and EC – 
in terms of trends in socio-economic convergence or divergence. Their findings 
were surprising to both the academic and policy making communities given that 
they went against the prevailing views on what was happening in terms of the 
direction taken by regional disparities. The authors concluded in their report to the 
Brookings Institution that between 1970 and 1990 regions in the EC had converged 
at a rate of approximately 2% per annum. The conclusions reached by Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin conflicted significantly with what was being written on the Commis-
sion’s behalf in the Periodic Reports on the trend in regional disparities. The Third 
and Fourth Periodic Reports stated that: “As a result of the first oil shock and the 
major worldwide disequilibrium of the last fifteen years the process of real 
convergence was interrupted and partly reversed” (CEC 1987, p. 52) and “During 
the 1980s disparities in incomes per head in the Community increased slightly up to 
1986, since when they have remained at around the same level” (CEC 1991, p. 11). 
The implications of the results reported by the Periodic Reports were that the EC 
needed a regional policy capable of easing the pain of market integration and in 
slowing down the increase in disparities. Very little consideration was reflected in 
the Periodic Reports regarding the objective outlined in the Single European Act of 
reducing regional disparities over time. That shift in expectations had to wait until 
after 1993 when evidence began to accumulate that regional, socio-economic 
disparities were not increasing but rather decreasing under the combined impact of 
the Single Market and Cohesion Policy.3 
                                                                        
2 In 2007 (p. 90) Molle reiterated his previous conclusion that “since the 1950s a continuous process 
of long-term convergence between the core and the periphery has taken place”. 
3 See the Cohesion Reports produced by the Commission (i.e. 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2010). There 
is still a lot of debate on how much of the convergence process is fuelled by the Single Market 
and/or by the Cohesion Policy. With regard to the impact of EMU, Christodoulakis (2009) argues 
that regional divergences began to grow once again after the introduction of the Single Currency 
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The Impact of EMU 
EMU was the other policy that was supposed to underpin the success of the Single 
Market. Operating within a common currency, the uncertainties attached to 
individual national currencies and the free circulation of capital would be 
eliminated. Dyson (2002, 2006 and 2008) has argued that EMU has set out to 
institutionalise a paradigm of ‘sound money’ and finance, the retrenchment of 
welfare state provisions and the rejection of inflationary wage bargaining regimes. 
The Commission (1996) argued that EMU would make the Single Market more 
effective by “constraints which now result from exchange rate risk and by generally 
increasing transparency and competition” (CEC 1996, p. 6). However, the exact 
impact of EMU on peripheral and core economies has been debated in the academic 
literature from the very beginning (Martin 2001). From 1999 to 2007 the main 
beneficiaries of the policy seemed to be the peripheral areas due to the stabilization 
effect of the fall of interest rates in the transition from traditionally weak national 
currencies to the euro (CEC 2008d). A telling example of this change was provided 
by Greece where the interest rate went from 7.7% for the drachma in 2000 to 4.3% 
in 2001 when the country entered the euro (Featherstone 2008). The same trend 
had been witnessed in Spain and Italy during the previous decade (Quaglia – Furlong 
2008). For the latter, the lower interest rates generated by membership in the euro 
significantly benefitted the country’s ability to finance its accumulated debt and 
keep its annual deficit under control (Nanetti 2010). For the four cohesion countries 
of the EU-15 and Italy the requirements for nominal convergence imposed by the 
Maastricht criteria had already begun to produce benefits in terms of reduced 
inflation and management of fiscal matters during the second half of the 1990s.  
Aside from the nominal aspects of convergence in terms of inflation, interest 
rates, and deficit and debt levels, there was a real expectation that EMU would be-
come a powerful instrument in producing real economic convergence. Expectations 
were that EMU would have a significant impact on levels of economic growth by 
eliminating the need to use devaluations to regain competitiveness and the intro-
duction of other reforms. Frank Barry (2003) observed that during the run-up to 
EMU: 
“Monetary and fiscal policies were reined in, competition policy strengthened, 
state ownership reduced and EU aid increased considerably. Substantial improve-
ments in labour market performance were recorded in Ireland and Spain. Wage 
moderation was promoted in Ireland by the tax-cutting ‘social partnership’ 
agreements, and in Spain by the labour-market reforms of the 1994–97 period” (p. 
910). 
                                                                        
but does not argue that the growth in regional disparities is necessarily due to EMU. We will 
discuss further the impact of EMU at greater length below. 
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The association of EMU with the Stability and Growth Pact added increased 
credence to the new currency in becoming a stabilizing factor for the domestic 
economy in that national governments would be discouraged in succumbing to the 
lure of borrowing to pay for social welfare schemes or extensive infrastructure 
projects (Brunila et al. 2001, Grauwe 2005). Thus, EMU was expected to produce 
low inflation and low interest rates, exchange stability and sound public finances. 
Three of the four expected results were achieved, but the fourth – sound public 
finances – did not materialise as expected. 
EMU also worked to encourage increased flows of FDI to countries in the euro 
zone. The flow of FDI into the EU was initially associated with the creation of the 
Single Market at the beginning of the 1990s, and a decade latter it underwent 
another significant surge. Little attention was paid during the initial years of EMU to 
whether the FD flowing into the participating countries was funnelled into produc-
tive sectors such as R&D and the construction of new facilities for the production of 
exportable goods or to finance the consumption of capital goods – e.g., for the pur-
chase of second homes – that remained within the country. Ardy et al. (2003) 
reported that already in 2001 the deficit in the balance of payments for Ireland was 
0.6% of GDP, for Spain 3.0%, for Greece 4.2% and for Portugal 9.6%, and they 
observed at the time that “whether this is a problem is a matter of argument” (p. 7). 
At the beginning of the decade the most important considerations in underwriting 
the stability of the Euro were fiscal stability and capital flows. Oversight of the for-
mer was allocated to the procedures foreseen in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
In 2004 France and Germany overran the established deficit limits, but it was diffi-
cult for the Member States to agree on a common approach to the issue. As a result, 
the March 2005 reform of the SGP introduced more flexible criteria for its enforce-
ment (Chang 2009, Talani 2009, Farina – Tamborini 2007). 
In the CEECs the prospect of adopting the euro has raised a number of con-
siderations. For some the possible adoption of the euro will help the participating 
countries to reap the benefits of closer integration with other euro Member States 
in terms of gains from trade, growth, employment, and FDI flows, but it was argued 
that these gains would be made at the ‘cost’ of giving up the use of monetary policy 
as a stabilization instrument for the internal economy (Beblavy 2007, Dyson 2006). 
The evidence cited confirms that the formation of EMU stimulated trade between its 
member states. Estimates of likely gains for growth of trade and incomes from 
joining the euro area differ from 85% of increase in trade (Rose 2002) to a more 
modest trade gain of 6–15% after five years of EMU (Faruqee 2004). Maliszewska 
(2005) finds that members of EMU trade on average between 6% and 26% more 
than otherwise would have been the case. Trade increases are presumably caused 
by lower transaction costs, greater competition and transparency of prices 
(Schadler 2005). Studies report that the adoption of the euro would add 0.6–0.9% 
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to average GDP growth in Hungary for 20 years and about half this range for Poland 
(Schadler et al. 2005). 
In addition to gains for trade and growth, the adoption of the euro by the CEECs 
would eliminateexchange rate risk. Rostowski (2005) points to higher exchange rate 
risks in CEECs as these countries have built up high current account deficits due to 
expectations of rapid economic growth. 
Joining EMU would pose the challenge of the costs of meeting the Maastricht 
criteria and giving up the supposed shock-absorbing role of the exchange rate 
(Zubek 2006 and 2008, Greskovits 2006). Dabrowski (2005) argues that the costs 
of giving up sovereign monetary policy for small open economies are not large as 
discretionary currency devaluation aimed at boosting external competitiveness will 
most likely end with higher internal inflation that will eventually eat up the real 
effects of the nominal devaluation and, in the end, lower the credibility of the central 
bank. Empirical work presented in Schadler (2005) concludes that the largest share 
of shocks in the CEECs has been monetary or financial in origin; thus, losing the 
exchange rate instrument may not be particularly costly if other more efficient 
adjustment mechanisms are put into place. 
Dabrowski (2005) concludes that EMU entry will likely accelerate the catch-up 
process for CEECs in the long run and help real convergence or economic cohesion. 
The IMF study (Schadler et al. 2005, Schadler 2005) also suggests a positive balance 
in the adoption of the euro for the CEECs, provided that they adopt structural and 
fiscal policies strongly geared toward minimizing overall economic volatility. 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 helped to expose some of the 
basic weaknesses of the SGP operating at the European level and the support 
mechanisms foreseen by the rules of EMU. First of all, the financial crisis emphasized 
the existing imbalance in two vital areas: (1) fiscal balance of Member States and (2) 
the balance in current accounts. The first was highlighted recently by the situation 
in Greece and the second by the most recent Irish crisis. However, an important 
element in highlighting both crises was the on-going financial difficulties of Member 
States on the periphery that, on the one hand, called into question the sustainability 
of their national fiscal policies and, on the other, placed into question their ability to 
respond to the lack of confidence in financial markets. The sovereign debt crisis 
affecting a number of EU and non-EU countries has helped to instil a ‘risk avoidance’ 
strategy among international investors that has already heavily compromised the 
economic and financial stability of the peripheral countries participating in EMU.  
The reform of the SGP in 2005 (Farina – Tamborini 2007) to a certain extent 
allowed Greece to continue with ignoring the need to balance its budget. By 2010 
this approach by the Greek government threatened to bring the country out of EMU 
and required a countervailing policy on the part of the EU for more stringent 
measures to monitor and react to fiscal imbalances (CEC 2010c), The EU also had to 
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put together rescue packages to buttress investor confidence in national govern-
ment bonds. The first to bring attention to the potential role that could be played by 
the dual deficits (fiscal as well as current account) were authors, such as Blanchard 
(2006) and Arghyrou and Chortareas (2008), who studied the current account defi-
cits that were afflicting the southern tier of EU Member States. However, the most 
detailed paper on the topic appeared in 2009 by Nikos Christodoulakis (2009) who 
reported increasing current account and trade deficits within the Euro area between 
‘northern’ (e.g. Germany, Finland, Austria, etc.) vis-à-vis ‘southern’ (e.g. France, Italy, 
Spain, etc.). The author does not argue that the twin deficits originated from EMU, 
but he notes that the common currency, if anything, encouraged increased differen-
tiation between the two groups of countries. What seems to be important in 
explaining these trends is the relationship between traded and non-traded goods 
that are attracting FDI into the country. In the former case, FDI expands traded out-
puts, increases productivity, and improves competitiveness. In the latter, FDI flows 
into a non-traded domestic economy (i.e. housing) that reduces traded output and 
increases domestic demand. It is in this manner that property bubbles arise with a 
potentially devastating impact when they burst on the viability of banks and confi-
dence in their ability to ensure deposits. 
The impact that the Euro crisis has had on the growth prospects of Greece and 
Ireland (but also Portugal and Spain) has been dramatic. At the present time, both 
countries need to concentrate more on mending their fiscal policies rather than 
focussing on policies to promote growth. Greece, Ireland and Spain are expected to 
still remain in recession in 2013. The financial crisis in Portugal may also have the 
impact of leaving the country in recession and abandoning any growth-oriented 
internal macroeconomic policy. In other words, is it possible for the Member States 
hit by the sovereign debt crisis to keep paying double or triple the rate of interest 
on Euro bonds in comparison to other EMU countries and maintain a focus on the 
Lisbon objectives of increased growth and job creation?  
The Contribution of Cohesion Policy 
The results reported by studies in the abundant literature available on the impact of 
Cohesion Policy have varied a lot. Some have found evidence of the Cohesion Policy 
having a positive effect on economic growth; others have found no significant or 
even a negative impact. The results of the analysis do not necessarily vary with the 
data selected or the time period to be covered by the policy but rather with how one 
defines the policy. Does one include under the rubric of ‘cohesion policy’ [as is the 
case with Boldrin – Canova (2001)], the ‘regional policy’ of the EC from the creation 
of the ERDF in 1975 to the reform of the Structural Funds (1988) or the policy as 
implemented by the reform of the Structural Funds from 1989 onward? Given the 
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difference in the operation of the Structural Funds during these two periods (i.e. pre- 
and post-1989), the emphasis on the pre-1989 analysis cannot be labelled as an 
evaluation of EU cohesion policy but rather of the early EC regional policy. Such a 
choice emphasises the fact that the Boldrin and Canova study is not a study of a pro-
active policy but rather of a quite limited EC financial allocations to Member States 
for the purpose of financing a regional policy monopolised to a great extent by them, 
which used a quota system to allocate contributions, which lacked any specific 
programmatic approach and where no monitoring and evaluation of investments 
was ever undertaken. A second question is associated with the definition of 
‘convergence’. The Single European Act that launched the Cohesion Policy spoke of 
“the convergence of the less developed regions” toward the European average 
rather than the convergence of all regions (both wealthy and poor) toward a 
European or a national average. In studies that focus on the latter version of the 
definition, the analysis of convergence is carried out within Member States rather 
than within the EU. As we have seen in the literature cited above on convergence 
and divergence, most studies do conclude that disparities have decreased across 
Europe but in many cases they have increased within Member States (De la Fuente 
and Vives 1995, CEC 1999, Midelfart-Knarvik – Overman 2002, Monfort 2008, Farole 
et al. 2009). 
Leonardi (1998: 165–172) was one of the first to point out that it is possible for 
initially poor countries, such as Ireland, to converge dramatically toward the EU 
average, while at the same time undergoing a significant intra-state divergence pro-
cess as one or more regions (e.g. Dublin or Cork) develop dramatically and thereby 
outstrip the increases made by the other Irish regions vis-à-vis the European 
average. In other words, the Northern and Western regions in Ireland have not 
grown as fast as other Irish regions. Therefore, this has produced increased dis-
parities within Ireland. The same has been the case in Portugal and Spain to say 
nothing of what has happened in the new Member States in the creation of the ‘do-
nut’ phenomenon where national capitals have outstripped the rest of the country 
in the rate of growth and prosperity. 
If, however, attention is paid to how the poorer regions and major beneficiaries 
of EU cohesion policy have performed vis-à-vis the European average the empirical 
evidence is clear: the convergence targeted by the SEA and cohesion policy has, in 
fact, taken place (Cappelen et al. 2003, Leonardi 2005, CEC 2009 and 2010).  
The Sapir Report (2004) noted that one of the expectations associated with the 
original Single Market programme seems to have been confirmed: “European re-
gions do appear to have become more specialized in the aftermath of economic 
integration, reflecting both their comparative advantages (especially in terms of the 
population’s skill endowment, a key regional characteristic in a low-mobility envi-
ronment) and incipient agglomeration effects due to local economies of scale”. In 
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analyzing the six macro regions targeted by the cohesion policy – Greece, Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, the Italian Mezzogiorno and the East German Laender – “the six 
macro-regions displayed annual growth of 3.3% between 1991 and 2000, while the 
rest of the EU produced annual growth of 1.9%”. Convergence was definitely taking 
place between member states but not necessarily within member states. The Sapir 
Report also produced interesting data with regard to the level of inequality across 
EU countries which fell by one-half between 1970 and 2000. However, inequalities 
within countries climbed back to where they were in 1970 by the late 1990s. Sapir 
concluded that “inequalities within countries seem to be directly linked to growth: 
inequality is reduced during periods of high growth but remains stagnant during 
periods of sluggish growth.” 
Ramajo et al. (2008) analysed the period 1981–1996. Their finding was that 
regions covered by the Cohesion Policy were converging faster than was the case 
with the regions in other Member States. Puigcerver-Peñalver (2007) analysed the 
impact of Structural Funds during two first programming periods (1989–1993 and 
1994–1999), and his findings indicated that the positive impact of Structural Funds 
on growth was more significant during the first programming period than during 
the second. Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) investigated the effects of Structural 
Policy in 1995–2001. Their results suggested that more ‘corrupt’ countries gain as 
much economic growth from Structural Funds as others, so that countries with 
looser controls were not more ineffective in the use of funds than others.  
According to Cappelenet al. (2003), the effect of EU regional support on economic 
growth is stronger in more developed regions, which indicates that receiving 
region’s responsiveness affects the impact of support. The results of Mohl and Hagen 
(2010) find exactly the opposite results. They suggest that the impact depends on 
the nature of the operational programmes on whether Structural Funds have had a 
significant impact on growth or not. They found along with Leonardi (2005) that 
payments in the Objective 1 regions have improved regional economic growth, but 
payments in Objective 2 and 3 regions have not had any appreciable effects on 
growth rates. This finding should not be surprising given the different levels of 
financing for Objective 1 versus non-Objective 1 regions. Leonardi (2005) found that 
from 1988 to 1999 the beta convergence rate in Objective 1 regions was 3.9% per 
annum while in non-Objective 1 regions it was 0.2%. Overall, the convergence rate 
for the 189 regions studied by Leonardi was 1.4%. In a previous study Armstrong 
and Taylor (2000) found that the general rate of convergence in Europe had been 
1.5%.  
Another finding discussed in the literature with regard to Cohesion Policy is that 
the impact of the policy on growth does not necessarily emerge immediately; it can 
take more than three years to appear. The expectation of immediate results and the 
growing economic and financial crisis have placed significant strain on regions and 
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countries in maintaining the original focus of the policy on growth and employment. 
According to Mancha-Navarro and Garrido-Yserte (2008), there is a risk that future 
cohesion policy will begin to diverge from its original objectives of restructuring un-
derdeveloped economies due to the expansion of overall objectives as a result of the 
emphasis on the Lisbon and Gothenburg strategies. They suggest that since 2007 the 
main objective has become competitiveness rather than growth, given that the latter 
seems to be an automatic by-product of joining the EU and participating in the Single 
Market. According to this view, joining the EU has had the effect of reducing the ‘risk 
factor’ associated with doing business in Central and Eastern European countries, 
thereby increasing the inflow of foreign direct investment and speeding up privati-
sation that has characterised the CEECs from the mid-1990s to the first part of the 
decade. As a result, it was felt that the Cohesion Policy in the CEECs could focus on 
other objectives – the environment and clean energy – given that economic growth 
and job creation were being delivered ‘automatically’ by market forces. 
Martin and Tyler’s (2006) analysis of the impact of Structural Funds in the 
Objective 1 regions up to 2002 has shown that Structural Funds expenditures 
accounted for the creation of approximately one million new jobs. According to their 
analysis the major turnaround in the employment data took place in the 1994–1996 
period when the Structural Funds expenditure become steady and sustained. Prior 
to that period, Objective 1 regions continued to shed employment. To a certain 
extent the data demonstrate that some of the predictions of job losses attributed to 
the rationalisation effect of the Single Market (Begg 1992) did take place in the 
immediate aftermath of the implementation of the policy but that the statistics 
quickly turned around as European and foreign capital was quickly attracted to the 
less developed areas and the Cohesion Policy began to make significant strides in 
the restructuring of the peripheral economies. 
Cieślik and Rokicki (2009) studied the effect of Cohesion Policy programmes 
between 2004 and 2006 on income and employment in Poland as the country gained 
gradual access to Structural Funds during the transition. Their finding was that 
Structural Funds expenditures probably did not impact on economic growth in the 
most developed regions but did have an impact on the growth potential in less de-
veloped regions. The other result was that in the short run Cohesion Policy appears 
to contribute to production and employment increases in the least developed versus 
the most developed regions. Cardenete and Lima (2005) investigated the impact of 
Structural Funds on Andalusia in Spain. Their results indicated that the funds did 
not significantly change the structure of the regional economy in Andalusia. A com-
pletely different result was suggested by the SOCCOH Report (2008 Chapter 3 pp. 
55–86) for the Spanish regions of Murcia and Galicia. In a similar manner, Yuill et al. 
(2009) concluded that Cohesion Policy has improved significantly the relative posi-
tion of Spain’s regions in general when set against other regions in Europe. In the 
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cases of Portugal and Greece (Konsolas et al. 2002) the results for selected regions 
were quite positive. After 2005 the national governments began to over-reach what 
was permissible on the basis of their economic base in terms of providing social sup-
port for their citizens. 
According to Ederveen et al. (2006), Structural Funds, as such, did not generally 
enhance economic growth in all Member States, but in countries with the right kind 
of institutions, rules and conditions Structural Funds did have an impact. Their 
conclusion is that Cohesion Policy is only conditionally effective in contributing to 
economic growth. Bradley and Untiedt (2008) do not agree with these results. On 
the contrary, their analysis indicates the opposite to be the case. They write that the 
recommendations of Ederveen et al. are unconsidered and off the mark.  
Such contrasting conclusions are normal when it comes to the evaluation of 
Cohesion Policy. What is important to keep in mind in analyzing such studies is, first 
of all, the period of time that is covered and, second, the regions that are considered. 
Given the constant expansion of the EU over the last fifteen years it is important that 
the analysis of disparities not fall prey to the incorporation of increasingly poorer 
countries and regions in the analysis without controlling for the comparison of the 
economic performance of the same countries and regions across time. The latest ex-
post evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2000–2006 (CEC 2009 and 2010b) 
focused on Objective 1 and 2 regions and the ERDF interventions. The results indi-
cate that the Cohesion Policy or Structural Funds interventions have positively 
influenced the socio-economic development of particularly Objective 1 regions.  
Ramajoa et al. (2008) find that regions in the EU cohesion countries (i.e. Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain) receiving the largest amount of funding between 1989 
and 2006 have converged separately – i.e. more significantly than the rest of the EU 
regions. Estimates indicate that in 1981–1996, there was a faster conditional con-
vergence in terms of relative income levels of the regions belonging to these coun-
tries (5.3%) than in the rest of the regions of the EU (3.3%). They conclude that these 
results support the idea of a positive effect of the EU cohesion policies in fostering 
economic growth and convergence in the poorest EU Member States. Similar results 
seemed to be taking place in the CEECs prior to the onslaught of the 2008–2009 
financial and economic crisis that threw national budgets out of balance and dried 
up FDI flows.  
Mohl and Hagen (2010) extend the empirical analysis of the impact of Cohesion 
Policy to 2000–2006. They find that Objective 1 payments promote regional eco-
nomic growth, whereas for the other Objectives (i.e. 2 and 3) no positive and sig-
nificant impact on the EU regional growth is found. The results are robust when 
controlling for spatial correlation. They also show that the growth impact does not 
appear immediately, but that it occurs with a time lag of approximately two to three 
years. The Fifth Cohesion Report (2010c p. 205) also provides empirical evidence of 
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the higher growth rates among Objective 1 regions vis-à-vis non-Objective 1 regions 
during the 1995–2006 period. 
The advantage of econometric evaluations is that they can be appraised with 
standard statistical criteria. Their drawback is that they cannot capture the interplay 
of effects which may be important for massive policy changes such as the Single 
Market. The net result is that it is not possible to establish conclusively what the 
relative performance of these regions would have been in the absence of EU cohe-
sion and other EU policies (Sapir 2004). Attempts have however been made, such as 
Busillo et al. (2009) to test the effect of regional policy compared to a counterfactual’ 
situation in order to isolate the effects of the policy from the shadowing effect of 
other factors. They identify the presence of a, albeit slow, convergence process 
across EU regions in the last twenty years which they ascribe to the impact of Cohe-
sion Policy.  
The use of macroeconomic models allows for more interactions among endoge-
nous variables, but neither the models nor their results can be judged as statistically 
satisfactory or consistent (Baldwin – Venables 1995). Bradley (2006) writes that the 
Hermin model demonstrates that the impacts of Structural Funds in isolation are 
modest due to the fact that their long term benefit depends on a country’s ability to 
respond to external opportunities arising in Europe and the rest of the world. Veld 
(2007) uses the QUEST II model to evaluate the potential impact of the Cohesion 
Policy programmes for the 2007–2013 Convergence objective. He finds that trans-
fers have a positive impact on GDP, employment and productivity, but that the mag-
nitude of the effect depends on the productivity assumption of interventions. 
Further, the ex-ante impact analysis of Structural Funds produced by the Commis-
sion (2007) is based on HERMIN2, EcoMod3 and QUEST models. The HERMIN2 
model shows cohesion policy as having a significantly positive effect, with absolute 
GDP being 5 to 10% higher in most of the new Member States than would have been 
the case in the absence of intervention. EcoMod3 predicts significant positive effects 
of policy intervention in all 15 Cohesion countries, especially in the new Member 
States, where funding is relatively high. The boost to demand in the Cohesion coun-
tries from spending from the Structural Funds predicted by the QUEST model is 
relatively modest. Substantial differences in the estimated impact of the Cohesion 
Policy between the models are due to different assumptions discussed in Bradley 
and Untiedt (2007). 
According to recent estimates (Gakova et al. 2009), European Cohesion Policy is 
expected to create about 1.9 million additional jobs by 2015 in Cohesion countries, 
while average GDP gains are expected to range from 1% in Spain to around 3% in 
Poland, Slovakia and Romania and to more than 5% in the Baltic states. Allard et al. 
(2008) find that new Member States stand to benefit greatly from the inflow of EU 
funds. These funds could boost GDP per capita by as much as 5 percentage points 
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between the years 2010 to 2020. However, the size of the benefits will depend on 
the right institutional and policy framework. The authors stress that the EU funds 
need to be directed predominantly to investment purposes rather than distributed 
evenly over the national territory. 
Concern for economic cohesion has been a constant feature of the process of 
European integration. While the formation of the Single Market offered the promise 
of a significant increase in the output of the Community as a whole, the political 
viability of the project also required that the distribution of benefits be perceived as 
fair by the constituent states and regions (De la Fuente – Vives 1995).  
Numerous studies do find both β-convergence and δ-convergence across Euro-
pean countries4. However, most studies find a small convergence rate across EU 
countries (Eckey – Turk 2006). It should be noted that the results are not only sen-
sitive on the choice of countries being considered and the level of NUTS regions 
employed, but convergence estimates are also sensitive to the choice of the addi-
tional explanatory variables (Magrini 2004). While the four remaining regions of 
southern Italy have shown no recent signs of convergence, the other four southern 
Italian regions have exited from the Objective 1/Convergence objective (Leonardi 
2005). Three (Abruzzo, Molise and Sardinia) have exited due to economic growth 
which has brought their GDP/p.c. scores above the 75% threshold while only one, 
Basilicata, has exited from the convergence criteria for 2007–2013 due to the statis-
tical effect of the entry of ten new Member States after 2004.5 Spain, Portugal and 
Greece have grown faster than the EU average over a number of years, while Ireland 
and the East German länders have significantly driven the convergence trend in the 
EU during the last two decades. The impressive performance of Ireland is such that 
in only 15 years it has moved from the bottom group of the poorest four EU coun-
tries to become one of the top four (in terms of GDP per capita). For Ireland it will 
important to see whether the country will be capable of holding on during the next 
few years to the development levels it achieved before the collapse of its banking 
sector. 
At the same time that the above cited studies have discussed the ongoing process 
of convergence of the less developed regions toward the European average, there 
are still a number of studies (Farole 2009) that report the exact opposite or at least 
that divergence is taking place at least within Member States. The argument is that 
Member States with large metropolitan areas – usually the regions containing the 
national capital – are growing at a faster rate than the more peripheral areas. The 
argument goes that while the EU is experiencing a process of convergence across 
                                                                        
4 See e.g. Eckey and Turk (2006), Monfort (2008) for a survey of the literature. 
5 See Leonardi and Nanetti (2010) for a detailed analysis of the development of Basilicata from 
1987–2007. 
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countries, there is evidence of divergence across regions within individual countries 
(see e.g. De la Fuente – Vives 1995, Sapir 2004, Monfort 2008). Gianetti (2002) 
argues that the differences in the pattern of convergence and divergence across EU 
regions can be explained by the international knowledge spillovers. Stronger 
knowledge spillovers due to economic integration bring convergence across regions 
that can competitively produce the high-tech goods. On the other hand, disparities 
are amplified within countries where there are regions specialized in the traditional 
sectors that do not benefit from the exchange of knowledge. 
What is the role of Cohesion policies in explaining these convergence patterns? 
On the grounds of limited evidence of convergence the effectiveness of EU Cohesion 
Policy has been criticized by some (e.g. Eckey – Turk 2006) and supported by others 
(e.g. Batchler – Mendez 2007). Boldrin and Canova (2001) have argued that Euro-
pean Structural Funds have had no observable impact on regional growth and eco-
nomic convergence. In contrast to other scholars, they did not find any β-conver-
gence and δ-convergence across NUTS-2 regions attributable to Cohesion Policy. As 
for convergence across countries (2003), they attribute the observed increases in 
growth in the CEECs to national policies and not to regional transfers. Here again, 
we can agree with them due to the fact that they were trying to measure the impact 
of the policy when the policy did not exist. Prior to 2004 the candidate states had 
access to limited pre-accession funds rather than the full budgetary allocation pro-
vided after accession took place.  
Turning to the effects of the various implementation areas of Cohesion Policy, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004) assess the effect of the policy axes and find that 
despite the concentration of development funds on infrastructure and, to a lesser 
extent, on business support, the returns to commitments on these axes are not 
significant. Support to agriculture has short-term positive effects on growth, but 
these wane quickly. According to the authors, only investments in education and 
human capital – which represent about one-eighth of the total commitments – have 
medium-term positive and significant returns. Based on the empirical results they 
argue for the need to rethink the nature of regional policy, prioritise innovative and 
locally tailored investments, and improving the capabilities of local institutions in 
managing development strategies. Martin (1998) finds that transfers spent on 
infrastructure investment may increase aggregate attractiveness of a country but do 
not lead to convergence between regions in that same country. The strengthening of 
national infrastructure grids has invariably the tendency to favour the richest and 
more politically connected regions in the country, and it gives firms the incentive to 
locate near the largest market/s (the rich region). The proximity to larger markets 
enables the local firms to reap the benefits of increasing returns to scale in the larger 
market while facilitating sales to the poor regions. Fagerberg and Verspagen (1996) 
also find that EU investment support to poor, peripheral regions is inefficient. They 
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find that EU support for R&D and investment only impacts positively on growth in 
regions for which the rate of unemployment is below important threshold levels.  
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002), in turn, find evidence of polarization i.e. 
increased inequality between core and periphery at the regional level, but there is 
no evidence of polarization at the national level. Therefore, they conclude that 
structural spending is justifiable only at the regional level. However, their empirical 
analysis suggests that Structural Fund expenditures during the years 1989–1996 
did not prevent regional polarization within Member States from taking place.  
In addition to pure economic contributions, Bachtler and Taylor (2003) argue 
that the concept of added value is a key consideration in analyzing the contribution 
of Cohesion Policy spending. Added value is however a disputed concept, and 
Bachtler and Taylor suggest that it can be identified in the following areas; ‘cohesion 
added value’ – enabling additional economic activity to take place and becoming a 
catalyst for socio-economic regeneration; ‘political added value’ – making the EU 
more visible and generating greater support among citizens for the EU integration 
process; ‘policy added value’ – promoting the creation of a strategic dimension in 
regional development policy making (the existence of Cohesion Policy helps to 
promote a more integrated regional development process on the basis of a complete 
multi-sectoral and integrated approach); ‘operational added value’ – the creation of 
public-private partnerships in the delivery of the policy and the creation of a more 
transparent and coherent policy process; and finally ‘learning added value’ – 
learning is an integral part of structural fund programming from the beginning to 
the end and therefore the continuing policy process that characterizes Cohesion 
Policy creates the premise for learning new and more efficient approaches to the 
planning and implementation process. 
The Cohesion Policy for 2014–2020 
With the June 2013 agreement reached between the European Council and the 
European Parliament on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) it will be 
possible to finalize in short order the Regulations providing the legal base for the 
Partnership Agreements between the Commission and the Member States and in 
formulating the operational programmes at the national and regional level. Unless 
it is changed during the subsequent months, the Regulation for the Cohesion Policy 
(Article 82) foresees the use of the regional level data in GDP/per capita expressed 
in for the years 2006–2008 to identify the regions qualifying for ‘convergence’ vis-
à-vis those that will receive support for the ‘competitiveness/employment’ 
objectives. However, given that the new cycle of Cohesion Policy begins in 2014 and 
covers the seven years up to 2020, the economic status of many countries and 
regions has radically changed from the one reflected in the Commission’s projection 
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on the basis of the 2006–2008 data. Therefore, is the Cohesion Policy ‘fit for 
purpose’? In order words, does it provide the basis for responding to the economic 
crisis, and can it really achieve the objectives outlined for the Policy in the Europe 
2020 programme given that the situation has changed so radically in many regions 
and Member States? 
The result of the analysis of the 2006–2008 data is presented in Figure 1. As is 
evident from the distinctions made in the Figure between ‘convergence’ and ‘non-
convergence’ or competitiveness regions there has been a further reduction of 
regions covered by the convergence objective vis-à-vis those covered during the 
2007–2013 period. We need to remember that 2006–2008 represented the culmi-
nation and highest level of the convergence process that we have discussed above. 
What the new data show is that the recession hit Europe hard in 2009and has con-
tinued to hit Member States and regions hard also in 2010, 2011, 2012 and even in 
2013. 
Table 1 reports the GDP performance among the 27 Member States for from 
2009 to 2012. During the first full year of the recession, 2009, there was a severe 
loss of GDP across the EU in both southern and eastern European countries. Growth 
returned positive in 2010 but weakened in 2011. In 2012 a number of countries fall 
back into recession. The most important examples of continued economic down-
turns were registered in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Slovenia. 
The question that needs to be posed is: whether the simulation carried out by the 
Commission fits any longer the empirical reality existing at the regional and national 
level across the EU? Some preliminary indications on the lack of congruence 
between the simulation carried out by the Commission on the basis of 2006–2008 
data vis-à-vis the reality in 2009 and 2010 is already provided by the regional data 
provided by Eurostat for 2009 and 2010. Of particular concern are the data for all of 
Greece (Table 2) and for selected regions in Spain, Italy, Portugal and the UK (Table 
3). 
If we were to factor in the potential regional level data for 2011 we would find 
that almost all of the regions on our ‘critical list’ will have fallen back below the 75% 
of the EU average and therefore qualify once again for the ‘convergence’ objective. 
The issues highlighted by the data in Tables 2 and 3 point out the danger of basing a 
seven–year development policy on the basis of data that has been superseded by 
events and in not building into the policy the necessary corrective mechanisms 
necessary to respond to the current distortions present in the market. Among the 
major distortions that need to be corrected is the difficulty if accessing the credit 
market on the part of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and in the 
attraction of the foreign investment that had flowed out of the peripheral economies 
during the height of the crisis. 
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Figure 1. Eligibility simulation2014–2020 [GDP/head (PPS), index EU27=100] 
Source: Cohesion Policy 2014–2020 – Investing in growth and jobs. Luxembourg, Publications 
Office of the European Union, 2011. doi:10.2776/43732 
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Table 1. Change in GDP 2009–2012 in EU 27 
Contry 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU 27 –4.3 2.1 1.6 –0.3 
Belgium –2.8 2.4 1.8 –0.3 
Czech Republic –4.5 2.5 1.9 –1.3 
Denmark –5.7 1.6 1.1 –0.5 
Germany –5.1 4.2 3.0 0.7 
Estonia –14.1 3.3 8.3 3.2 
Ireland –5.5 –0.8 1.4 0.9 
Greece –3.1 –4.9 –7.1 –6.4 
Spain –3.7 –0.3 0.4 –1.4 
France –3.1 1.7 2.0 0.0 
Italy –5.5 1.7 0.4 –2.4 
Cyprus –1.9 1.3 0.5 –2.4 
Latvia –17.7 –0.9 5.5 5.6 
Lithuania –14.8 1.5 5.9 3.7 
Luxembourg –4.1 2.9 1.7 0.3 
Hungary –6.8 1.3 1.6 1.7 
Malta –2.8 3.2 1.8 1.0 
Netherlands –3.7 1.6 1.0 –1.0 
Austria –2.1 2.1 2.7 0.8 
Poland 1.6 3.9 4.5 1.9 
Portugal –2.9 1.9 –1.6 –3.2 
Romania –6.6 –1.1 2.2 0.7 
Slovenia –7.8 1.2 0.6 –2.3 
Slovakia –4.9 4.4 3.2 2.0 
Finland –8.5 3.3 2.8 –0.2 
Sweden –5.0 6.6 3.7 0.7 
United Kingdom –4.0 1.8 1.0 0.3 
Bulgaria –5.5 0.4 1.8 0.8 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 2. Greek Regional GDP/PPS 2009–2010 
Region 2009 2010 Difference 
Anatoliki Mkedonia, Thraki 70 66 –4 
Kentriki Makedonia 75 68 –7 
Dytiki Makedonia 86 80 –8 
Thessalia 72 65 –7 
Ipeiros 65 61 –4 
Ionia Nisia 85 76 –9 
Dikiti Ellada 66 62 –4 
Sterea Ellada 84 81 –3 
Peloponnisos 76 71 –5 
Attiki 124 115 –9 
Voreio Aigaio 78 70 –8 
Notio Aigaio 118 107 –9 
Kriti 86 80 –6 
Greece  94 87 –7 
 
Table 3. Regions on the“Critical List” for 2011–2012: Spain, Italy, Portugal and the UK 
 2009 2010 2011 
Spain 103 99  
Castilla La Mancia 83 79  
Andalucia 79 75  
(Galicia 92 90)  
Italy 104 103 100 
Basilicata 74 70  
Sardinia 80 78  
Portugal 80 80 77 
Azores 75 75  
United Kingdom 111 111 109 
Lincolnshire 78 78  
Tees Valley and Durham 77 77  
Convergence regions:  >75%; Transition regions   <75->90% 
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What are the Potential Responses to the Current Impasse? 
In the preparation for the initiation of the fifth cycle (2014–2020) of the Cohesion 
Policy there are a number of decisions that need to be taken and transformed into 
policy initiatives. The first is to take into considerations the change that have 
impacted the regional economies since 2008 through either a recalibration of the 
list of regions eligible for the convergence objective or the setting aside of special 
funds for those who have entered into crisis – i.e. fallen below the 75% GDP/p.c. 
barrier as a result of the economic crisis. A step in this direction has already been 
taken through the creation of a third category of regions – ‘those in transition’ – 
whose GDP/p.c. falls between 75% and 90% of the EU average. The Cohesion Policy 
budget has already provided for financial support up to 75% of their 2007–2013 
budget. In addition, extra funds should be provided for those regions where the 
GDP/p.c. falls below the 75% barrier in the three years prior to the initiation of the 
2014–2020 Cohesion Policy. 
A second need was identified clearly by the President of the Commission, Jose 
Manuel Baroso, in his speech to the European Parliament on the 12th of June 2013. 
On that occasion Baroso spoke of the difficulties incurred by investors in the 
peripheral countries as a result of the differentiated interest rates being applied to 
loans in the peripheral vis-à-vis the core countries. Baroso stated that: “These 
spreads seem to relate less to the intrinsic credit quality of the borrower and more 
to their geographic location! This is an absurd situation in an economic and mone-
tary union. SMEs are particularly affected by these constraints in the credit supply.” 
Provisions need to be taken to lower the interest rates incurred by investors in 
the peripheral economies. Otherwise, the Cohesion Policy will not be in a position to 
leverage private initiatives in support of the development goals identified by the 
operational programmes, thereby blocking the generation of a multiplier effect that 
in the past has expanded the impact of public programmes and investments. Steps 
in this direction have been proposed through programmes supported by the Euro-
pean Investment Bank through the creation of instruments for the sharing of private 
equity, risk-sharing, targeted investments, and the supply of credit by the EIB to 
SMEs undertaking investments as part of the Cohesion Policy. 
A third provision that is under discussion is the ‘front-loading’ of the Cohesion 
Policy expenditures – in other words, taking special provisions to spend a larger 
proportion of the budget during the first three years – rather than gradually building 
up expenditures over the seven years as has been the case previously. The result 
was that the largest expenditures took place at the end of the Policy cycle. This 
change in orientation would provide a kick-start to the policy process and be in a 
position to mobilize an important part of the available resources at the beginning of 
the policy cycle rather than at the end. Accordingly, the implementation of the 
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Cohesion Policy could be in a position to accelerate the economic upturn that is 
expected in the post-2013 period. 
A final point of concern is to provide a response to the deepening employment 
problem that has generally affected working people in the EU but especially youth 
unemployment (Table 4).  
Table 4. Unemployment rate for youth under 25 years of age, 2007–2012 
GEO/TIME 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 
Austria 8,7 8,3 8,8 10,0 8,0 8,7 
Belgium 19,8 18,7 22,4 21,9 18,0 18,8 
Bulgaria 28,1 25,0 21,8 15,1 11,9 14,1 
Cyprus 27,8 22,4 16,6 13,8 9,0 10,2 
Czech Republic 19,5 18,1 18,3 16,6 9,9 10,7 
Germany (until 1990 former 
territory of the FRG) 
8,1 8,6 9,9 11,2 10,6 11,9 
Denmark 14,1 14,2 14,0 11,8 8,0 7,5 
Estonia 20,9 22,3 32,9 27,5 12,1 10,1 
Greece 55,3 44,4 32,9 25,8 22,1 22,9 
Spain 53,2 46,4 41,6 37,8 24,6 18,2 
European Union (27 countries) 22,8 21,4 21,1 20,1 15,8 15,7 
Finland 19,0 20,1 21,4 21,5 16,5 16,5 
France 24,3 22,8 23,6 24,0 19,3 19,8 
Croatia 43,0 36,1 32,6 25,1 21,9 24,0 
Hungary 28,1 26,1 26,6 26,5 19,9 18,1 
Ireland 30,4 29,1 27,6 24,0 13,3 9,1 
Italy 35,3 29,1 27,8 25,4 21,3 20,3 
Lithuania 26,4 32,2 35,3 29,0 12,2 6,8 
Luxembourg 18,1 16,4 15,8 16,5 17,3 15,6 
Latvia 28,4 31,0 37,2 36,2 14,5 11,9 
Malta 14,2 13,8 13,1 14,4 12,2 13,9 
Netherlands 9,5 7,6 8,7 7,7 6,3 7,0 
Poland 26,5 25,8 23,7 20,6 17,2 21,6 
Portugal 37,7 30,1 27,7 24,8 20,2 20,4 
Romania 22,7 23,7 22,1 20,8 18,6 20,1 
Sweden 23,7 22,8 24,8 25,0 20,2 19,2 
Slovenia 20,6 15,7 14,7 13,6 10,4 10,1 
Slovakia 34,0 33,5 33,9 27,6 19,3 20,6 
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The data on the general fall in employment rates across the EU is of great concern 
across the EU but especially in many of the peripheral economies. However, what is 
most alarming is the rise in the level of youth unemployment described in Table 4. 
Here, the situation has become extremely critical for those attempting to enter the 
job market for the first time. Therefore, there is an urgent need to use the Cohesion 
Policy to create new jobs and to fund programmes designed to create job incentives 
for young people. This has been identified as one of the main objectives of the 
programmes supported by the European Social Fund. 
The four points listed above can provide the European Union with the ability to 
respond to the interaction between the future Cohesion Policy and the current 
economic crisis. The Cohesion Policy is one of the few policies available at the 
European level with the opportunity to pro-actively respond to the problems that 
have currently impacted on a number of European economies, but to do so it has to 
coordinate its efforts with national initiatives and with the opportunities that 
emerge from the flow of productive factors in the private market. Now is the time to 
create the strong link between the Cohesion Policy and the prospects for growth in 
the peripheral countries under stress and the European Union as a whole. 
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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE COURSE OF 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF GERMAN 




This contribution focuses on East Germany’s development path after unification. 
The motivation for this topic stems from the fact that East Germany’s catching up in 
terms of productivity which was rapid in the first half of the 1990s, slowed down in 
the second half and stagnated in the 2000s (Figure 1). The question comes up what 
is behind this slow down of convergence? Therefore, the first part of this contribu-
tion discusses main driving forces of regional convergence or divergence from the 
viewpoint of economic theory and existing empirical analysis.  
Then, the second part will provide empirical evidence how East Germany and its 
sub-regions are endowed with factors which can be regarded as important for 
catching up economically. Finally, the third part briefly discusses some policy con-
clusions derived from the economic development achieved so far. 
Main Driving Forces of Regional Convergence or Divergence from the 
Viewpoint of Economic Theory and Empirical Analysis 
East Germany’s rapid convergence in terms of productivity in the first half of the 
1990s was in line with neoclassical growth and trade theories. The disappearance 
of the inner German border represented a case of economic integration and induced 
mobility of persons, goods, services and capital de facto ‘over night’. The increased 
mobility in mind, the respective theories predict convergence. However, as shown 
above, the speed of convergence slowed down which became subject to numerous 
contributions of economists worldwide. In Germany, Sinn and Westermann (2000) 
published a paper which provides an analogy between East Germany and the 
Mezzogiorno region in Italy. They point to three shortcomings as explanations of a 
                                                                        
1 Presentation at the International Conference “Territorial Cohesion in Europe” for the 70th Anni-
versary of the Transdanubian Research Institute, 27–28. June 2013, Pécs/Hungary. 
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Figure 1. Relative productivity in East Germany (West Germany, Berlin excluded = 100%) 
Productivity = Gross Domestic Product per employee, unadjusted prices 
Source: Regional Accounts VGRdL 2013, calculations and diagram by IWH. 
 
persistent development gap: an infrastructural gap, an exorbitant increase in wages 
and a ‘Dutch Disease’ problem induced by massive consumption-oriented fiscal 
transfers for active labor market policy (ibid.: 12–22). The shortcomings mentioned 
might have had an explanatory power in the 1990s, later they have lost of im-
portance. Nevertheless, the productivity gap is still persistent. This leads to the 
question whether there are other factors which provide additional explanations for 
East Germany’s persisting productivity gap?  
Indeed, recent regional economic theories do not necessarily predict conver-
gence. Instead, divergence is possible, too. Due to new growth theories, divergence 
may evolve because regions possess different potentials to explore economies of 
scale and associated with this, they do not benefit equally from positive externalities 
(for an overview see Bröcker 1994: 29–50). The thoughts of the New Economic 
Geography go into the same direction and explain the distribution of places of pro-
duction across space. If the balance between agglomeration forces and transporta-
tion costs undergoes changes, the distribution of economic activities will change 
either in the favor of economic centers and at the expense of the periphery, or vice 
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East Germany’s Endowment with main Factors of Economic Development 
To come back to East Germany’s economy: The most obvious shortcoming of the 
centrally planned economy at the end of the 1980s was the obsolete capital stock, 
both in the enterprise sector and in infrastructure (Deutscher Bundestag 1998: 67). 
After German unification, great efforts were made to modernize fixed assets. On 
average, endowment with fixed assets reached more than four fifth of the West Ger-
man value (Table 1). In the producing sectors, the capital stock exceeds the West 
German average. The opposite is the case in agriculture, forestry and fishery and in 
the service sector. 
Regarding human capital, the proportion of workforce possessing a higher for-
mal professional education was and is still higher than in West Germany (Table 1). 
This does not necessarily mean that all persons with tertiary education are actually 
employed in a way using this formal education. Regardless persistently higher pro-
portions of employees with tertiary education in East Germany, the rates of change 
were less favorable in the Eastern part of the country in the 1999–2011 period 
(Table 1). 
The number of employees with tertiary education increased by 11% in East Ger-
many compared to 38% in the western part. Obviously the demand for higher skills 
shows more dynamism in West Germany because of differences in terms of firm size, 
industry structures and functional structures. 
Indeed, small firm size seems to be a ‘Gordian Knot’ when it comes to an expla-
nation why East Germany lags behind in terms of productivity. The average firm size 
is, measured by turnover per unit liable to turnover tax, only half of the West Ger-
man average (calculations by IWH based on Federal Statistical Office 2013c). The 
lower firm size is a result of restructuring the enterprise landscape after German 
unification. The previously centrally planned large industrial trusts (German notion: 
‘Kombinate’) were not competitive after introducing the German monetary union. 
Hence, the large entities were split up in the course of privatization. In addition, 
numerous new firms were established which were per se very small at the begin-
ning. As a result, a firm landscape has evolved that mainly consists of small and 
medium-sized units. Contrary, there is a lack of large enterprises. The fragmented 
small scale firm landscape has far reaching consequences: the small firm size creates 
barriers for entering into international markets. To illustrate, the ranking of export 
shares in manufacturing enterprises by German federal states is in parallel with the 
average firm size (Figure 2).  
But it is not the low proportion of large enterprises as such which forms a barrier 
for further economic progress in East Germany. The virtual shortcoming is the lack 
of large enterprises hosting own research and development (R&D) and other head-
quarters functions. Taking Germany’s Top-500 companies (ranking 2011 by DIE 
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WELT), only 30 out of 500 headquarters are located in East Germany (DIE WELT, no 
date of publication, calculations by IWH). This has consequences for the regional 
capability to create value added, offer high income jobs, gain respective tax revenues 
and control the regional development autonomously instead of being controlled by 
external economic actors.  
 
Table 1. East Germany’s1 relative economic performance 
A) % (West Germany2 = 100%); B) difference between East Germany and West Germany in 
percentage points3 
Indicator Unit Period 1 Value 
Period 1 
Period 2 Value 
period 2 




total A) 1991 44.9 2009 85.2 
agriculture/forestry/fishery 36.7 89.7 
producing sectors 58.7 119.0 
service sectors 43.3 79.1 
Share of employees with tertiary educa-
tion in total employment (LFS-data) 
B) 1999 8.9 2011 5.4 
Change of number of employees with 
tertiary education (LFS-data) 
B) Not applicable 1999– 
2011 
–27.3 
Share of private sector in R&D 
expenditures 
B)   2010 –32.8 
Patent applications per 100,000 
inhabitants 









rural hinterland   78.4  92.7 
rural regions 75.1 83.4 
Key: 1 – East Germany including Berlin; 2 – West Germany, Berlin excluded; 3 – Negative 
value: East Germany < West Germany. 
Sources: Regional Accounts VGRdL 2011a, b, 2013; European Commission > eurostat 2013; 
Federal Statistical Office 2013b; German Patent and Trade Mark Office 2012; Federal 
Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR) (no 
date of publication); calculations by IWH. 
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Figure 2. Proportion of export sales in total turnover and average number of employees per 
enterprise in the manufacturing, mining and quarrying sectors by German federal 
states, 2012 
Source: Federal Statistical Office 2013d, calculations and diagram by IWH. 
The lack of headquarters goes along with a lower R&D intensity in East Germany, 
measured by the share of R&D expenditures in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Figure 3). There are only two Federal states in East Germany where this share is 
above national average: Berlin and Saxony. Berlin’s position is not surprising, due to 
a high concentration of public research institutes in the German capital region. 
Saxony’s high rank stems from relative strengths in the manufacturing sector and 
well developed public research facilities. 
Regardless positive exceptions, the – on average existing – weakness in terms of 
R&D in East Germany especially in the enterprise sector stems from structural pe-
culiarities: the dominance of small firms, the lack of large companies which host 
headquarters functions, and the lower proportion of the manufacturing sector in 
East Germany and in particular the lower proportion of technology-oriented indus-








































































Proportion of exports in total turnover (%) Employees per enterprise
38 Gerhard Heimpold 
 
Figure 3: Share of R&D expenditures in GDP by German federal states, 2010 
Sources: Federal Statistical Office 2013a; based on data from Stifterverband, Wissenschafts-
statistik, Essen, Regional Accounts VGRdL; calculations and diagram by IWH. 
Moreover, the regional innovation system in East Germany is characterized by a 
large proportion of public institutions, i.e. universities and non-university research 
institutes, in R&D expenditure. Whereas in the economically more advanced West 
German federal states more than 50% of R&D is financed by enterprises, the reverse 
is the case in East Germany, but not only there. This is a feature of structurally weak 
West German federal states, too (Figure 3). The relative strength of the public sector 
and universities in R&D can, however, only partly compensate for weak R&D activi-
ties in the enterprise sector. Taking patent applications per 100,000 inhabitants as 
an indicator representing innovation throughput, East Germany has remained per-
sistently far below the West German average (Table 1).  



















Public Sector Universites Enterprises
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Discussing East Germany’s convergence path has to consider the spatial dimen-
sion, too. Over a long period, the convergence debate in Germany was heavily fo-
cused on the global East West comparison. This global comparison was appropriate 
in a situation of large differences in economic performance. But East Germany was 
and is not a homogeneous space. Some regions have shown greater progress, other 
have lagged behind since unification. Thus, comparing spatial entities which show 
similar structural characteristics might be more adequate. Comparing core cities, 
densely populated hinterland, rural hinterland and rural regions in East Germany 
with their West German counterparts in terms of productivity, the the East West gap 
is greater between core cities than between rural regions (Table 1). Especially the 
rural hinterland has undergone considerable progress in terms of productivity. This 
is due to a massive suburbanization of economic activities since 1990. Numerous 
cities were not capable to provide industrial sites being free of environmental pol-
lution and free of unclear property rights in the early 1990s. Therefore, numerous 
firm decided to locate outside cities.  
Policy Experiences and Future Challenges 
The progress made especially in terms of productivity, modernization of fixed assets 
in enterprises and infrastructure, establishing an SME sector, and strong public R&D 
would not have been achieved without public support by European Union, federal 
and federal states’ budgets. Support was strongly concentrated on the moderniza-
tion of fixed assets both in enterprises and in infrastructure over the first ten years. 
Special attention was directed to SME. However, the awareness has arisen in the 
course of time that there is no mono-causality of East Germany’s economic back-
wardness. Instead, a broad bundle of factors hampered and is still hampering eco-
nomic development. As a consequence, policy introduced a wide range of support 
schemes to tackle the great variety of regional needs. Nevertheless, a number of 
shortcomings remain persistent and form important challenges for future economic 
policy (for the following, see IWH et al. 2011: 86–101): 
First, the small firm size which represents obviously a Gordian Knot of economic 
development requires further firm growth and a business friendly environment. This 
does not only refer to traditional financial support schemes for SME. It goes beyond 
and includes, for instance, a tax law which is neutral in terms of legal form and firm 
size. 
Second, the lack of headquarters cannot be abolished directly. Headquarters 
change their location very seldom, due to sunk costs and existing networks. There-
fore, it seems more realistic to help prospering medium sized-firms further to grow 
and become “new” headquarters.  
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Third, strengthening private R&D requires, first, to ensure that the science sys-
tems will be flexible enough to develop new promising technologies. Second, 
strengthening private R&D activities means mitigating the structural shortcomings 
that induce the low R&D intensity. Because the latter takes time and patience, policy 
can, third, provide direct assistance for R&D projects whereby collaborative projects 
of public research entities and enterprises and support for industrial clusters seem 
to be of particular relevance, due to the relative strength of the public research sec-
tor.  
Fourth, enhancing economic development in cities remains an important chal-
lenge which does not only require favorable conditions for the development in the 
cities themselves. In addition, the stakeholders of economic development should try 
to organize a fruitful inter-municipal cooperation with the surrounding territories 
to attract investors and share the economic benefits from successful investments. 
Fifth, availability of skilled labor force will form a crucial challenge for future eco-
nomic development, due to demographic changes. It requires a broad bundle of 
efforts which comprises, for instance, family-friendly working and living conditions, 
attractive conditions for in-migration of skilled labor force, integrating long-term 
unemployed into the labor market and ensuring life-long learning.  
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SPATIAL STRUCTURE AND SPILLOVER EFFECTS 
Gábor Balás – Klára Major 
Introduction 
Spatial structure is usually considered as exogenous in spatial analysis and is quan-
tified by a contiguity matrix. Therefore, conclusion from a spatial analysis is always 
contingent and its validity is constrained by the relation between the relevant spa-
tial structure and the one quantified by the contiguity matrix. When creating a con-
tiguity matrix, researchers have to make important decisions, most of which are 
often made on a practical ground. 
A contiguity matrix gives a discrete description of the otherwise continuous 
space, therefore the first step is to define the spatial units. The existing solutions 
very often choose administrative spatial classifications, as data are usually collected 
for these units only. The next step is to identify the units considered to be influencing 
each other, that is, where to presume the existence of spatial spillover effects. This 
idea is expressively mirrored in the phrase of “contiguity matrix”, since it is usually 
presumed that spatial spillover effects only exist between geographically close units. 
The third decision refers to the presumption about the intensity of the spillover 
effects between two units that are in connection with each other. The standard 
solution is to identify the existence of the connection, and the intensity of the effect 
is finally reached in the standardising step of the contiguity matrix in which 1 (ex-
pressing the fact of the connection) is divided by the number of neighbours. Thus 
researchers usually assume a priori that a unit having more neighbours influences 
them less. 
These implicit assumptions strongly influence the conclusion and limit the inter-
pretation. In his paper Rincke (2010) addresses a similar question. As he notes, the 
choice of a spatial matrix is crucial in many empirical applications involving cross 
sectional dependence. However, the literature offers little guidance on how to 
choose an appropriate matrix. Rincke suggests the application of a commuting-
based refinement of the contiguity matrix. His concept rests on the idea to assign 
weights according to the degree of substitutability of communities as places of resi-
dence.  
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The motivation of our writing this paper was to find the way of building the right 
contiguity matrix. We address the first and third aspects of building a contiguity ma-
trix: by varying the presumed spatial spillover effects and their intensity, we embed 
a different (discretised) spatial structure in our spatial econometric model. It is hard 
to distinguish the effects of the first and the third aspects since the standardisation 
step of the matrix automatically changes the intensities for every different pre-
sumed spatial structure. Even though in our application the different discretisation 
schemes lead to only minor differences in the estimation results, we think that the 
issue we posed so far is of high importance and needs to be answered more deeply 
in later research. We need to understand the role of the presumed spatial structure 
(or more generally, the choice of the contiguity matrix) to be able to interpret the 
results with more confidence.  
In our application we shall build a spatial econometric model to estimate the 
effects of EU funds on territorial cohesion in Hungary. The data of the Hungarian 
micro-regions (NUTS 4) will be analysed. The reason for choosing micro-regions as 
the level of measurement is that the number of micro-regions (174) is large enough 
for a statistical investigation, they may be considered as more-or-less homogenous 
(in comparison with counties, for example) and data collected by settlements can 
easily be aggregated at this level.  
The EU-funded subsidies influence micro-regions through three different chan-
nels. First, there is a direct local effect: EU-funded payments in any form increase 
local income directly. Secondly, the total amount of the support is limited, therefore 
any support that is paid in region i will decrease the potential support available for 
region j. We may observe a regional crowding out effect: the exogenous spatial pat-
tern of subsidy distribution itself may lead to spatial spillover effects. Finally, if these 
subsidies do influence the incomes of the regions where they are paid, they may lead 
to an endogenous spatial spillover effect through their impact on the spatial pattern 
of the income distribution: the higher income in region i may generate extra demand 
for products of neighbouring regions, thus leading to higher income in those regions. 
In our application we shall study the presence and size of the endogenous and 
exogenous spatial spillover effects and their relationship with the presumed spatial 
structure. 
The spatial structure of the Hungarian economy is very special. The Central 
Region surpasses all other regions in Hungary: its population, income and basically 
all relevant aspects are outstandingly higher than the maximum or average of those 
of the other regions. While the Central Region’s income is close to 75% of the EU 
average and is close to loosing its eligibility for cohesion funds, the other regions are 
far below this level. Therefore, the question relating to the spatial structure in 
Hungary basically is how to incorporate the specialities of the Central Region into 
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our estimation strategy. In the standard approach the contiguity matrix is symmet-
ric: if region i and region j are neighbouring, their impact on each other is more-or-
less the same. However, the spatial structure of the Hungarian economy differs from 
this due to the big differences in development. Therefore, we apply an asymmetric 
contiguity matrix and compare its results to those of the symmetric one. 
In the first section of the study we are introducing the applied Durbin spatial 
econometric model in general and the questions of model-specification. Here we 
shall introduce the symmetric contiguity matrix and our data for quantifying it. Then 
we shall turn to our spatial econometric model applied to describe the income of the 
Hungarian micro-regions (so-called “TGE” model),1 the data background and the 
questions of impact measurement. In this section it will also be shown how to embed 
the special features of the Hungarian spatial structure into the contiguity matrix. In 
the section following that we are going to show the estimation results and interpret 
them. Finally we shall draw our conclusions. 
The Spatial Econometric Model 
In econometrics models are usually designed to look for relationships between 
cross-section, time series or panel data. In the spatial context the speciality comes 
from the fact that spatial units (a special case of cross-section structure) are related 
to each other and spatial econometric models are designed for controlling this 
relationship. The usual way is to include spatial lag variables. First we introduce the 
concept of spatial lag and then summarise the spatial econometric models we use in 
our application. In our summary we heavily rely upon LeSage – Pace (2009) and 
Elhorst (2010a, 2010b). 
Measuring Spatial Effects 
Spatial effects are measured by spatial lag variables. Spatial lag is an analogue of 
time lag with some differences. While in the case of time lag we control for the effects 
of two observations being close to each other in time, in the case of spatial lag we do 
the same for being close in space. However, time is “one dimensional” in the sense 
that data are easily ordered by time, “before” and “after” are identified without any 
problem. But space is “two dimensional”, and ordering data according to its spatial 
location is not a trivial task. In this case the question therefore is whether being close 
to each other is enough to assume that there is some linkage due to space. The usual 
way to quantify this idea is by constructing a contiguity matrix. 
                                                                        
1 „TGE” is an abbreviation of Territorial Economic Power („Területi Gazdasági Erő” in Hun-
garian), which is a proxy for GDP. We use this data for measuring income of NUTS4 regions 
where GDP data are not available. 
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Let us denote the number of spatial units with N, the contiguity matrix W is then 
an NxN matrix in which cell (i,j) is 0 if region i and region j are not in connection with 
each other (we will call it “not neighbouring”), otherwise it takes some positive 
value. There are different ways to construct a contiguity matrix, we are introducing 
some of them here briefly. 
The W contiguity matrix is usually designed for controlling geographical close-
ness, therefore traditionally its cell (i,j) takes the value of 1 if region i and region j 
are neighbouring, and 0 otherwise. Another way to define “closeness” is to give cell 
(i,j) a value of 1 if the distance between region i and region j is less than a given 
threshold, and 0 otherwise. Let us note that the contiguity matrix is symmetric in 
each case: the value of cell (i,j) is precisely the same as the value of cell (j,i).  
In our application the spatial units of investigation are the micro-regions of Hun-
gary. The distance between any two regions is measured by the time needed to 
travel by car from the centre of region i to the centre of region j. It is assumed that 
there are no traffic jams or speeding, so the time needed for covering a certain dis-
tance is calculated using the maximum allowed speed limit. By definition two re-
gions are neighbouring if the distance between them is less than an ex ante defined 
threshold. In line with our earlier work we chose this threshold to be 60 minutes.  
Based on this threshold value we defined a W1 matrix, its cell (i,j) takes the value 
of 1 if region i and region j are neighbouring, and 0 otherwise. To calculate spatial 
lag variables we still need to “standardise” this matrix, which is reached by dividing 
each element with the sum of its row. In this way we create a row-normalised W 
contiguity matrix with the sum of each row equalling 1. Therefore, the elements of 
this W matrix may be considered as weights when spatial lags are calculated. Let us 
note that there are only nonzero elements in matrix W in cell (i,j) if region i and re-
gion j are “neighbouring”, that is, where distance is smaller than our pre-specified 
threshold. The elements of the main diagonal are zero. 
Spatial spillover effects are measured by the spatial lag variables calculated by 
the multiplication of the standardised contiguity matrix by the given variable: Wx. 
In this way the spatial lag of x is simply the average of x in the neighbourhood of the 
regions. The spatial structure embedded in the matrix W therefore influences which 
regions are taken into consideration when mutual dependences are examined. 
Spatial Spillover Effects in Spatial Econometric Models 
Spatial spillover effects in spatial econometric models are measured by the spatial 
lag variables which we often name as spatial interaction variables. There are three 
different ways to include spatial spillover effects in our empirical modelling strat-
egy. Spatial spillover effects can be: 
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 endogenous spatial interaction, if the spatial lag of the dependent variable (y) 
is included; 
 exogenous spatial interaction, if the spatial lag of the independent variable (x) 
is included; 
 spatial lag of the error term.  
As is shown by Elhorst (2010a), it is not possible to include all of these spillover 
effects in the same model because it is not possible to identify the coefficients of all 
variables. At least one must be excluded which may be up to the decision of the 
modeller. However, the most often applied version is the Durbin model in which 
both endogenous and exogenous spatial interactions appear. 
In case we have panel dataset, it is still possible to include fixed effects variables 
which are themselves ready to control for spatial or time fixed factors. In our model 
we use the panel version of the Durbin model: not only spatial interaction, but also 
fixed effects are included in a simple regression equation. By including spatial 
interaction and fixed effects in the same model, we have the following model 
equation that we aim to estimate: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜒 + 𝜌∑𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡 +∑𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1










where ρ is the coefficient of the spatial lag of the dependent variable (endogenous 
spatial interaction), θk is the coefficient of the K independent variables (exogenous 
spatial interaction),  denotes the spatial,  the time fixed effects and  is a white 
noise error term. 
However, the correctness of the model specification is a difficult question. It is 
not clear a priori that the above model is right. It is usually checked by some formal 
test (see next subsection). The basic question in this case is if there are fixed effects 
in an empirical model beyond which we do need spatial interaction variables or not. 
Even if we find that the answer to this question is yes, we still need to figure out 
whether both endogenous and exogenous spatial interactions are relevant. We 
briefly show these model specification tests in the next subsection. 
Model Specification 
Fixed effects control for those observed and unobserved factors that are constant in 
time. Including fixed effects, we are able to filter out much of the variability of the 
dependent variable. It is not clear a priori that after controlling for fixed effects, we 
still need to include spatial lag variables. If neighbouring regions are similar, fixed 
effects of neighbouring regions are similar, too, therefore, fixed effects are just as 
able to control for the spatial structure (spatial closeness) as spatial interaction 
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variables are. However, it might happen that time-invariant features of regions can-
not capture all effects that space influences on them. It might be the case when non-
observable, time-invariant features of two neighbouring regions are very different 
and spatial spillover effects lead to the similarity of the dependent variable. In these 
cases fixed effects cannot capture the influence of closeness, therefore, spatial 
interaction variables are relevant. Since it is not clear a priori if we need to embed 
both in the analysis, we are going to check it by formal tests. 
Formal tests of model specification form a two-step procedure (see Elhorst 
2010a and 2010b). In the first step we test if the spatial interaction variables are 
needed after including spatial and (or) time fixed effects. If the test accepts the rele-
vance of the spatial interaction, then the second step focuses on choosing the rele-
vant model specification: which spatial interaction variable to include (endogenous 
spatial interaction or both). Following Elhorst’s (2010a and 2010b) practice, we ap-
plied this two-step model specification procedure to test the relevance of our model 
specification. The results proved to be very robust towards the acceptance of the 
above-specified fixed effects Durbin model, therefore, in the following we will show 
the estimation results of this specification only. These tests and the model estima-
tion were both carried out using Elhorst’s (2010b) software for MATLAB. 
Spatial Econometric Model of TGE  
Our model aims to estimate the spatial spillover effects of EU funded subsidies on 
income. Income is difficult to measure at this very “low” spatial level, since income 
is usually measured by GDP which is not estimated for micro-regions. Therefore, we 
use the so-called TGE (“Settlements Economic Power”) as a proxy for income. TGE 
is calculated from county-level GDP data by disaggregation. The method of 
disaggregation is to calculate shares of each settlement of a given county in GDP, 
based on the distribution of personal income tax base, number of registered firms 
and the volume of local taxes. The detailed description of the method for calculating 
TGE can be found in Csite – Németh (2007).  
As TGE measures the income of micro-regions, we estimate its value by 
controlling for factors of production, namely, the share of labour force in the 
population of the micro-regions, equities of the firms located in the given micro-
regions and the average level of salaries (per head) which measures the level of 
human capital of the labour force in the given micro-regions. The dependent 
variable, TGE, measures income and is expressed in terms of Hungarian currency 
(million HUF per population). The explanatory variables in more detail are: 
 Share of labour force (%): the higher the share of the labour force in the total 
population of a micro-region, the higher the TGE. This leads to exogenous 
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spatial spillover effects, too: even if the share of labour force is higher in the 
neighbouring regions, this might lead to higher local income due to easier 
access to productive labour. 
 Average level of salaries (million HUF per head per year). The average salary 
is calculated from personal income tax data of persons employed full time . We 
assume that the higher the average salary, the higher the local income. We also 
assume that the average level of salary is a proxy for the average level of 
human capital of the given micro-region, therefore, it measures the dif-
ferences in TGE of two micro-regions with the same amount of labour force. 
 Average level of equities (billion HUF / firms): the more capital firms have on 
average, the higher will be the income of the given micro-regions. We will call 
this variable as “capital” in the following. 
 Number of registered firms as expressed in the ratio of local population (%). 
We assume that the higher the number of firms, the higher the income of the 
micro-regions will be.  
 Subsidies paid by the government from EU sources. This is also normalised 
with the population size, and is expressed in Hungarian currency (million HUF 
per population). We will describe this variable in more detail in the next 
section.  
 Finally, we aim to model the effect of spatial structure on the estimation 
results. Therefore, we estimate the above model in two different specification 
forms, one following the standard approach (as is shown in the previous 
section) in building up the (symmetric) contiguity matrix, and an alternative 
method aiming to express the asymmetries of the spatial structure of the 
Hungarian economy. We describe this approach in more detail below. 
Cohesion Funds 
Disbursement of cohesion funds initiated after 2004 and their volume increased 
extraordinarily by 2010. The increase reached the order of 2, but not steadily over 
time or in space. Therefore, we embedded in our model of local income the amount 
of support that had been paid in the given year in terms of per head support (million 
HUF per population). We aim to identify the effect of these payments on local income 
as is done in programme evaluation practice. As it can be seen In Table 1, after 2004 
there were no micro-regions without any support, therefore, whether a micro-
region had been supported or not is not appropriate to identify the effects of the 
funds. Three assumptions are necessarily for us to be able to interpret our 
estimation results as effects. Namely, we assume that 
1. it is possible to separate the effects of governmental support on local income 
from the differences in support intensity, 
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2. the above-defined contiguity matrix is an adequate description of the spatial 
structure, 
3. data are appropriate for econometric analysis, that is, there is not too much 
noise and there are not many data errors. 
Table 1.  Average financial support in micro-regions per population 
Year Supported micro-regions, 
average 
Not supported micro-regions, 
average 
Units TGE per head 
(HUF/head) 
Support per head 
(HUF/head) 
Units TGE per head 
(HUF/head) 
2004  157 2,061,436 5,661.304 17 1,027,735 
2005  174 2,186,299 18,510.072 0 NaN 
2006  174 2,360,679 29,015.562 0 NaN 
2007  174 2,533,807 51,586.331 0 NaN 
2008  174 2,665,419 68,915.431 0 NaN 
2009  174 2,599,748 104,458.189 0 NaN 
2010  174 2,674,760 125,775.739 0 NaN 
Total/average 1201 2,441,696 57,852.738 17 1,027,735 
The Central Region  
The speciality of the Central Hungary (NUTS2) Region comes from two different 
sources. On one hand, it is much more developed than the other parts of the country, 
on average its income is almost double of that of the rest 6 regions. Nonetheless, 
until 2007 it attracted more cohesion support than the other regions.2 On the other 
hand, this region is rather heterogeneous, the standard deviation of TGE per head is 
about half of the average value, whereas it is one third in the case of the per head 
support for 2010. This basically means that the diversity of TGE per head is higher 
within the region than that of the financial support.  
For the rest of the country the picture is just the opposite in both respects. The 
remaining six NUTS2 regions are less heterogeneous as measured by the coefficient 
of variation: the standard deviation is approximately one third of the average TGE. 
On the contrary, the support is much more heterogeneous: at the beginning it is 
about 100% and later its value is declining. Yet, in 2010 it is about 50%, higher than 
in the case of the Central Hungary Region (see Table 2). This basically means that in 
these regions the variation in the support is still higher than the variation of the TGE. 
                                                                        
2 We define the location of financial support by the official location of the firm that has won 
the support. Unfortunately, many companies have their official site in the Central Region, 
while their actual activities are carried out elsewhere (sometimes at different locations). 
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Table 2. Average and standard deviation of TGE per head and financial support per head 
in Central Hungary’s micro-regions versus in the rest of the country 
Year Micro-regions in the Central Hungary Region 
(17 units) 
Micro-regions outside the Central Region 
(157 units) 
TGE  
(million HUF per head) 
Financial support 
(000 HUF per head) 
TGE  
(million HUF per head) 
Financial support 









2004  3.2098 1.25 7.1688 4.80 1.5579 0.60 4.7679 9.53 
2005  3.5682 1.43 21.8497 13.85 1.6428 0.65 17.1961 14.85 
2006  3.9113 1.66 32.4041 15.73 1.7446 0.68 27.6690 28.55 
2007  4.1623 1.72 59.4238 33.27 1.8786 0.71 48.4331 29.10 
2008  4.4238 1.86 66.6778 33.72 1.9470 0.65 69.8296 32.55 
2009  4.3952 1.95 86.8022 35.74 1.8549 0.61 111.7824 65.21 
2010  4.4794 2.04 96.8477 36.12 1.9155 0.62 137.9464 74.32 
Average and standard deviations have been weighted with population.  
The Central Region’s advanced state suggests that the return on any projects 
(investment, training, etc.) might be different from that of the other regions. 
Therefore, governmental financial support in this region might have a rate of return 
different from elsewhere. We control for this fact using interaction variables. In the 
following, the so-called “subsidy_KMR” variable will measure it. This variable is the 
interaction of a Central Region dummy and the support variable, therefore, it 
measures the extra return the support yields in the Central Region in comparison 
with the other regions. However, as we will see, it is also possible to include the 
spatial lag of the interaction variable in the regression. In case it is significant, we 
may interpret it that the support has different returns not only in the Central Region, 
but also in the neighbouring regions. This is the case of the above-mentioned 
exogenous spillover effect. 
Spatial structure is embedded in the contiguity matrix. As we take into account 
the role of this matrix in our estimation, we build another contiguity matrix based 
on asymmetric relations. If it is plausible to assume that the effects of two regions 
influencing each other are not symmetric, then this matrix is able to capture it. 
Basically what we assume is that the spatial spillover effects are directed relations, 
therefore, the effect of region i on region j is not necessarily the same as the effect of 
region j on region i.3 In the case of a symmetric matrix, if region i and region j were 
identified as neighbouring, then both had an impact on the other. The relevant 
                                                                        
3 We have to mention that literally this is also the case with the “symmetric” matrix (in 
general), since due to normalisation, no one can guarantee that the quantitative effect of 
region i on region j is the same as that of region j on region i.  
Spatial Structure and Spillover Effects  51 
difference between the two approaches comes when we assume that region i has an 
impact on region j, but region j has no impact on region i. In our application the 
outstanding Central Region might have much wider influence on the other regions 
than vice versa. We wish to capture this by using a different, asymmetric contiguity 
matrix built on the following procedure. 
We use the same starting point: region i has an influence on region j if their 
distance is smaller than a pre-specified threshold. But now the threshold depends 
upon the features of region i and therefore it is different for each micro-region. To 
be more concrete, let us say that region i has an impact on region j if their distance 
is smaller than bNia , where Ni denotes the population of micro-region i, and a, b are 
positive parameters. This means that region j has an impact on region i only if their 
distance is smaller than bNja, which, in general, means a different threshold from 
that of region i. Basically this concept is close to the idea of the gravity model which 
emphasises that the impact of any region is proportional to its size. Let us note that 
if a=0 then we have the original idea, since in this case the threshold is the same for 
all micro-regions. If a=1 then the threshold increases proportionally with the 
population of the regions, if a<1 then it is less than proportional, etc. 
Definitely, the parameter values have a large impact on the structure of the 
contiguity matrix and on the estimation results. Therefore, we had to choose their 
values with great care. Without having any formal test, based on the following 
reasoning we applied numerical methods to choose the parameter values. The 
values of the parameters definitely have a strong impact on the spatial structure of 
the economy (who is neighbouring with whom) and also on the number of the 
neighbouring relationships. These are two different channels the impacts of which 
are hard to distinguish. Therefore, it is reasonable to choose the values of a,b to have 
the same number of neighbouring relationships. In this way our new contiguity 
matrix will differ from the initial one only as to the structure embedded in it, but not 
as to the deepness of the relations. 
Following this method we found that b=1 and a=0.3773 will lead to 2021 
neighbouring relations in the asymmetric case in contrast to the 2020 neighbouring 
relations of the symmetric case. We used the average population of the micro-
regions between 2000 and 2010 as weights (Ni). With these parameter values the 
new contiguity matrix reflects gives back the original concept rather well, because 
the capital, Budapest (a separate micro-region itself) influences all other micro-
regions, whereas there are only 28 micro-regions influencing Budapest. From all the 
neighbouring relations 701 are asymmetric, from which 249, that is 36% of all 
asymmetric relations, belong to the Central Region. The rest belong to “countryside” 
micro-regions having a town with relatively big population (usually the administra-
tive centre of the region or county), therefore, their impact might be greater than 
that of – smaller settlements and micro-regions (Figure 1).  
52 Gábor Balás – Klára Major 
 
Figure 1. Number of neighbours according to the asymmetric contiguity matrix 
Estimation Results 
Estimation results using symmetric and asymmetric contiguity matrix are shown in 
Table 3. Test statistics of our estimated model are very similar in both cases, the log-
likelihood is slightly better and R2 is slightly worse in the case of symmetric 
contiguity matrix, even though these differences do not seem remarkable. Neither 
significance nor coefficients changed much, but still, there are some minor changes. 
The most important differences are that (1) the coefficient of the labour force 
variable has increased and thus reached significance at 10%, and (2) the coefficients 
of the subsidy differ in the two models, its importance is examined in detail in the 
next section. We estimated both models without the subsidy variables, too, and 
tested the significance of the subsidy variable using likelihood ratio test. In the case 
of the symmetric contiguity matrix, the log-likelihood of the narrower model is 
1275, that is, the likelihood ratio test suggests that the more general model fits 
better. In the case of the asymmetric contiguity matrix, the log-likelihood of the 
narrower model is 1259, so the conclusion is the same. 
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Table 3. Estimation results of the TGE model 
Variable Symmetric contiguity matrix Asymmetric contiguity matrix 
coefficient z-value coefficient z-value 
Labour force 0.0056 0.1742 0.00794* 0.0574 
Number of firms 0.0264*** 0.0000 0.02745*** 0.0000 
Salary 1.6288*** 0.0000 1.76252*** 0.0000 
Equities 0.0444** 0.0206 0.04687** 0.0155 
Labour force_KMR 0.0448*** 0.0000 0.04163*** 0.0002 
Subsidy_2 0.94458*** 0.0000 0.79112*** 0.0001 
Subsidy_2_KMR 11.4438*** 0.0000 11.8213*** 0.0000 
W*labour force 0.0234*** 0.0093 0.01883** 0.0152 
W*number of firms –0.0282*** 0.0000 –0.02899*** 0.0000 
W*salary –0.5987*** 0.0000 –0.50389*** 0.0000 
W*equity 0.1322* 0.0600 0.05959** 0.0940 
W*labour force_KMR –0.0518* 0.0532 0.00459 0.8674 
W*subsidy_2 –0.4456 0.4616 –0.00956 0.9810 
W*subsidy_2_KMR –17.1008*** 0.0000 –17.82839*** 0.0000 
Rho 0.5520*** 0.0000 0.44160*** 0.0000 
r2 0.9621  0.9615  
Corrr2 0.5301  0.5321  
Log–likelihood 1378.62  1370.74  
N 2610  2610  
Periods 1996–2010  1996–2010  
*indicates significance at 0.1 level, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01. 
Based on our estimation results, the Central Region’s interaction variables are 
significant. In the case of the subsidy variable, this proves the initial hypothesis that 
the yield of these supports is different in the Central Region, just as it is different in 
the neighbourhood of the Central Region. It is important to note that only the 2-year 
lagged values of the subsidy proved to be significant, which was not the case with 
the subsidy_X_KMR interaction (X=0,1,2) variables. The interaction variables have 
been constructed by the multiplication of the Central Region dummy and the 
subsidy variable (and its lagged variables), therefore there was very high correlation 
between the lagged values of the interaction variable. This high connection made it 
impossible to identify the exact timing of the interaction effect. Because only one of 
the subsidy_X_KMR interaction variables was reasonable to be included in the 
regression, we chose subsidy_2_KMR which is easier to interpret; basically we have 
no reason to assume that the timing of the Central Region’s specific extra effect is 
different from that of the overall subsidy.  
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Subsidies generally have no exogenous spillover effect: they increase the local 
income where they are paid. However, this is not the case with the subsidies paid in 
the Central Region, it has a strong negative exogenous spillover effect on the 
surrounding area. The estimated effect of this exogenous spillover seems higher in 
the model of the asymmetric contiguity matrix. 
At the same time, by increasing local income, subsidies generate endogenous 
spillover effects. This effect is positive: higher subsidies lead to higher local income 
and higher local income lead to higher (endogenous) spillover, that is, higher income 
in the neighbouring micro-regions. This channel works for every micro-region, 
including those located in the Central Region. But the effect of the subsidies in the 
Central Region increases local income more, therefore, its endogenous spillover 
effect is stronger here than in other micro-regions. Basically this means that the total 
spillover effect of the Central Region is the sum of the (negative) exogenous spillover 
effect and the (positive) endogenous spillover effect. Therefore, using our 
estimation results, we calculated the net effects as well. 
The Central Region’s Specific Effects 
The estimated model made it possible to calculate the effect of the subsidy on the 
income of micro-regions. As it is suggested in Elhorst (2010a), the effect of an 
explanatory variable is not necessarily shown by the estimated coefficients, due to 
the spillover effects. The net effect of an explanatory variable shows us the changes 
in the dependent variables after all spillover effects took place. We can reach it by a 
simple formal rearrangement of the model, and then we can estimate the partial 
derivative of the dependent variable with respect to the explanatory variables. We 
followed this path to calculate the effects of the subsidies.  
The spatial econometric model can be rearranged to show the total effect of the 
explanatory variables, including the spillover effects. We introduce this concept 
with a simpler model in which there is only one explanatory variable (x) and we omit 
the notation of the fixed effects, too. This simplification makes the notation much 
simpler and the transformation more transparent. After these simplifications our 
spatial econometric model can be written in the following way (using matrix 
arithmetic notations): 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜃𝑊𝑥 + 𝜀 
where y denotes the vector of the dependent variable, x denotes the vector of the 
independent variable, W is the contiguity matrix and ρ, β, θ are unknown coeffients, 
finally  denotes white noise error term. By rearranging this equation, we get: 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝑦 = 𝛽𝑥 + 𝜃𝑊𝑥 + 𝜀 = (𝐵 + 𝜃𝑊)𝑥 + 𝜀 
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where I indicates the identity matrix and B indicates a diagonal matrix with β in the 
main diagonal and zero elsewhere. (Basically it is βI.) Therefore, the final 
rearrangement of this equation shows us the total effect of changes in x to y:  
𝑦 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝐵 + 𝜃𝑊)𝑥 + (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝜀 
Let us denote 𝐹 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝐵 + 𝜃𝑊) matrix, its (i,j) element shows us the 
total effect of x in region i to the value of y in region j. The total effect of x on y can be 
calculated by Fx: the financial support of region i has an influence on its own local 
income and through the endogenous spillover effects also on the neighbours’ 
income, which then spreads further into space through the neighbours of the 
neighbours, etc. The final sum after taking into account all the spillovers that spread 
through the economy is shown by Fx. 
Let us be even more concrete in our case and divide the total effect of subsidies 
into exogenous and endogenous spillover effects. As is shown in Table 3, the two-
year delays of subsidies (subsidy_2) and their Central Region specific values 
(subsidy_2_KMR) play a significant role in explaining TGE of micro-regions. First let 
us denote subsidy_2 = x and in order to distinguish the effect of the subsidies paid in 
the Central Region from that of the subsidies paid outside the Central Region, we 
partition the subsidy_2 variable (x) into two parts: 
𝑥 = 𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝑥𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐾𝑀𝑅  
where xKMR is the same, as x for micro-regions belonging to the Central Region and 
zero otherwise, xNONKMR has been created similarly. Using this notation, our final 
model can be written in the following form (including only significant subsidy 
variables): 
𝑦 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦 + 𝛽1𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝜃𝑊𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝜀 
Rearranging this equation, following Elhorst idea, we get that the explained part 
of y with regard to the subsidies may be expressed as 
𝑦 ≈ 𝐻(𝛽1𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝜃𝑊𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅) + 𝐻𝛽1𝑥𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐾𝑀𝑅  (1) 
where H denotes 𝐻 = (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1 matrix and we took into account the fact that x 
may be partitioned into Central Region specific and non-Central Region specific 
parts. We calculated the right hand side of (1) and called it as “total effects”. 
However, from the total effects of the subsidies some are going through the 
endogenous spillover effects, that is, by the spatial autocorrelation of the TGE 
variable, whereas others may be the results of the spatial pattern of the subsidies. 
To distinguish these in the case of the subsidies paid in the Central Region, we 
calculated 𝐻(𝛽1𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅 + 𝛽2𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅) which shows the “local and endogenous spillover 
effects”. Whereas the expression 𝐻𝜃𝑊𝑥𝐾𝑀𝑅  shows us the “exogenous spillover 
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effects” of the subsidies stemmming from the fact that more subsidies paid in the 
Central Region lead to less available amount for the countryside. 
We summarised the average values of the estimated Central-Region specific 
endogenous and exogenous spillover effects and total effects of the subsidies in 
Table 4 for the asymmetric contiguity matrix model and in Table 5 for the symmetric 
contiguity matrix model. 
Table 4. Total effect of subsidies and KMR-specific effects of the subsidies, the latter divided 
between endogenous and exogenous spillover effects as predicted by the asymmetric 
contiguity matrix model 
 Year Hungary, total Non KMR regions, total 
Total 
effects 
KMR-specific effects  
(000 HUF per head) 
Total 
effects 
KMR-specific effects  

























2006 24.1 28.0 –8.2 19.8 82.4 1.5 1.8 –5.6 –3.9 –252.6 
2007 75.8 87.7 –29.9 57.7 76.2 8.8 6.2 –20.0 –13.7 –156.5 
2008 103.6 138.1 –65.3 72.9 70.3 8.8 13.3 –42.7 –29.3 –333.9 
2009 201.3 250.2 –102.2 148.0 73.5 20.4 20.8 –66.7 –45.9 –225.4 
2010 229.2 291.8 –140.3 151.5 66.1 36.0 27.8 –88.9 –61.1 –169.9 
Table 5. Total effect of subsidies and KMR–specific effects of the subsidies,  the latter divided 
between endogenous and exogenous spillover effects as predicted by the symmetric 
contiguity matrix model 
 Year Hungary, total Non KMR regions, total 
Total 
effects 
KMR-specific effects  
(000 HUF per head) 
Total 
effects 
KMR-specific effects  

























2006 22.8 30.3 –13.2 17.1 74.8 3.8 2.5 –6.2 –3.7 –98.0 
2007 73.1 96.8 –49.7 47.1 64.5 19.6 8.9 –22.1 –13.3 –67.9 
2008 94.7 159.2 –108.9 50.3 53.1 27.1 19.5 –48.7 –29.2 –107.9 
2009 189.6 281.7 –168.4 113.4 59.8 52.3 30.6 –76.5 –45.9 –87.7 
2010 214.0 337.8 –235.7 102.1 47.7 84.5 40.4 –101.1 –60.6 –71.8 
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We find that the overall impact of the subsidies on the incomes of micro-regions 
is positive on average. However, the subsidies paid in the KMR regions modify this 
general picture in three respects. 
1. The subsidies had a higher return in the Central Region, which led to higher 
income of the KMR micro-regions.  
2. The higher income of the KMR regions led to further endogenous spillover 
effects on other micro-regions inside and outside the Central Region.  
3. The subsidies paid in the Central Region decreases the potential resources of 
the other regions, through which it leads to negative exogenous spillover 
effects. 
The nationwide average values show that the total effects of the subsidies are 
positive, the local and endogenous spillover effects had a higher magnitude of 
positive values than the negative exogenous spillover effects. However, in the case 
of the non-KMR regions, these negative effects had been larger than the positive 
endogenous spillover effects of the KMR-specific subsidies, therefore, the subsidies 
paid in the KMR region had negative overall effects outside the Central Region. 
Nevertheless, these negative exogenous spillover effects were not as large as to 
counterweigh the sum of the positive effects (local subsidies and positive 
endogenous spillover effects).These results seem to be insensitive to the choice of 
the spatial weight matrix, the only difference appears in the relative size of these 
effects.  
Conclusions 
Although our results require further investigation, we still find it important to ana-
lyse the role of the spatial weight matrix in the estimation results and conclusions. 
This methodology is quite new and our understanding its working is still limited. We 
wish to emphasise that our estimation strategy was based on the following assump-
tions: 
1. it is possible to identify the effects of governmental support on local income 
from the differences in support intensity, 
2. the above-defined contiguity matrix is an adequate description of the spatial 
structure, and 
3. data are appropriate for econometric analysis, that is, there is not too much 
noise and there are not many data errors. 
These assumptions may prove to be very strong in our case, probably each might 
be questioned. Nonetheless, without these assumptions it is not possible to estimate 
the effects of subsidies at all. Our results and conclusions from this analysis were 
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not sensitive to the choice of the spatial contiguity matrix, and its structure (sym-
metric or asymmetric) did not prove to be relevant. Still, we  had some discretionary 
choices, like the number of neighbouring relations, which may be relevant. These 
issues should be analysed later. 
The results show that subsidies increase the local income of the micro-regions 
and spatial spillover effects may spread. The net effect is positive, but it is the sum 
of different components of which not all proved to be positive. The robustness of 
these results is hard to check, but they are absolutely necessary. The relative size of 
the positive endogenous spillover effects and the negative spillover effects were 
only a bit different in the two models using different contiguity matrixes, however, 
the significance of the difference is not negligible.  
The interpretation of the model is weakened by the fact that in another study we 
investigated the effects of different (homogenous) sub-categories of EU funds and 
found different results. In that model (see Balás – Németh 2013) we categorised EU 
funds by their funding goal and investigated the impacts of the different categories 
on employment and the income of micro-regions as well as on migration. In the final 
model several categories proved to be significant and the subsidies paid in the KMR 
region had a positive spillover effect on average (in contrast to the present model 
where subsidies were not differentiated by funding goals). However, we could not 
incorporate those results into the present study, as it would have made our analysis 
more complex and lengthy. Nonetheless, we find it important to further study this 
issue. 
The interpretation of the results is even more difficult because the Central 
Region is itself heterogeneous. The “central place” is more probably the capital only, 
not the whole Central Region. However, capital Budapest, with its almost 2 million 
population, form one micro-region in the present analysis, so the above-described 
methodology would not apply to Budapest. The spatial fixed effects contain all 
relevant Budapest-specific effects, but it is not possible to separate the effects of 
subsidies from the other variables in the model. One of our very important tasks 
here is to further develop our model to be able to analyse the “Budapest-specific 
effects” instead of the KMR-specific ones. 
In our analysis we took the number of neighbouring relations and also the micro-
regions as administrative territorial units as given. Both are important parts of the 
model, but their different specification may lead to different results and different 
spillover effects. To understand the role of these factors is key to better under-
standing spatial econometric models.  
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BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR THE STRUCTURAL 
FUNDS IN THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES* 
Cecília Mezei 
Introduction 
It is almost a commonplace that Structural Funds (SF) have a significant impact on 
public administration, especially in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
tries where the absorption of EU subsidies is one of the most important policy and 
political ambitions. However, the governance regime of Structural Funds is a con-
siderable challenge, since traditional government structures and practices in the 
CEE countries do not typically harmonise with the principles of decentralisation or 
regionalism, partnership, efficiency, transparency and strategic integrative plan-
ning. Therefore, CEE countries have tried to adapt to these challenges in different 
ways; institutionally by implementing internal structural reforms of public admin-
istration (learning) and/or by establishing separate, “unfamiliar” structures and 
institutions to better fit the SF system (imitating), besides functional changes in the 
instrumental model and processes. The main question was whether it is better to 
develop an internal institutional system and integrate it into the national admin-
istration in a way corresponding to EU regulations, or to build a new SF institution 
separated from the national governmental structure, so that the SF institution thus 
created fully fits the European requirements.  
For comparison we have chosen four “Visegrad” countries, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, representing special Central and Eastern European 
answers to the institutionalisation pressure of the Structural Funds. All of them 
accessed to the EU at the same time, still they have had different SF managing struc-
tures. 
Having very few own resources for development, the proper utilisation of EU 
resources has been one of the most important political objectives in the Visegrad 
countries. This strong financial dependence greatly influenced the institutional sys-
tem established for the utilisation of the pre-accession, then the structural and the 
                                                                        
* This research is supported by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, the OTKA No. 104985 entitled “New driving forces of spatial 
restructuring and regional development paths in Eastern Europe at the beginning of 21st 
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cohesion funds. Namely, in the course of shaping the institutional system, the EU 
regulations had to be respected which, however, were changing over time together 
with the aims and tools of the EU’s cohesion policy. From the very beginning the 
Visegrad countries were “shooting at moving targets” as regards both the objectives 
to be supported and the national SA managements established to effectively allocate 
the resources (Figure 1). 
In 2004 all four Visegrad countries acceded to the European Union as full mem-
bers, but in respect of some funds the new members became only partially “equal” 
to the old ones. Suffice to mention here, for example, the gradual introduction of 
agricultural direct payments between 2004 and 2013, or the practice of so-called 
capping. Moreover, the Visegrad co-operation was not an active integration at the 
time of the accession negotiations, which is clearly reflected in the fact that these 
four countries managed to achieve different conditions in the course of negotiating 
 
 
Figure 1. The research areas’ categorisation, 2004–2013 
Key: 1 – Cohesion Regions and Objective 1 areas; 2 – Competitiveness and Employment Re-
gions and Objective 2 areas; 3 – Competitiveness and Employment Regions and before 2007 
Objective 1 areas; 4 – National boundaries; 5 – NUTS 2 boundaries. 
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with the EU. Thus in 2013 the close co-operation of the four Visegrad countries was 
a surprise and it led to getting additional sums from the cohesion fund for each 
country. 
Co-operation among the four Visegrad countries has varied in the course of his-
tory. There were periods of close co-operation as well as loose relations, sometimes 
getting to the brink of disintegration, which were obviously influenced by the for-
eign and minority policies of the political elites in power in these countries. 
For a long time the EU dealt with not only these four countries but also the whole 
Eastern Bloc as a single unit, the so-called eastern issue. The East European policy 
of the EU also influenced the Visegrad co-operation. Although these countries have 
very different characteristics in respect of their public administration structure, eco-
nomic dependence, settlement network and the role of their borders, it was only 
lately that they ceased to appear as one unit on the EU’s map. 
The four examined countries also differ in the way they have shaped their SA 
institutional system, following completely different ideas and having diverse admin-
istration structures. The creation of SF management commenced in these countries 
at a time when EU cohesion policy seemed to prefer regions and was definitely 
favouring decentralisation. In 2004 the slogan of “Europe of regions” was already 
waning, but it still held true that the richer countries were federal, whereas the 
poorer ones were rather centralised. The EU regulations relating to SF management 
did not require decentralisation and – as it turned out – they contained several ele-
ments which could easily be “fulfilled” ostensibly. Some countries chose this easier 
way, while others launched organic changes with thorough work. The former ones 
were the so-called imitating countries, while the latter ones undertook to go through 
a learning process. Let us have a look how it happened. 
Public Administration Reforms 
While in general the European Union considers the structure and functioning of pub-
lic administration as a national internal affair, it has established a fairly strong 
adaptation pressure by regulating the rules of utilisation of the Structural Funds 
(Pálné Kovács 2009). From the perspective of territorial governance it is an im-
portant question, because this pressure on administrative reforms was simulta-
neous with SF management building in each Central and Eastern European Member 
State (EU 12). The Structural Fund’s relative importance is particularly high in the 
CEE countries where the SF have virtually replaced the domestic development 
policy, determining the national contributions and the national development 
resources. The SF in these countries significantly exceed the volume of national de-
velopment resources regulated by non-EU rules. Therefore, the role of the SF is 
much more dominant in these cases than in the old Member States, and thus these 
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funds serve as an instrument to promote multi-level and participative governance 
in the new Member States. That is why preparation for the Structural Funds was 
able to influence the administrative reforms in the CEE countries to such a high 
degree.  
For example, the significant change in the Polish regional policy model was 
introduced when the comprehensive territorial reform came into force; there we 
can see a real learning process. On the other hand, Hungary only imitated the insti-
tutional reforms by having built separate SF institutions which have not been inte-
grated into the public administration system. While in Poland and in the Czech 
Republic the public administration reforms have created self-governing regions, the 
so-called voivodeships at NUTS 2 and krajsat NUTS 3 levels, Slovakia and Hungary 
have only built planning regions at NUTS 2 level, transferring the administrative ad-
justment to these scales. The situation is contradictory in the Czech Republic, as 
instead of the NUTS 3 level institutions having self-governance and regional 
development tasks, one has to deal with 8 planning-statistical regions in the case of 
SF management. In contrast to this, the situation in Poland is ideal as everything can 
be found at the NUTS 2 level (Figure 2). 
This diverse set of regional institutions and frameworks demonstrates that the 
scope for implementing EU Cohesion Policy varies greatly (Bachtler–McMaster, 
2008). While the Polish NUTS 2 level forms a rational basis for regional Structural 
Funds programmes, in the other investigated countries the NUTS 2 regions contain 
more than one self-governing units. 
During the reference years (2004–2013) partnership became one of the key 
principles of EU support policy. It means multi-tier (sub-national, national, suprana-
tional) and multi-actor (local and regional authorities, private and civil organisa-
tions) participation of partners in policy-making, planning, implementation, moni-
toring and evaluation (EP 2008). The system of multilevel governance, the degree of 
decentralisation and participation in decision-making and power, however, varies 
among the analysed countries and also among regions within a country. The legacy 
of centralism, the lack of traditions of working in partnership, and the weakly insti-
tutionalised sub-national authorities in the CEE countries raise questions about the 
transferability of the partnership approach to the new member states, the main re-
cipients of cohesion funding (Dąbrowski, 2011). 
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Figure 2: The Visegrad countries’ public administration systems and their relationship with 
the NUTS 2 regions  
Key: 1 – Country boundary; 2 – Boundary of NUTS 2 (planning or self–governing – regions; 
3 – Boundary of NUTS 3 self–governing regions. 
Policy Co-ordination 
Domestic Regional Policy 
In the 2007–2013 period each Visegrad country prepared a national development 
plan, called National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), agreed on by the Mem-
ber States and the Commission, setting the investment priorities for the regional and 
sectoral programmes to be supported by the European Union in the given program-
ming period. The SF management institutions are responsible for ensuring com-
pliance with the objectives of the national development plan, which should be con-
sistent with the EU’s balanced development requirement. That is why the planning 
section of the national development plans and the implementation of the national 
programmes are both important in the CEE countries.  
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There are two main forms in the CEE countries’ practice of supporting the bal-
anced development of a territory through domestic regional development manage-
ment and implementation. In the first model the special regional development 
“sectoral institution” (ministry) is responsible for regional development tasks, while 
another, a supra-ministerial institution is responsible for inter-sectoral co-
ordination, that is, for the “horizontal” enforcement of the territorial approach. In 
this case the central administration of regional development is divided between two 
institutions. In the second model there is a top ministry which performs the manage-
ment and planning of development policy as a whole, including domestic regional 
and inter-sectoral development.  
These models varied over time and from country to country. For example, in 
Hungary the first model was built between 2008 and 2010, but before and after that 
Hungary can be considered a sample country of the second (divided) solution, as the 
tasks of planning and implementing regional development had been and have again 
become separated into two ministries. In Slovakia a top ministry of regional de-
velopment (the Ministry of Construction and Regional Development) has been func-
tioning since1999, although from 2010 to 2012 the tasks of the ministry were 
divided (mostly) between two ministries and the Prime Minister’s Office. Since 1996 
the Czech and since 2005 the Polish practice can be classified as the second, inte-
grated type, where regional development ministries have been responsible for 
regional development. 
Integration of SF Management 
As regards the compliance of SF institutions with the domestic public administration 
systems, two models can be identified. In the integrated model the planning, imple-
menting, monitoring and evaluating institutions and procedures are not distinct 
from the domestic development institutions and procedures. On the other hand, in 
the separated model there are parallel SF and public administration institutions. 
This model includes varying degrees of administrative integration (using existing 
administrative bodies), namely, the integration of programming (the EU pro-
grammes are integrated partly into domestic development policy implementation), 
and financial integration (using funds according to the national accounting rules). It 
may appear therefore as a mixed model, like the Hungarian one (Perger 2009). 
From 2004 to 2006 the Polish SF management system was an integrated one. 
The managing authorities were located at different Operational Programmes (OPs) 
in different ministries. At the Integrated Regional Operational Programme (IROP) 
the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Policy of Poland (which was the central 
body of SF management until 2005) was responsible for co-operation with the self-
governments of 16 voivodeships, and voivodeship offices were the intermediate 
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bodies. Since 2005, and of course during the new programming period, the Polish 
regional development top ministry has been responsible for both domestic regional 
policy and SF programme implementation. The managing, intermediate, certifying 
and auditing bodies are integral parts of the national public administration system. 
In the new programming period regional self-governments have become the 
managing authorities of the 16 new Regional Operational Programmes (ROPs) in 
Poland. These voivodeships are responsible for the domestic regional development 
tasks, too, so it is an integrated model also at a regional level.  
In the period between 2004 and 2006 Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
also had an integrated system for SF management. Usually the sectoral ministries 
were the managing authorities, and they made decisions about support. While the 
Slovakian and Czech systems remained integrated, the Hungarian SF institutional 
system became separated in the new programming period (2007–2013). SF plan-
ning, implementation and management became the tasks of the National Develop-
ment Agency (NDA) which is now subordinated to the National Development 
Ministry, separated from the traditional public administration organisations. 
However, this system is rather a sample of the mixed model, characterised by the 
integration of the SF institutions’ programming and financing, but with administra-
tive separation. The NDA, in co-operation with the ministries concerned, is respon-
sible for the planning and implementation of the entire NSRF as well as for the 
managing authority functions with respect to all operational programmes, including 
the regional ones. However, from 2014 on, SF management will again be the task of 
the ministries involved, thus becoming integrated once more. 
Involvement of Self-governing Regions 
Here we are going to analyse the centralised and the decentralised public admin-
istration bodies’ role in programming and implementation. In the decentralised 
model the regional actors have an important role in the process of planning, 
programming and implementing ROPs. They make decisions about the allocation of 
the ROPs. In contrast, in the classical form of the centralised model the central state 
administration bodies are responsible for planning, implementing and managing the 
whole SF programme, including the ROPs. Though these central bodies may involve 
regional partners in the planning process, it still remains centralised, as are the 
managing authorities (Perger 2009). The centralised SF managing system can in-
crease the efficiency of co-ordinating the implementation of OPs and improve trans-
parency, but from the point of view of territorial governance, this solution provides 
fewer opportunities for the regional actors.  
The scope of action in financing is one of the most significant elements among 
the conditions of territorial governance. Authorisation in itself is not sufficient to 
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guarantee effective scope of action, financial autonomy is also required which, 
however, is deficient among the CEE countries’ actors at regional level. 
During the first programming period (2004–2006) the Polish SF management 
system was the most decentralised model in the Visegrad countries, since Poland 
has a decentralised state administration system with self-governing NUTS 2 regions. 
The new three-level territorial structure with large voivodeships was introduced in 
1999. The regional is an administrative level with the government’s local repre-
sentatives, but there are also elected self-governments of the voivodeships, with 
their own budget and competencies. This new regional self-governmental frame-
work corresponds to the NUTS 2 level which served as a basis for preparing the re-
quired institutional system of European Cohesion Policy in Poland. The territorial 
structural changes carried out made the management of regional development pos-
sible at the regional level from 2007. Essentially, due to the IROP (2004–2006), 
regional institutional capacity was successfully set up at the voivodeships. Thus, in 
the new programming period, the decentralisation of SF management could become 
deeper, as the 16 ROPs and their management by the regional self-governments 
justify it (MRD 2011). The Polish practice shows that development policy can be 
transferred from the state administration to the self-governments, which has 
increased the policy’s legitimacy and integration.  
From the point of view of territorial governance, it is a problem that public 
finances for regional development have remained centralised in Poland despite the 
so-called regional contracts signed by the regional self-governments and the 
Ministry. As an evaluation study explains, the impact of European Cohesion policy 
on the Polish multi-level governance system goes far beyond financing. The system 
needs the further enhancement of co-operation across levels among government, 
municipalities and public and private actors. There are also other challenges, like 
capacity-building at local-governmental level (competent and efficient public 
officials), and performance monitoring and policy impact assessment at both local 
and central levels (Kramer – Kołodziejski 2011). 
The Czech SF management system was centralised in the first programming 
period, as the Ministry of Regional Development managed the IROP programme. For 
the new programming period, 9 regional OPs were created, 2 for Prague and 7 for 
the cohesion regions. At the cohesion regions the Regional Councils, funded directly 
for the ROPs management in 2006, were the Managing Authorities, while in Prague 
a department of the City Hall had the same function. The Regional Councils (Boards), 
consisting of representatives from all regional assemblies (NUTS 3) within the NUTS 
2 regions, have their own offices for the management and implementation of ROPs. 
The Hungarian and Slovakian SF managements were centralised in the period 
between 2004 and 2006. The reason for this was their centralised state administra-
tion system, and it was an EU expectation that programme structure should be 
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single, transparent and centralised (Perger, 2009). The new Slovakian territorial 
governments had no role in NSRF planning (Buček, 2011); by contrast, the 
Hungarian Regional Development Councils, established by the Regional Develop-
ment Act and operating from 1999, were able to prepare regional development 
strategies. Finally, due to pressure from the EU, Hungary made one single ROP, 
which relied only partially on regional plans. Slovakia, however, had no regional 
programme at all, only a sectoral OP with regional elements.  
After 2007 the Hungarian model, with 7 separated ROPs but with a centralised 
managing authority (NDA), became more centralised, though the RDAs were the 
intermediate bodies of the ROPs. However, the Slovakian system is even more 
centralised. Except for the City of Bratislava, the regional self-governments (krajs) 
are partly involved in the implementation of SF, since each one is an intermediate 
organisation in the Integrated Regional Operational Programme. In the Bratislava 
OP the city self-government is the intermediate body (Buček 2011). 
Hungarian regionalists hoped that top-down regionalisation could be imple-
mented, first when the Regional Development Act was born, then at the time of 
elaborating the national development plans in the early 2000s (these had regional 
dimensions, too, and there were multi-level discussions about the plans). But RDCs 
and RDAs had a negligible role in the allocation of the national development 
resources from the beginning (1996) to 2008. It was negligible because the amount 
of decentralised domestic regional development funds was very small. From 2012, 
when RDCs were abolished, the county governments remained the only spatial 
development and planning actors; they had been involved in elaborating regional 
development strategies, but they were not experienced in co-ordination. Since that 
time the local self-governments have lost many of their functions which have been 
transferred to the county level “deconcentrated” state administration. Besides this 
recentralisation, the RDAs, as SF institutional and regional development actors, have 
also become centralised organs. 
Challenges for the Visegrad Countries 
One of the biggest challenges of adaptation was the so-called Europeanisation pres-
sure, especially regionalisation. The extensive effect of the SF on national admin-
istrations in the CEE countries can be explained by their strong motivation to 
acquire development resources eligible for less developed regions. The CEE coun-
tries were preparing for accession at that time and they believed that regions mat-
tered. The main argumentation for the necessity of regionalisation stemmed from 
SF regulations, although the criteria of “good governance” formulated and con-
trolled yearly by the European Commission implied the indirect message to decen-
tralise and develop the “regional administrative capacities” (Pálné Kovács 2011). 
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The CEE countries tried to adapt to the tasks deriving from the Europeanisation pro-
cess. The motivation to gain access to SF played the most significant role in this, but 
there were no strict regulations for the establishment of administrative regions. The 
necessary elements of SF-driven adaptation were (1) the delimitation of the NUTS 2 
regions; (2) the establishment of regional consultative bodies based on the princi-
ples of partnership, and also (3) that of the managing authorities of SF (Pálné 
Kovács, 2011). Poland was the “eminent student” among the Visegrad countries, 
while the others used the freedom of adaptation not for real, but for imitated region-
alisation.  
The system of objectives of regional policy; the requirements concerning the insti-
tutional system of the SF as well as the national programming and planning prescrip-
tions created for fund absorption have all been frequently modified. Accordingly, 
national and regional practices of adjustment and plan elaboration procedures have 
also changed, and the success of adaptation has varied, too. In principle, EU member 
states have enjoyed greater liberty and have had wider responsibilities since 2007. 
Poland has exploited the opportunity of decentralisation, which the rest of the 
investigated countries have failed to achieve. The institutional changes in the system 
of public administration or regional policy further decreased the chances of pre-
serving and transmitting organisational knowledge, the network of relations and 
also the already established other networks. For instance, the Hungarian regional 
level deprived of functions will not be able to co-ordinate the joint preparations for 
the period starting from 2014; the new method based on the collaboration of county 
municipalities is an utterly new practice rendering access to functioning methods 
and reliable partners difficult. County municipalities are not prepared for this task.  
The partnership principle is a general EU requirement for all of the institutional 
bodies in the SF management system during the whole implementation process. 
However, due to the CEE countries’ traditional, bureaucratic state administration 
system and to their limited experiences in this field, partnership building has been 
a great challenge and it would need a new form of management. There are two ways 
to involve stakeholders in the SF allocation process; the first is when they are mem-
bers of the Monitoring Committees and they monitor the implementation of SF 
funds, and the second, when they can comment on and/or create the sectoral and 
regional programmes of NSRFs.It was common that the biggest, umbrella organisa-
tions were able to exploit the opportunity of the SF consultation processes. The 
involvement of smaller NGOs poses some technical problems when it comes to ex-
panding civil society partnerships in cohesion policy. Local or ad-hoc NGOs often 
lack the resources in terms of personnel and infrastructure to analyse and process 
documentation, and even to have continuous representation in case they participate 
(e.g. voluntary representatives attending meetings) (EP 2008). 
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The biggest challenge and the most difficult task of SF management is to empower 
the final beneficiaries and to give them enough time to learn the processes. The con-
stantly changing conditions, institutions, rules and staff make it practically impos-
sible for the stakeholders involved in the project to accumulate knowledge. The 
elaboration of project proposals has been transferred to the private sector, since the 
institutional system of SF is lacking the necessary capacities. This may be one of the 
underlying reasons why the poorest are the least successful in getting into projects. 
Organisations having insufficient own funds (enterprises, self-governments, civil 
stakeholders) cannot avail themselves of the services of project proposal writing 
companies. 
The effects of political elections and the impacts of the hectically changing public 
administrative system have to be investigated separately. These have affected the 
functioning of the entire institutional system, the internal and external relations as 
well as the communication of regional policy and SF management. For example, in 
Hungary continual personal and institutional changes at the ministries, in addition 
to the unclear division of labour between them, inhibited the operation of bureau-
cratic automatisms, despite the existence of unchanged institutions, such as NDA 
(KPMG 2011). The changing intermediate bodies caused problems in communica-
tion with the stakeholders and beneficiaries, similarly to the effect of erratic com-
munication caused by the fluctuating staff in the SF management organisations. The 
latter can also hinder the accumulation of organisational knowledge, even in a cen-
tralised system like the Hungarian one. The impacts of the governmental change in 
2010 resulted in disrupting sectoral portfolios and the NDA exactly at the time when 
they should have taken part in strategic planning (preparation for the new program-
ming period, rethinking the rules of spending the money under the circumstances of 
the financial crisis and in the light of the mid-term evaluation reports). 
The global financial crisis meant a challenge for all CEE member countries. This 
was manifest, among others, in central budget restrictions which have postponed 
setting significant social, territorial and often economic development priorities, 
have blocked development projects, and reduced the funds owned by local/territo-
rial public administrative units (self-governments). The crisis has placed several 
potential project participants in a hopeless situation, regardless whether they were 
actors financed from public or private funds. From the aspect of SF, it is important 
to note that the exhaustion of national development resources has considerably 
increased the importance of SF, thus the regulation (in certain cases overregulation) 
of SF may further hinder the success of allocation. Overregulation excludes several 
good ideas and potential projects, so that they do not even reach the phase of 
preparing proposals or they fall out in the first round. The last aspect to be con-
sidered is that the financial crisis has raised the risk of accomplishing projects 
successfully in the case of several beneficiaries. 
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Conclusions 
The Visegrad countries have often been treated as a uniform block by EU policies, 
albeit they chose dissimilar paths already in their political-economic transition pe-
riod despite their common historical roots. The individual countries applied varying 
degrees of decentralisation, provided different opportunities for FDI and – as ana-
lysed in this paper – were differently affected by the Europeanisation pressure. 
From among the four examined countries Poland chose a unique path, it has 
accomplished administrative-institutional reforms including decentralisation as 
their integral part. On the contrary, Hungary followed another road, that of recen-
tralisation. The Czech Republic and Slovakia took some steps towards decentralisa-
tion, but the institutional system established to deal with EU funds did not properly 
involve the regional/local participants. 
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A STUDY OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITY 
IN HARGHITA COUNTY, ROMANIA 
Andrea Csata 
Introduction 
In this paper the impacts of European Union funds on rural areas, more specifically, 
on Harghita County, Romania will be studied. In Romania there are major dif-
ferences among the various parts of the country in attracting European Union funds. 
These differences can be found, on the one hand, in the type of programmes, on the 
other hand, regionally, at the level of development regions and also at county level. 
If we take a look only at the Regional Operational Programme, we can see that its 
operation has not strengthened cohesion so far, especially not in the long-term. 
Thus, in what follows, the local economic impact of several programmes on Harghita 
County will be analysed.       
The main aspect of analysis will be the allocation of rural development funds, but 
I shall also compare the allocation of these funds and the operation of the Regional 
Operational Programme as well as the attraction of agricultural subsidies. The study 
focuses mainly on the economic impact of these funds and on their role in sustaining 
the local economy. 
Rural Areas and European Union Funds 
The development of rural areas cannot be separated from rural activities due to 
their territorial facilities and rural character. In this way, agricultural subsidies play 
an important role in sustainable rural development. Sonnino et al. (2008) have high-
lighted the importance of the sustainable rural development paradigm, as it has the 
potential for a reconstituted agricultural and multi-functional land-based rural sec-
tor. 
Marsden’s study (2003) is also important, as it emphasises that sustainable rural 
development is territorially based and thus it redefines nature by re-emphasising 
food production and agro-ecology, which re-asserts the socio-environmental role of 
agriculture. Marsden also calls our attention to the fact that agriculture is a major 
agent in sustaining rural economies and cultures. 
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Concerning the analysis of the rural development funds’ impacts, I would like to 
mention two major studies that have investigated them.  
In the first one, studying the rural development funding of four development 
regions in the same county, Szőcs et al. (2012) concluded that the economic dimen-
sion had greater effect, while the environmental one was totally neglected. Since 
there are no size limits nor needs set for the territories applying for these funds, 
effectiveness depends on the mayors’ personal and administrative capacity, and 
most of the projects are not really sustainable.  
In the second one, applying the method of input–output analysis, Bíró (2012) 
examined the impact of supports by the Common Agricultural Policy. The results 
show that the Romanian agriculture forestry and fishing sector has an average 
impact on the overall economy, namely increasing the agricultural production with 
1 RON (Romanian currency) means an input demand increase with 1.8089 and an 
output rise with 1.7485.  
 The final increase in agricultural demand by 1 RON leads only to 0.2344 RON 
income growth in the total economy.  
The appreciation of sustainable development is reflected in the Europe 2020 
strategy, the principle aim of which is to be a strategy of smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. The next planning and budget cycle in rural development also tries 
to operationalise these main strategic aims: promoting transfer of innovation, 
enhancing competitiveness, preserving the ecosystem, emphasising the importance 
of green energy, strengthening social inclusion and reducing poverty. Innovation, 
closer co-operation among agriculture, rural activities and research, and the support 
of young farmers have came into prominence. The ways of co-operation (product 
sales, improving rural services), the LEADER-approach, urban–rural co-operation, 
and renewable energy have all become re-evaluated. 
Research Frameworks 
Our paper analyses the impacts of European Union funds from the perspectives of 
the economy and of  development sustainability. The core analysis deals with the 
distribution and impacts of rural development funds, but in order to provide a com-
parative analysis, other two major funding opportunities – the Regional Operational 
Programme funds and the European Union agricultural subsidies – will also be 
included.  
An attempt will be made to answer the following questions: How efficiently are 
the above-mentioned EU funds utilised at county level, especially in Harghita 
County? How are these funds used? What do they mean for the local economy? What 
do they mean from the perspective of sustainability? How much do they help the 
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convergence and cohesion of the counties included in general, and in the case of 
Harghita County in particular.  
For the purpose of the research basically the data available on the relevant 
agencies’ official websites were used, but additional data from these agencies were 
also requested, namely, from The Payments Agency for Rural Development and 
Fishing (PARDF), the Regional Development Agency and the Agency for Payments 
and Intervention in Agriculture. The data analysed relate to the funds allocated for 
the period 2007 – 1st March 2013. 
Our research focuses on Harghita County, since it is a good subject for analysis in 
respect of rural areas, as more than half of the county’s population live in rural areas 
and according to the National Institute of Statistics this rural population tends to 
increase: (1990: 52.3%, 2010: 56.1%). Population density also shows the charac-
teristics of a rural area: the average for the entire county is 48.9 inhabitants/square 
kilometre, for the rural areas 32.1 and for the urban areas 149.4. 
In 2012 unemployment rate was 5.6% at a national level, 6.4% in the Centre 
Region, while it was 7.5% in Harghita County. Furthermore, the GDP per capita in 
2012 was 4640 EUR in Harghita County, 6018 EUR in the Centre Region, and 6924 
EUR at a national level. Harghita County is an area with low income where the 
annual average take-home pay was 1114 RON in 2012, a sum that is smaller than 
that in the Centre Region (1333 RON) and the national average (1512 RON). The 
county can be characterised as a mainly mountainous region with 59.7% agricul-
tural land – out of which 39.6%  meadows and 37.1% pastures – and 35.7% woods.  
Although most of Harghita county’s localities are considered to be developed and 
highly developed, according to a statement issued by the Centre Development 
Region, only Brasov County precedes Harghita County in development. In Harghita 
County only 16% of the localities can be considered very poor and poor, and more 
than half of them are developed.  
All in all, we can state that Harghita County is highly developed and has a good 
infrastructure in spite of its low income rate. 
Research Results – The Analysis of Rural Development Funds 
When analysing rural development funds, only the funds tendered exclusively by 
the Rural Development Agency (PARDF) were taken into consideration, since the 
211, 212 and 214 actions of the Rural Development Programme belonged to the re-
sponsibility of another institution, the Romanian Agency for Payments and Inter-
vention in Agriculture (APIA). The data of the latter will be analysed later, when pre-
senting the direct agricultural payments.  
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Twelve out of the 20 successful measures were envisaged for competition (out-
side the LEADER axis). Regarding sectorial involvement, the majority was agricul-
tural: 8 agricultural, 2 in tourism, 2 multi-sectorial. As to the beneficiaries, these 
actions were targeted mostly at entrepreneurs dealing with agriculture, tourism, 
other businesses, as well as at local governments, forestry, and joint tenancy. Con-
sidering the objectives and the impacts of these actions, the economic objectives are 
prevalent, then come the environmental ones, while the social objectives are the 
least or only indirectly taken into account.  
Harghita County had an average share from the funds as regards the amounts 
utilised. Surprisingly the counties which performed better were the more developed 
counties from Transylvania (Timis, Cluj, Bihor), and Bistriţa Nasăud and Suceava, 
which are less developed (Figure 1).  
Regarding the amount of funding per capita, the seaside county Tulcea, and Sălaj 
proved to be the best performers, whereas Harghita County shows an average 
performance (Figure 2). 
Considering the number of projects, Harghita County has an average rating, the 
best performers in this case being Alba County and Bistriţa Năsăud (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 1. Share of subsidy per capita of project funds at county level until 
March 2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania. 
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Figure 2. Share of subsidy per capita of project funds at county level until 
March 2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania. 
 
Figure 3. Share of number of projects at county level until March 2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania. 
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Since most of the funds are agricultural or related to agriculture, the amount of 
fund per hectare of agricultural land was also calculated. Here Bistriţa Năsăud 
County was the best performer, but Dambovita County is also among the top 
counties. Harghita is below average in this respect (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Share of  project value per one hectare of agricultural land at county 
level until March 2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania. 
All in all, it can be said for the analysed period that in the case of the National 
Rural Development Programme, Bistrita Nasaud County performed the best, 
Harghita County can get an average rating, while Bucharest received the least money 
– naturally, due to the type of funding (Figure 5). 
As regards the localities in Harghita County, all of them had rural development 
projects except three. The majority of localities had 1–5 projects on average; 7 
localities had over 10 projects. In the case of both project number and the amount 
of funding, the best performing localities were Joseni, Remetea and Zetea. Regarding 
the number of projects, in addition to these three localities there are also Ciumani 
and Pauleni-Ciuc (Figure 6). 
From the county level projects those localities could gain a higher proportion of 
funding which possessed adequate administrative capacity. The projects that had 
the greatest impact, and were the most important, were the infrastructural invest-
ments. However, a signed project contract does not necessarily mean that the 
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Figure 5. Share of number of projects at Harghita County level until 
March  2013 
Source: Based on National Rural Development Programme of Romania  
 
Figure 6. Share from the total value of projects at Harghita County’s 
settlement level until March 2013 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the official site of the Payment Agen-
cy for Rural Development and Fishing [1 March 2013]. 
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project has actually been carried out. There are two main obstacles in carrying out 
a project: public procurement procedures and the ban on employment in the public 
sector (namely, according to the IMF negotiations, from January 2009 it has been 
prohibited to employ new workforce in the public sector, except some officially ap-
proved positions). 
For example, Ciumani has not been able to begin the implementation phase for 
two years now, as during the procurement procedures the results have always been 
appealed. In the case of local government projects, political affinity and political 
“colours” played a considerable role. 
As most of the rural development funds remained in the local economy, it bene-
fited much from these projects which targeted local economic operators such as 
small and medium-sized businesses, farms and local governments. The funds ob-
tained by these operators remained in the local economy as the money was spent 
locally. In the case of bigger infrastructural investments, because of the public pro-
curement procedures, non-local, well capitalised companies (from Bucharest, 
Oradea, Cluj-Napoca, etc.) took some of the money, but as their contractors in imple-
mentation were mainly local sub-contractors, a substantial part of these sums went 
back to the local economy (Figure 7). Besides money, employment is also an 
important factor, as it contributes to local stability. In order to provide an accurate 
mapping of these processes, there is another ongoing research project. 
 
Figure 7. The economic utilisation of rural development funds, the use of rural development in 
the economy, illustration of the satekeholders 
Source: Author’s  elaboration. 
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Research Results – Analysis of the Regional Operational Programme  
The overall objective of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) is to support 
and promote sustainable local development in Romania`s regions, both economi-
cally and socially, by improving the infrastructure conditions and the business envi-
ronment which in turn support economic growth. This means that the ROP’s aim is 
to reduce economic and social development disparities between the more de-
veloped regions and the less developed ones, focusing on the unique needs and re-
sources of the supported regions.  
The priority axes of the ROP are:  
1. supporting the sustainable development of towns – urban growth poles;  
2. improving regional and local transport infrastructure;  
3. improving the social infrastructure;   
4. supporting the development of the regional and local business environment;  
5. promoting sustainable development and tourism;  
6. providing technical assistance.  
Taking a look at the distribution of the Regional Operational Programme funds 
we can see that a great amount was spent on education, training, urban and social 
development, and on road upgrading. At the same time, the development of business 
environment, tourism and enterprises received a much smaller sum (Figure 8). 
Harghita County is around the average as regards both the number and the value 
of the projects at the Regional Operative Programmes level as well.  
Among the successful projects, the welfare-enhancing projects were in majority, 
while there were only a few projects that helped to increase long-term competitive-
ness, for example, business development. The maintenance costs of these invest-
ments are later paid by the community, thus the public sector has to face a subse-
quent cost increase. If public welfare investments and their costs grow asymmetri-
cally, and meanwhile they do not enhance the local income and economy, this may 
lead to problems in sustainability. The welfare effects of these ROP projects can be 
felt at the localities, but they also have to provide the maintenance costs, while the 
profits of implementation are enjoyed by the more developed regions through the 
big companies (Figure 9). 
Summing up, although the effects of welfare investments are noticeable at the 
local level, a substantial amount of the funds for the implementation of the projects 
goes to other regions and localities, while the maintenance costs remain at the local 
level. Some of the projects are still under implementation, but there can already be 
observed spectacular changes in infrastructure and space planning. The follow-up 
phase of the projects is an important topic for further research.  
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Figure 8. Regional Operative Programme of Romania, share from the total 
value of contracted projects at county level 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the official site of the Regional Opera-
tive Programme, http://www.inforegio.ro/node/22 [1 March 2013]. 
 
 
Figure 9. Utilisation of the Regional Operative Programme funds in the economy, flow chart of 
the stakeholders 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Research Results – Analysing the Effects of European Union Agricultural 
Subsidies  
The present section studies the agricultural subsidies having come from EAGF and 
EAFRD funds and disbursed by APIA. They include area-based grants (SAPS), other 
direct payments (sheep and cattle subsidies, etc.) and direct payments from the 
rural development fund paid out by APIA.  
It is a great advantage of European Union agricultural subsidies that their 
application system is easier and the number of targeted people is much larger, so it 
provides direct support to a wider public. The large number of targeted people can 
be explained by the fragmented land structure.  
With respect to agricultural subsidies applications, Harghita County was second 
at a national level after Constanta County, due to the grants for disadvantaged 
mountainous regions. 
On the basis of the distribution of farm support at county level according to the 
size of agricultural land, there is a growing number of requests for agricultural 
subsidies in general. The largest increase occurred in the case of farms of 20–50 ha, 
and at the same time, in the case of farms of over 500 ha a significant drop can be 
noticed (Table 1).  
Table 1. The amount of agricultural subsidies – according to the size of agricultural land 
Land size (ha) Number of beneficiaries Increase in 2011 
compared to 2008 
(%) 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 1  – 2 7,801 7,890 8,301 8,421 7.95 
 2  – 5 13,473 13,185 13,717 13,924 3.35 
 5  – 10 4,770 4 733 4,953 5,040 5.66 
 10  – 20 1,219 1 261 1,315 1,393 14.27 
 20  – 50 394 427 454 505 28.17 
 50  – 100 129 121 132 130 0.78 
 100  – 500 138 134 136 148 7.25 
 500  – 1,000 23 18 17 15 –34.78 
1,000  –  12 6 7 6 –50.00 
Total 27,959 27,775 29,032 29,582  
County-wide total grant 
value – million RON 
129 158 200 233 80.02 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from APIA Harghita. 
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It turns out from the interviews we made that the beneficiaries of small subven-
tions use it to supplement their daily expenses and reinvest it in agriculture. Bene-
ficiaries of medium subventions also reinvest in agriculture but they also buy lands. 
Finally, the beneficiaries of great subventions reinvest it by buying lands and equip-
ment, and they can also save money. 
Due to the relatively simple application procedures, many people submit their 
applications. The value of these grants has continuously increased as has done the 
number of applicants, thus there has been continuous growth in the amount of suc-
cessfully won grants. While the value of these grants disbursed by APIA Harghita in 
2007 was 60.36 million RON, by the year of 2012 this value had reached 281.22 mil-
lion RON. 
A one-year area-based grant sum per farm in Harghita County was 566 EUR on 
average. In this county, the average grant value per household (including not only 
agriculture-related farms) was 2179 EUR for a period of six years, which means 363 
EUR annually, more than an average monthly take-home wage. So, it is an important 
source of funding in local, capital deficient areas.  
A Comparison of the Funds 
Naturally, each type of grant has its own logic and targeted public. By examining the 
performance of the counties in the Centre Region with respect to the above-
mentioned funds and their position within this region, we find that the Regional 
Operative Programme has not enhanced cohesion. However, the rural development 
funds and agricultural subsidies have helped the poor counties to get access to extra 
income.    
Comparing GDPs in the Centre Region counties we find that Brasov County takes 
the first place, followed by Sibiu, while Harghita County has only the fourth position 
with its GDP being only 53% of that of Brasov. Taking into account the grants won 
too, as a benchmark, the county with the highest GDP and the highest amount of 
grants was taken as 100. The GDP and the grant amount of the other counties were 
related to this number.  
The best performing county regarding effectiveness in using rural development 
funds was Alba County, Harghita County being the third. During the examined 
period, unfortunately, Harghita County failed to call about half of the sum accessed 
by Brasov County from the Regional Operative Programme which was meant to 
directly serve cohesion policy. Thus, we can state that this fund has not enhanced 
cohesion, it has not helped the county to catch up, instead, it has strengthened the 
segregation of Harghita County and its lagging behind.  
At the same time, with respect to agricultural subsidies paid through APIA, 
Harghita County took second place in 2012 (Table 2).  
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Table 2. A comparison of the counties in the Central Development Region of Romania by GDP,  
and the utilised Regional Operative Programme and Rural Development Programme 
funds 
GDP Regional Operative Programme Rural Development Funds 
County The best 
performing 
county (%) 










Brasov 100.00 Brasov 737.80 100 Alba 184.3 100 
Sibiu 82.83 Mures 491.60 67 Brasov 115.7 63 
Alba 78.19 Alba 469.28 64 Harghita 113.3 61 
Mures 57.61 Sibiu 436.30 59 Mures 93.2 51 
Harghita 53.06 Covasna 364.30 49 Sibiu 710.9 39 
Covasna 48.97 Harghita 329.96 45 Covasna 593.9 32 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
On examining the importance of these funds in the county’s local economy, we 
can see that the most concentrated fund distribution and the highest value projects 
were implemented through the Regional Operational Programme, while the grants 
awarded to the largest targeted public were those disbursed through the direct 
agricultural payments. These two factors – the concentration of fund distribution 
and the targeted public – show that agricultural and rural development funds helped 
in stabilising local economies and maintaining purchasing power, while the Regional 
Operative Programme although served competitiveness, it, unfortunately, also had 
significant drawbacks.   
It can be observed that the grants helping the development of rural areas (rural 
development and agricultural funds) were similar in value to the amount allocated 
from the Regional Operative Programme.    
The total grants received by Harghita County from the three programmes 
amounted to 42.83% of the county’s yearly GDP in 2012, which was an important 
factor in the county’s economic life.  The grants’ value if projected per one year, in 
other words, the one-year average grant, means 7.40% of the GDP in 2012 (Table 
3). 
Conclusion and Future Challenges 
As a conclusion, we can say that the funds Harghita County managed to get represent 
an important resource in maintaining the county’s local economy. The money 
disbursed to private entrepreneurs and small local businesses greatly contributed 
to their sustainability; the ROP funds had their positive effects on enhancing welfare, 
but not on increasing competitiveness.  
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GDP in 2012 
compared to the 










1,451 21.70 3.62 62 
Rural development 
programmes 
498 7.45 1.24 1930 
Single Area Payment 
Scheme Agricultural 
payments 2007–2012 
1,019 13.68 2.54 173,046 
Total 2,969 42.83 7.40  
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Agricultural subsidies, due to their large scattering, mainly contributed to the 
stability of the local economy and the maintenance of local purchasing power.  In the 
case of the Regional Operational Programmes, most applications were submitted by 
the public sector for welfare-enhancing project grants which do not necessarily im-
prove long-term competitiveness. The results achieved by these funds in main-
taining the local economy, increasing the competitiveness of local enterprises, and 
in improving business environment all fall behind those of the more competitive 
counties, and this might cause long-term fallback.   
The disadvantages of funds the public sector applied for were, on the one hand, 
that it was hard to implement them because of the problematic public procurement 
procedures, and, on the other hand, that the positive effects were hindered by the 
ban on recruiting new employees in the public sector. The system should respond 
to the question: how can funding be inclusive and sustainable if recruitment of new 
employees is not allowed?  
Our research raises some further issues that need to be investigated in the 
future: how grant applications will change in the future, the follow-up phase of suc-
cessful projects, the projects’ economic burden (maintenance costs, possible 
indebtedness, social burden etc.). Further research might also be carried out on the 
effects of economic changes caused by the grants, or in what direction the economy’s 
structural deficiencies change, etc. How can greener and more sustainable projects 
be realised without causing social conflicts? How could the Regional Operative Pro-
grammes be changed in order to favour the less developed counties with weaker 
capital, without the help of big cities or the central economic region? How can inno-
vation be created and then developed at the level of rural areas? And finally, how 
can grants ensure all these?    
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According to the current framework agreements, the next payment structures 
and plans naturally build on the experiences of the previous period which, as it was 
shown in this paper, was not quite innovative and inclusive, nor even environment 
friendly. 
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TERRITORIAL PROCESSES AND THEIR 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PRACTICE OF REGIONAL 
PLANNING – ON THE EXAMPLE OF HAJDÚ-BIHAR 
COUNTY1 
Zsolt Radics – Ernő Molnár – János Pénzes 
Introduction: Spatial Aspects in Regional (Development) Planning 
The frequent preponderance of sectoral thinking is a basic problem of development 
planning, although handling spatial problems as well as EU and Hungarian directives 
call for integrating spatial aspects into the planning process. Spatial thinking means 
mostly developments based on specific local conditions, aiming to moderate 
territorial differences and/or intensify spatial connections. It could be integrated 
into regional planning by the spatial weighting of general sectoral development 
objectives or by including spatial categories having specific/independent sectoral 
objectives. 
Both of these cases of spatial thinking need ideas about the space of the de-
velopment area. In the last programming period of 2007–2013 – when the NUTS 2 
regions played an important role in the development planning process in Hungary – 
the strategy of the North Great Plain region made an attempt to define region-specific 
spatial planning categories based on complex indices (ÉARFÜ 2008). The aim of the 
initiative was to create settings for defining development mixes suiting the 
characteristics of the different spatial units. In the spatial development categories 
(regional development pole, subcentres and their agglomerations, dynamic and 
potentially dynamic micro-regional centres, micro-regional subcentres, rural areas) 
firstly the hierarchic, secondly the geographic aspects of the typology were reflected 
(Figure 1). It is worth mentioning that these spatial categories were incorporated 
into the development strategy of Hajdú-Bihar County for the above-mentioned 
period, but unfortunately (in the end) they played no role in the realisation of the 
regional development objectives (TÉRPORT 2006). 
                                                                        
1 This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed 
by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/2-11/1-2012-0001  
‘National Excellence Program’. 
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Figure 1. Spatial development categories of the North Great Plain region 
Source: ÉARFÜ 2008. 
It does not mean that there was no spatial differentiation in the development 
practice. However, the micro-regions as tools used for this purpose were not always 
functional units and their social, economic and infrastructural development levels 
were only compared to the national average. This meant that almost every micro-
region belonged to the beneficiary category, making it difficult to differentiate the 
spatial units from each other within the North Great Plain region. 
The objective of our study is to point out the characteristic national territorial 
processes – with special regard to rural areas – and the practice of regional planning 
after the change of the political regime in 1990 on the example of Hajdú-Bihar 
County. This NUTS 3 unit is located in the eastern part of Hungary, near the Hun-
garian–Romanian border; its county centre is Debrecen, the second largest city in 
the country after Budapest. 
The social-economic problems and the challenges of regional development 
planning are investigated by a comparative analysis of the demographic, infra- 
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structural and economic processes in respect of the positioning of the county and 
intra-regional inequalities. 
We will also present the targets (and the dilemmas of planning due to the mani-
fold character of the county) based on a complex situation analysis that fits both the 
national and the European development objectives for the period 2014–2020. The 
effective exploitation of spatial characteristics and the appropriate allocation of 
development resources might contribute to easing territorial problems in the 
county and to its catching up which might also serve European level cohesion. 
Our paper relies on the situation analysis subchapters of the currently shaping 
regional development concept of the county (HBMO 2012). 
Geography of Hajdú-Bihar County 
The area of Hajdú-Bihar County is divided into eleven micro-regions fitting in the 
landscape characteristics. The most important areas are: 
Hortobágy: the salt affected soils and the relatively dry climate make this area 
really characteristic. The fluvial shaped surface is almost completely flat, however, 
the extreme conditions are not appropriate for agricultural cultivation. The natural 
vegetation consists of different grass associations that can be exploited by cattle and 
sheep breeding (besides the production of wheat and potatoes). 
Hajdúság: it is covered by loess that makes the central part of the county ex-
pressively fertile. This area provides the most intensively cultivated agricultural 
land-use. Wheat, maze, sugar beet and autumn barley are the often planted agricul-
tural crops. The Pannonian strata in the depth comprise a significant part of the 
Hungarian natural gas reserves and a dominant part of the thermal water reservoirs.  
South-Nyírség: it is typical due to the aeolian and fluvial forms with sand and 
sandy soils that do not provide appropriate conditions for agricultural production. 
The north-eastern part of the county is characterised by extended forests and areas 
focusing on rye, autumn barley, potatoes and tobacco cultivation. 
Sárrét: the southern part of the county is covered by hydromorphic soils due to 
extended water and swamp surfaces. The river Berettyó and the branches of the 
river Körös formed this territory where different forest associations appear as a 
result of the humid conditions. Besides grasslands, wheat, medick, sunflower and 
red clover fields are the most typical. 
The hydrological conditions of the county are relatively poor (Figure 2). The 
most important river is the Tisza in the western part of the county, the rivers 
Berettyó and Sebes-Körös are in the southern part. The rivers Hortobágy, Kösely 
and the system of Kálló brooks should also be mentioned, but they have modest flow 
rates. Complex utilisation – water management, communal and industrial water 
supply, irrigation, recreation – occurs in the case of the great canals (Western and 
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Figure 2. The natural characteristics of Hajdú-Bihar County 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
Eastern Main Canals). The lakes here are mostly artificial (besides the former river-
beds and low areas with periodical water cover) and are used for fish-breeding or 
recreation. The western and extended southern parts of the county are endangered 
by floods, and besides this, the largest part of Hajdú-Bihar County might be affected 
by high ground water causing damage in agriculture and even in the inner areas of 
settlements. 
The largest part of the Hortobágy territory is protected as the Hortobágy 
National Park which is listed among the world heritage sites by UNESCO. This spe-
cial environment with folk traditions creates one of the most emblematic landscapes 
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of Hungary with important domestic and international tourism. The Hajdúság and 
Bihar landscape protection areas include various valuable natural areas in the 
county. 
Demographic Processes and Human Resources 
Hajdú-Bihar County was fourth in the rank of counties regarding their population 
with its over 538,000 inhabitants in 2012 (it equals 5.4% of the total population of 
Hungary). The general decreasing trend of the population here (–2%) has been more 
moderate than the Hungarian average (–3.8%) since the change of regime in 1990. 
The number of live births is higher, the death rate is lower than the national or the 
“rural”2 average in Hungary. Life expectancy at birth is higher than the rural average, 
but with regard to males it is lower than the national average. The county has a 
negative migration balance resulting in a moderate but unambiguous outmigration. 
The consequences of these demographic trends include the young age structure in 
Hungarian context, lower population density than the national value: only 87 people 
per km2 compared to the Hungarian average of 107 people per km2. 
The demographic processes represent considerable spatial disparities within 
Hajdú-Bihar County (Figure 3). Decreasing population number has been typical ex-
cept for the settlements in the surroundings of Debrecen. The peripheral areas of 
the county – the southern territory and the western part of the county close to the 
river Tisza (usually called inner periphery) – have faced a significant fall in popula-
tion after the millennium (in the case of some settlements the loss has exceeded 20% 
of the population since 2000). This spatial trend is the result of the suburbanisation 
process which has increased the concentration of population and resulted in a natu-
ral decrease and a migration loss at the same time. However, there is a group of 
settlements showing spectacular natural increase accompanied by an ethnic change 
as a result of the rapidly growing rate of the Roma population (e.g. Hencida, Pocsaj, 
Told). The increasing number of Roma population is characteristic in several settle-
ments, the largest communities living in the largest towns of the county (e.g. 
Debrecen, Hajdúhadház, Püspökladány, Balmazújváros, Hajdúböszörmény). The 
rate of increase of Roma population calculated on the basis of the 2011 census data 
showed similar values for the whole of Hungary (3.4 versus 3.1%). However, 
according to the referred expectation, the number of Roma inhabitants was 44,000 
(Pásztor – Pénzes 2012) in 2010, equally approximately 8% of the population (while 
18,546 people declared themselves as Roma during the census in 2011). 
                                                                        
2 “Rural” means here the average value of the counties except Budapest and Pest County. 
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Figure 3. The age structure and demographic expectations in Hajdú-Bihar County 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
Settlements with the youngest age pyramid are concentrated to the east and 
north of Debrecen; at the same time the rapidly aging population of some villages on 
the western and southern territories predicts the depopulation of the smallest 
settlements. 
A specific suburbanisation process can be observed among settlements close to 
Oradea (Romania), but on the Hungarian side of the Romanian border. This phe-
nomenon gives additional importance to the cross-border effect of Oradea on the 
peripheral settlements in the southern part of Hajdú-Bihar County. 
The illustrated territorial disparities of the county can serve as a basis for pre-
dicting the demographic trends: the surroundings of Debrecen might expect an 
increasing number of population, Debrecen and the largest towns of the Hajdúság 
area might be characterised by stagnation, while the southern and western periph-
eries might face a considerable population decrease. 
The level of education in the county is lower than the national average and the 
difference did not decrease between the last two censuses (the position of Hajdú-
Bihar, however, is not poor compared to other counties). Human resources are con-
centrated in the county: Debrecen and its immediate surroundings (and the largest 
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towns) have much higher values than the other settlements (the dominance of 
Debrecen has decreased since 2001). The border area is the most backward from 
this aspect, the low level of education is characteristic here in most of the settle-
ments. Selective migration makes the conditions even worse and conserves this 
problem of human resources. 
The University of Debrecen is one of the largest universities in Hungary with a 
wide spectrum of education. It is an accelerator of human resources development 
and it is responsible for the relationship between education and certain segments of 
the economic sector. 
Explaining Economic Conditions in Hajdú-Bihar County 
Debrecen plays a dominant role in the economy of the county: about two thirds of the 
enterprises and of the gross added value are concentrated in the county centre. 
Hajdúszoboszló and Hajdúböszörmény (close to Debrecen) are the most powerful 
towns in the county, but the role of Balmazújváros, Berettyóújfalu, Hajdúnánás, 
Nádudvar and Püspökladány is also significant (Figure 4). 
The majority of the economic nodes are located in the central region of the county 
(Hajdúság and Hortobágy) which are more developed economically and, 
accordingly, the outward flow of commuters from this region is relatively smaller. 
On the other hand, there are two peripheries characterised by underdeveloped eco-
nomic bases, a lack of local economic centres and – being close to the employment 
centres – by significant flows of commuters. The majority of the commuters in the 
outer periphery are working in Debrecen and a smaller group in Berettyóújfalu. For 
the inner periphery, the neighbouring industrial and township centre Tiszaújváros 
and partly Tiszafüred – the touristic and township centre on the lake Tisza – offer 
employment opportunities. 
The differences in the economic structure of the settlements within the county are 
also remarkable. In the majority of settlements agriculture is overrepresented in the 
employment structure, while in some greater settlements and in the northern part 
of the county industry provides employment. The tertiary sector is overrepresented 
in Debrecen, Berettyóújfalu (central functions), Hajdúszoboszló (tourism sector)  
and in Püspökladány (railway junction). The dominance of agriculture in Nádudvar 
and the strong industrial profile of Téglás are also worth noting. The first settlement 
was a major agricultural production and innovation centre in the socialist era and 
its role has been preserved also after the change of regime. The second town became 
an industrial location in the 1950s when the Hajdúság Industrial Works was estab-
lished, originally for producing armaments. 
The figure also has some information about the potential for future economic 
development: first of all industrial parks and thermal baths play important roles in 
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Figure 4. The economic spatial structure of Hajdú-Bihar County 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
restructuring the local economies. Industrial parks are mostly located in the 
northern part of the county (they were established after the construction of  motor-
ways M3 and M35). The industrial park of the largest area is located in Kaba on the 
premises of the former sugar factory, while industrial parks with the highest eco-
nomic performance are found in Debrecen. The thermal baths can be divided into a 
northern and a southern group: the baths of Hajdúszoboszló and Debrecen are of 
national and international importance, others are mostly regional or local. In addi-
tion to these, the county centre, Debrecen, also has significant research, develop-
ment and innovation facilities. The last component in the figure consists of the so-
called “free enterprise zones” created by the government in underdeveloped areas 
offering preferential economic conditions. 
Infrastructure 
The main road and railway lines provide good connections to Budapest and also 
within the North Great Plain Region (by motorways M3 and M35; and by the main 
railway line number 100). Airport Debrecen is the second Hungarian international 
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airport having flights to London, Eindhoven and (lately) to Dortmund. The current 
(the reconstruction of the Szajol–Püspökladány section of the Budapest–Debrecen–
Záhony main railway line and its continual maintenance) and future developments 
(extending motorway M35, constructing M47 and M4) will make the connection 
between Debrecen (as well as the southern part of Hajdú-Bihar) and Budapest and 
Oradea faster. However, secondary lines and smaller intraregional infrastructure 
would require developments as well. 
The institutional background of the settlements represents significant 
disparities, but most of the towns have the basic institutions to provide various 
services to their inhabitants and the hinterlands (Figure 5). In the territory of the 
inner periphery (in the surroundings of Tiszacsege) and of the southern part of the 
county (besides the north-eastern part of Hajdú-Bihar), public transport to the local 
centres has an outstanding role in supplying the smaller settlements. 
The development level of communal infrastructure (calculated by ten indicators 
with the Bennett method) represents disparities similar to the other previously 
 
 
Figure 5. The elements and development of infrastructure in Hajdú-Bihar County 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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illustrated factors. Towns – mainly the largest ones – have better and more de-
veloped infrastructure (regarding public utilities), while some of the villages espe-
cially in the Bihar area and along the state border can be regarded as under-
developed in this respect. 
Possible Spatial Categories (Synthesis) 
In defining spatial categories, territorially coherent units were detected and simul-
taneously these units were also separated based on their geographical, social-
economic-infrastructural features, their characteristics in the network of settle-
ments and their relations in the spatial pattern. The inwardness of integrated terri-
torial interventions requires this kind approach in the future. The administrative 
district boundaries were also taken into consideration during the delimitation of 
town-village relations (Figure 6). 
Debrecen and its Agglomeration Area 
It overlaps the primarily forest-covered area of South-Nyírség. This is a central area 
from the point of view of population and economic geography and is the most 
important junction of the road and railways networks. Debrecen is in its centre, 
being a regional pole as well, with numerous development possibilities that will be 
decisive in the future. However, in the case of several developments Debrecen 
cannot be treated alone as its influence on and various intensive relations with the 
surrounding settlements necessitate a territorially integrated approach. Most of the 
neighbouring settlements are characterised by increasing population and they 
require economic and infrastructural developments. Many of the small towns in the 
surroundings of Debrecen are strongly influenced by the centre. 
Traditional Agricultural and Small Towns: Hajdúság-Hortobágy 
This spatial category appears on the territory of Hajdúság and Hortobágy. Its 
network of settlements is characterised by middle-small-sized and small towns as 
well as villages (evolved from numerous former farms, concentrating their 
population in one place) without hinterland, with great spatial extent, and with 
limited relations with each other. This part of the county has relatively favourable 
social, economic and infrastructural indicators. Though agriculture has a key role in 
their development, their economic structure is diverse (the role of industry is 
significant in most of these towns and also tourism in some cases). It is important 
from the aspect of environmental management that several settlements are 
surrounded by the Hortobágy National Park. 
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Figure 6. Spatial categories in Hajdú-Bihar County 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
The Southern Periphery: Bihar 
This traditional network of settlements includes most of the area of the Sárrét 
micro-region which consists of small towns with extended hinterlands and of 
middle-sized and small villages. Its peripheral situation is due to its geographical 
location and social-economic-infrastructural backwardness. The centres – 
Berettyóújfalu and Püspökladány – distinguish themselves from the dominantly 
agricultural territory by their development indicators: their relative economic 
importance and infrastructural development are accompanied by their favourable 
geographical transport situation. This territory is connected to the peripheral areas 
of Békés County, the possible development of which can be accelerated by Oradea 
on the other side of the Hungarian–Romanian border. 
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The Inner Periphery along the river Tisza 
This area extending to the flood plains of the Hortobágy and the river Tisza is clearly 
separate from the neighbouring territory of the Hajdúság and Hortobágy by its net-
work of settlements and its disadvantageous social, economic and infrastructural 
indicators. Considering its economic role, the central town (Polgár) is not a domi-
nant centre. The spatial connections of the territory attach it to the neighbouring 
counties (to the commuters’ zone of Tiszaújváros and Tiszafüred). Its development 
basis is different due to the great touristic potential of the environs of the river Tisza 
and to the location of Polgár being close to the junction of important transport cor-
ridors (motorway M3, M30, M35). 
The core message of our present study is that the issues of regional development 
and the effects of territorial investments (partly financed from European resources) 
are relevant. However, these topics would be far-reaching and this is the reason why 
territorial planning was in the focus of our present study. We would refer to a former 
analysis we carried out in these topics (Radics – Pénzes – Molnár 2011, to be pub-
lished). 
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Nowadays on hearing the word ‘responsibility’ we often associate it with corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and there is no shortage of literature on this topic. 
According to literature, citizens, organisations and also the state can take responsi-
bility. Citizens and organisations (firms, civil organisations, etc.) can also accept 
responsibility for their own lives and actions and also for the events in their sur-
roundings, namely social and economic processes. The state can take responsibility 
for the latter as well.  
In accordance with these ideas, there is individual responsibility and social/eco-
nomic responsibility. Personal interests and personal opinions are the most 
important when speaking of individual responsibility. Social responsibility is a little 
more than that: social interests and goals are the most relevant here.  
In our opinion all concerned players are responsible for shaping their environ-
ment, namely it can be stated that all social and economic players and the decision-
makers are jointly responsible for the development of a region. We suggest that so-
cial responsibility is the base for territorial development.   
In our paper first we would like to show the theoretical background to this topic, 
after which, based on a citizen survey (2012–2013), we will show how people can 
contribute to the development of their settlement and region, thus taking responsi-
bility for their lives and their society. 
Social Responsibility 
Definitions 
First we would like to show what we mean by responsibility and who can take re-
sponsibility for whom.  
Responsibility means that a person or other social and economic players are con-
sciously aware of the consequences of their actions. So taking responsibility means 
that the players are aware of the positive and negative consequences of their deci- 
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sions and they do not shift these onto other players (Gaskó 2010). Who can take 
responsibility? 
 Citizens. 
 Organisations, institutions [firms e.g, financial institutions (Borzán et al. 
2011), banks (Lentner et al. 2011), civil/non-profit organisations, health and 
education institutions, other public institutions, etc.]. 
 State. 
Both citizens and organisations can take responsibility for their own lives and 
actions and also for their environment, namely for the society in which they live and 
operate. Based on these thoughts we will separate responsibility into two types: 
 individual responsibility: only the individual interest counts; 
 social/economic responsibility (social issues are in the focus of our paper): 
the goal of the players is to care about social happenings, so the way of 
thinking is at a community level, not at an individual one. 
We believe that these two types can be used for all of the actors, so we can speak 
about the following categories of responsibility: 
 self personal responsibility; 
  individual social responsibility – ISR; 
  corporate responsibility; 
  corporate social responsibility – CSR; 
  civil/non-profit responsibility; 
  civil/non-profit social responsibility; 
  institutional responsibility; 
 institutional social responsibility. 
Individual Responsibility 
When we speak about individual responsibility, we can distinguish between self per-
sonal and individual social responsibility (ISR). Self personal responsibility means 
that people take responsibility for their own lives in the following four contexts: 
1. The citizens’ basic responsibility is to live their life as is good for them: both 
their physiological and intellectual needs should be satisfied. By this it is 
meant that people have to live healthily and be balanced emotionally.  
2. The second level is when people care about their environment if they are 
asked to do so (external intentions). 
3. At this level people care about their environment because of internal inten-
tions. 
4. The highest level is when people also take responsibility for their close sur-
roundings, for example: taking care of siblings or animals, etc.  
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In these four cases responsibility refers only to the citizens’ own and family lives. 
We believe that persons who have no serious psychological problems can take 
responsibility for their lives, and sum up the consequences of their actions.  
If a citizen cares about both his/her close and wider environment, we can speak 
about individual social responsibility. This means that citizens are involved in the 
life of the community where they live. That is, people solve problems together, look 
after the environment (for example, they do not litter, etc.) and care about not just 
their own lives, but also about the community.   
We think that citizens can take responsibility in the following ways: 
 for other people: caring about other people (for example, behaving in a way 
that causes no negative consequences for others), helping poor people, donat-
ing for charity, helping people suffering from the negative effects of disasters, 
etc; 
 for local public issues (public services); 
 for the development of the settlement or a region: participation in the devel-
opment process; 
 for the environment: people are aware of the environmental issues; 
 for civil/non-profit organisations in the following ways: establish  an organi-
sation, membership in an organisation, donations, one per cent donation of 
personal income tax, as an employment, as a volunteer. 
With these actions citizens can assume responsibility for all members of society 
in the following two ways: 
 at an individual level; 
 at an organisational level, when citizens join a civil/non-profit organisation 
and help other people through their activity in the organisation.  
It is very important to mention that citizens will only be able to take responsi-
bility for each other if they are able to do this in their private life. And even the other 
social and economic players will only be able to do this if the members and leaders 
of their organisations are aware of it and practise it in their private life. So we think 
that every activity at a social level depends on how the people can accept responsi-
bility for each other. 
Responsibility of the Civil/Non-profit Organisations 
At an individual level organisations have to operate in a balanced way; in that case 
they can take responsibility for their environment. What do we mean by balanced 
operation? Effective operation of organisations depends on internal and external 
factors. The external factors are determined by the state and by the economic situa-
tion of a country. These factors are as follows: laws, political environment, economic 
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aspects, etc. Organisations have to accept these factors, and have to adjust to the 
situation of a country. Contrarily, internal factors are dependent on the organisa-
tions: proper income structure, effective leadership, motivated employees, wide-
spread relationships, clear view about the future, flexibility, etc.  
If the organisations face financial and leadership problems, they cannot concen-
trate on their goals and tasks, so they are not able to take responsibility for their 
own actions. In this case they cannot assume responsibility for their environment 
and society either. So we think that being socially responsible requires effective 
actions. If organisations cannot satisfy the needs of their members and the actors 
affected by their activity, they are not able to take responsibility for society.1 But it 
would be just the basic role of a civil/non-profit organisation. Vidal et al. (2005) note 
that assuming responsibility for society by firms is a voluntary task, but in the case 
of civil/non-profit organisations it is an integral part of their existence. 
In everyday life civil/non-profit organisations can take responsibility for society 
in the following ways: 
 organising programmes for the members and for other players; 
 publishing leaflets, books; 
 being involved in the decision-making process of the local government  civil 
control; 
 activity in public issues; 
 offering special services; 
 maintaining institutions; 
 employing well-trained people; 
 participating actively in settlement development. 
2. Social Participation 
If citizens and other players take responsibility for society, it means that they par-
ticipate in the everyday life of a settlement or in the development of a territorial unit. 
If we speak only about the participation of citizens and civil/non-profit organisa-
tions, it is called ‘social participation’.2 Social participation means (Reisinger 2009) 
that citizens and civil/non-profit organisations have the opportunity to communi-
cate their ideas and opinions about what is going on in their settlement, region or 
country. This is the form of appearance of social responsibility. If these players 
assume responsibility for their environment, they will participate in those forums, 
                                                                        
1 This idea has a lot of similarity with the responsibility at individual level.  
2 In the international literature it is often mentioned as ‘public participation’ or ‘citizen/community 
participation’. 
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etc. where they can express their willingness to care for other people. In our opinion, 
there are two main aspects of this participation: 
1. With local or regional decision-makers (co-operating with local or regional 
decision-makers): mainly participating in the development of a settlement or 
a region; making laws. 
2. Citizens themselves through individual or civil/non-profit organisation 
actions: issues which do not need local authorities are mainly local affairs 
affecting people living in a certain settlement or village (e.g.: collecting litters, 
having trouble with noisy neighbours, etc.).    
Both decision-makers and citizens as well ascivil/non-profit organisations must 
be aware that the society in which they are living and operating will be more effec-
tive ifthe players show their willingness to give their opinions on social and eco-
nomic issues and on development. 
All these things can only come true if the (local) government gives the people the 
opportunity to express their opinions about their lives and their settlement. To do 
this, the (local) governments, too, have to change their way of thinking about 
managing a settlement and its development. The tasks of the local governments in 
this case are to ensure not only local services, but also opportunities for the local 
players to participate. This kind of approach is the new way of operation of local 
governments. The Table 1. shows the old and the new tasks of local governments. 
The new way is called local governance, where the citizens and the civil/non-profit 
organisations play the main role in a settlement. The local decision-makers provide 
only the framework for social participation, and if needed they co-ordinate the 
process. 
Table 1. The old and the new tasks of local governments 
Old view (20th century model) New view (21st century model) 
Local governments are in  focus citizens and their organisations are in focus 
Local governments are responsible to the 
central government 
local governments are responsible to citizens 
Closed and slow model opened and flexible model 
Try to avoid risk innovative and risk taker 
Totally dependent form the central 
government 
has the right to decide on everything 
Bureaucratic has participatory approach 
Centralised glocalised 
Source: Shah 2006. 
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We believe that the base of the development of a settlement or a region is social 
responsibility and participation. The question is why? When people are asked what 
they would like to develop in their settlement, this has a positive effect on the 
settlement budget and people feel better because their opinions are taken into 
consideration. In such a situation, projects – supported by the local players – are 
likely to be successful not only in the short, but also in the long term, and can serve 
not only the interests of politicians but also those of other players. Furthermore, the 
results of the development are accepted also by the local players, so protests against 
the development processes will not occur. This type of development can save a lot 
of money for the settlement and also for the country, because the development plans 
are thus harmonised, and projects with no future will not be carried out.  
If citizens are aware of their important role in the development processes, and 
they really take part in them, they will realise that the use of the local and national 
funds are effective, and also trust in local and state players can deepen, which in turn 
can strengthen democracy in the country. In such a case all of the tasks of the state 
administration can be fulfilled more effectively; and people can live in a better 
society.  
Based on a national research carried out in 2012–2013, we try to answer here 
the question what kind of opportunities citizens have for expressing their opinions.  
3. Questionnaire Research 
Methodology 
The goal of the survey3 was to get information from citizens about their opinions 
and actions regarding social responsibility. In this paper we use only those data from 
this questionnaire which relate tothe methods of social responsibility/participation: 
 The main question is whether the local government has ever asked people 
about settlement development. If yes, in what way?  
 We also wanted to know what kind of local forums, etc. the citizens have ever 
participated in. 
 Ourlast question was how people felt about the effect they had on the life of 
their settlement.  
Our hypothesis was that less than half of the citizens had had a voice in the de-
velopment of their settlement and the citizens having expressed their opinion would 
feel that they had some effect on the life of their settlement. 
                                                                        
3 The survey was made together with my colleague Márta Nárai, PhD, Széchenyi István University. 
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We carried out our paper based and on-line national survey between April 2012 
and March 2013. It must be noted that with 1071 people having filled in the ques-
tionnaires, our sample is not represent the Hungarian citizens, so we can draw our 
conclusions only about those who participated.  
About half of the sample is under the age of 30, so there are a lot of students 
(35%). The ratio of women to men is 65%. The ratio of people who have a higher 
education degree is about 37%, much higher than the average in our society. About 
three-quarters of our sample live in a town or city.  
3.2. Are People Asked for their Opinions by the Local Governments? 
Only 28.2% of the sample said that they had been asked by the local government 
about the development or local issues in their settlement. About 55.7% of them said 
that they had filled in a questionnaire in settlement issues, also forums were men-
tioned quite often (39.2%). Other methods (for example: interviews, telephone or 
personal surveys) were rarely mentioned. It is very good that 81.8% of these people 
said they took the opportunity and gave their opinions on a certain issue. 12.5% of 
people asked were uninterested and 5.7% of them rejected the opportunity. These 
ratios are not very high, but show that people can be uninterested in these issues 
even if asked.  
Although there are no strong connections, we can say that the following demo-
graphic characteristics significantly determined the positive answer: 
 above the age of 30; 
 high qualifications; 
 living in a village; 
 working as an employee or retired; 
 married; 
 high income. 
Based on these results, we can conclude that people have more opportunities to 
voice their opinions in small settlements. Some former research also had the same 
results (e.g. Nárai 2008, Reisinger 2010). People with higher income and qualifica-
tions said in greater number that they had been asked, which is not surprising as 
they are more interested in local issues, so local governments find them more easily.  
Types of Citizen Participation 
We were interested in how people took part in the activities of their settlements. 
90.1% of the sample said they participated at least on one occasion. It sounds good, 
but as we can see in Figure 1, most of the sample marked only the election and the 
referendum which political decisions and not to everyday issues. Besides these, only 
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local forums were mentioned relatively often (29.5%), which is a citizen participa-
tory opportunity provided by the local governments regulated by law. The partici-
pants are mainly employed citizens with higher qualifications having a net income 
above 120,000 Ft (about 400 euros). Public hearing is a similar practice, but it was 
mentioned only by 9.5% of the sample. Other methods very rarely occur as these are 
seldom practised in Hungary, if at all. 
Of course participation also depends on the local governments, mainly because 
they organise most of these forums, etc. So if there are no opportunities for the citi-
zens provided by the local governments, there is not much left for them to take part 
in.  
 
Figure 1. Types of citizen participation in percentages (n=1053) 
Source: Based on the authors’ questionnaire research 
3.4. Attitude towards the Effect of their Contribution towards the Settlement 
We asked people to rank their feelings about the success of their contribution to the 
development of their settlement. Figure 2 shows the results. 84.3% of the sample 
said that their contribution had some effect or no effect at all on the life of their 
settlement. There is significant relationship between the feeling of contribution and 
the opportunities given by the local government to citizens to give their opinions. 
When people have the opportunity, they usually feel that they have some effect on 
the affairs of their settlement.    
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Figure 2. Opinions about the effect of citizen contribution on the life of the settlement given 
by citizens on a 1 to 10 scale, in percentages (n=1027) 
Source: Based on the authors’questionnaire research. 
Summary 
In the theoretical part of our paper we suggested that social responsibility is the 
base of settlement or regional development. If citizens and other local players can 
take responsibility for their own lives, they will be able to do the same for society, 
too. It means that players feel that they have to do something for the local society by 
voicing their opinions about the settlement. It is very important that local govern-
ments be open to this type of development, namely they have to give citizens the 
opportunity to speak about their goals, ideas and express their opinions about com-
munity affairs. We believe when citizens and other players have this opportunity, it 
benefits the settlement, because thus every action realised will be accepted by them, 
resulting in a higher level of satisfaction among people.  
In our research we tried to find out what kind of participatory opportunities 
citizens have at their settlements. We carried out a questionnaire research which 
was completed by 1071 people. Our hypothesis was that less than half of the citizens 
had had a voice in the development of their settlement and those citizens who had 
participated felt that they had some effect on the life of their settlement. Our hypoth-
esis was partly correct. Only 28.2% of the sample said that they had been asked by 
the local government about the settlement’s development and other local issues. 
Thisis much lower than expected. On the one hand, it is likely that people are not 
particularly motivated regarding these issues, but on the other hand, we do not 
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neither particularly active, or on the contrary, they are, but people are not very 
interested. We only know from these results that people in our sample are not very 
active. That is why it is no surprise that more than three quarters of these citizens 
feel they have no effect on the affairs of their settlement. We think that this is not 
good in the long term, because people will not enjoy living in a community where 
they cannot give their opinions and ideas as nobody is interested in them. The re-
sults support the second part of our hypothesis.  
What is the solution? We believe that politicians as well as citizens and other 
players have to be open to take the opportunities to speak about the future of their 
settlement. It is true that by this decision-making processes will take longer, but the 
settlements will be more successful and ultimately such communal processes will 
benefit both society and the economy in the long run.  
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THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
IN THE SOUTH PANNONIAN REGION* 
Sándor Zsolt Kovács 
Analysing banking, insurance and other financial, investment services at regional 
level, some essential conclusions can be drawn, since these services dynamically 
adapt to and predict the growth potentials of regions. The extent of banking activity, 
the volume of individual savings and loans, the rate of progress in insurances and 
financial investments are all indicators monitored constantly by both companies 
and international institutions (Juhász 2009). This important subject has not been 
researched yet, therefore, when studying businesses regionally, researchers often 
face the problem of lacking data. Although Croatian and Slovenian datasets, statistics 
are available, lower than national level analyses of the financial field are rare. 
Similarly to their administrative structure, countries also have their own finan-
cial institutions which can vary from a centralised one-tier banking system to multi-
tier systems including local-regional elements. Due also to their diversity, when the 
financial structure of a territorial unit smaller than the national level is studied, dis-
tortions can inevitably be observed. The characteristics of the territorial unit we are 
studying are not negligible, neither are the efficiency of the examined region and 
whether its country belongs to the centre or the periphery. In this respect it is a 
complex situation, because as a result of border changes in the Balkan, the examined 
territory can now be found in two countries, including the central counties of Croatia 
and two peripheral counties in Slovenia. Thus the mentioned distortions will be sig-
nificant in the Slovenian data where nothing counterpoises the “overweight” of the 
capital citywhich is located in the Croatian territory examined. 
Structural Changes in the Banking, Financial Servicing Sector in Croatia 
and Slovenia after the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 
The 1990s were a period of changing political systems in Central and Eastern 
Europe, accompanied by the long-lasting transition of the West Balkan (the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia) involving several crisis situations. In the course of this, the finan- 
                                                                        
* Research for this publication has been supported under OTKA – Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund grant No. 104985 (New driving forces of spatial restructuring and regional 
development paths in Eastern Europe at the beginning of 21st century). 
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cial system of this territory also disintegrated. Following the collapse of the inte-
grated Yugoslav financial system, the newly formed nation states established their 
own monetary institutional systems (central banks, supervisory bodies, etc.) rather 
quickly. The economies of these countries are characterised by a strong dominance 
of the banking sector in financial transactions and capital allocation (Gál 2010a), so 
our South Pannonian study will also concentrate on this field. 
It was not deficiency in the system of monetary institutions that caused the pro-
longed financial crisis, but rather that reforms of the financial system were post-
poned in most of the countries in the region (except Slovenia) and that the banks 
were not privatised on a large scale until the end of the 1990s. The first phase of the 
bank reform in the early 1990s consisted in establishing a two-tier system and ap-
proaching the international standards of risk management. During this time the 
banking systems of these new countries were characterised by quantitative rather 
than qualitative changes. 
Then a surge in the number of private banks led to having too many banks in all 
countries of the region. Croatia ranked first with its 54 banks in 1995, of which there 
was only one in foreign ownership (Golubovic–Golubovic 2005). Towards the end 
of the 1990s the following factors urged the bank reforms to be speeded up: 
 financial institutions worked under unregulated and not properly controlled 
business conditions; 
 the expansion of banks was accompanied by scandals; 
 the discredited financial institutions found it difficult to attract clients and 
their money, and thus to increase their loan portfolio and clientele;  
 banks in state ownership remained burdened with the toxic loans of big firms 
having been financed by the state irresponsibly (Gál 2010a). 
In addition to examining the general trends in the former Yugoslavia, we shall 
deal briefly with the bank reforms in these two countries as well. 
The fastest bank reform was carried out in Slovenia where the bank sector 
became well developed in the 1990s. The main elements of this reform were: (1) 
state guarantee for deposits in the central bank in Belgrade; (2) increased role of the 
state in the early phase of the reform; and (3) nationalisation of the biggest banks. 
As a result of consolidation, the number of banks decreased by 36% between 1995 
and 2012 (Table 1). 
As Croatia had a two-tier banking system already before gaining independence, 
it was adaptation to market conditions and international standards that played the 
prime role in the initial period of transition and restructuring. The 26 banks having 
operated in Croatia in 1990 became gradually privatised. As compensation for the 
deposits “trapped” in Belgrade, the Croatian state issued bonds, then consolidated 
the banks in two steps (first with a sum equal to 23%, then to 6%, of the GDP), which 
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 Table 1. The number of banks in Croatia and Slovenia 
Year Croatia Slovenia 
1995 54 39 
2000 43 28 
2005 37 25 
2010 33 25 
2012 32 25 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data from the central 
banks (1996–2012). 
was followed by bank privatisation. As a result of the bank consolidations and 
fusions, the number of banks decreased by 41% by 2012 compared to 1995 (see 
Table 1). 
The Slovenian bank reform was characterised by the strengthening of local 
banks, and it was only after this that foreign investors were cautiously allowed to 
enter the banking market. The ratio of banks in foreign ownership was only 12% in 
2000, then it started to grow, but it has remained far below the average of this area. 
According to recent data, the ratio of foreign banks is the smallest in Slovenia (39%), 
compared not only to the Balkan, but also to the whole of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Banka Slovenije 2012). Almost three quarters of the Slovenian banking 
market belong to Slovenian private or state owned banks (the ratio owned by the 
state was 22.7% in 2011). Croatia followed a different path. The first foreign owned 
bank in Croatia was the Raiffeisen Zentralbank which opened its branches in 1995, 
then came the German and Italian banks from 1998, when bank privatisation 
started. In 2000 out of the 43 banks 20 were in foreign majority ownership and only 
three remained state owned. Between 1996 and 2012 the ratio of foreign banks in 
banking assets grew from 1% to 90.6% (Table 2) (Hrvatska Narodna Banka 2013). 
Table 2. Ownership structure in the Croatian and Slovenian banking systems (%) 















2000 5.7 10.2 84.1 36.8 51.2 12.0 
2005 3.4 5.3 91.3 18.2 46.9 34.9 
2010 4.3 5.4 90.3 20.1 42.9 37.1 
2011 4.5 4.8 90.7 22.7 38.3 39.0 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of data from the central banks (2001–2012). 
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The Structure of Banking Services in the South Pannonian Region 
From a historical point of view, the first credit unions already existed in the territory 
of Banat at the time of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy (1867–1918). At that time 
here was the highest network density of local financial institutions based on the co-
operative principle. However, in the early 1900s there were very few commercial 
banks in this area, namely, there was only one branch, in the town of Eszék (now  
Osijek), of the remarkable Hungarian Commercial Bank of Pest (Gál 2010b). 
As already mentioned, following the transition in this area, banks had strong 
dominance within the financial sector over the other financial services (stock ex-
change, institutional investors).  
As regards the assets of the banking sector, they are equal to 86% of the GDP 
calculated at purchasing power parity in Croatia, while it is 137% in Slovenia. The 
former value supports our statement, whereas that of Slovenia is approaching the 
western ones (200–300%). 
The territorial structure of the banking systems in these two countries is cen-
tralised in terms of assets, but in respect of branches and headquarters there are 
also some elements of decentralisation. This is more characteristic of Croatia due to 
its geographical location. Out of the 32 banks in South Pannonia 22 have their head-
quarters on Croatian territory, while only 4 of the 22 banks in Slovenia have their 
headquarters on Slovenian territory, namely in Maribor (Podravska). Furthermore, 
out of the 10 biggest banks 9 are registered on the Croatian side and 1 on the Slove-
nian side of the South Pannonian region. The much higher Croatian numbers are due 
to territorial characteristics. As we have already mentioned, the Croatian side of the 
examined territory includes the capital city and its surroundings (altogether 12 
counties), whereas the Slovenian one consists of two peripheral counties (Kovács 
2013). 
It is also a distorting factor that while 55% of the Croatian branch network can 
be found on South Pannonian territory, only less than 21% of all of the Slovenian 
branches are located here (Table 3). It is worth examining the data in Table 3 in 
detail. Following the European consolidation trends, the number of banks in Croatia 
started to decrease after the turn of the millennium, then there was a slow increase 
in the network of branches until 2009, which was followed by another decrease (Gál 
2010a).Finally, there were 1266 branches in Croatia in 2011. The latter decline was 
the result of the crisis, during which the number of branches was reduced by 2.4% 
on a national scale compared to 2009, while in respect of South Pannonia this figure 
was 0.6%. The reason for this more favourable South Pannonian datum is that the 
liquidation and relocation of branches affected the central counties muchless than 
the coastal and the remote ones. Moreover, in the County of Zagreb the network 
even grew by 13 new branches. There was a reverse trend in the number of ATMs 
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Table 3. Territorial distribution of bank branches and ATMs in South Pannonia 
Counties/Regions/Countries Number of 
bank braches, 
pcs 
Ratio of bank 






Ratio of ATMs 
in the whole 
country, 
% 
Zagreb city and county 301 23.8 1,136 28.6 
Krapina-Zagorje 30 2.4 93 2.3 
Varaždin 44 3.5 133 3.3 
Koprivnica-Križevci 33 2.6 69 1.7 
Medimurje 27 2.1 82 2.1 
Sisak-Moslavina 37 2.9 111 2.8 
Bjelovar-Bilogora 27 2.1 72 1.8 
Vitrovitica-Podravina 27 2.1 41 1.0 
Požega-Slavonia 25 2.0 50 1.3 
Slavonski Brod-Posavina 30 2.4 71 1.8 
Osijek-Baranja 85 6.7 200 5.0 
Vukovar-Srijem 30 2.4 107 2.7 
Croatian South Pannonia 696 55.0 2165 54.5 
Croatia 1,266 – 3975 – 
Podravina 95 14.1 281 15.2 
Pomurska 41 6.1 104 5.6 
Slovenian South Pannonia 136 20.2 385 20.9 
Slovenia 675 – 1,845 – 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of 2012 data from Hrvatska Narodna Banka and 
Banka Slovenija. 
in recent years. The constant rise continued after 2009 and until the end of the first 
half of 2012 450 new machines started to operate in the country, which means 
12.5% increase, and more than  half of them were put into operation in 12 counties 
under study (Hrvatska Narodna Banka 2012). 
As regards the network density of branches, the situation is clearly more 
favourable in the more urbanised counties. 23.8% of the branches are concentrated 
in Zagreb County, while the coastal areas rank second. Osijek-Baranja might also be 
mentioned with its 6.7%. The effects of the crisis can naturally be found in the 
county data as well. After 2008new branches were opened in only three Croatian 
counties (Zagreb, Osijek-Baranja, Medimurje), which altered the above ratio a little. 
It was a positive development that there was no big wave of closing branches in this 
region, only four of them finished operation in the first half of 2009, 1-1 in Krapina-
Zagorje and Varaždin and 2 in Vukovar-Srijem counties. Overall, in longer term, 
there was a decrease in the number of branches until 2012, which is partly due to 
the bankruptcy of Obrtnička Banka d.d. As a result of all these changes between 2009 
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and 2012, there was a significant rise in the number of branches in Zagreb County, 
Vukovar-Srijem County got two more, while the rest of the South Pannonian coun-
ties suffered losses to various degrees (Hrvatska Narodna Banka 2001; 2012). 
The largest number of ATMs can also be found in the capital city and in Zagreb 
County, albeit their 33.7% share at the turn of the millennium was decreasing till 
2003; since then they have kept their 28–29% share. They are followed in rank by 
Osijek-Baranja County where its 3% share in 2000 grew to 5% by the end of 2012 
(Hrvatska Narodna Banka 2001; 2012). 
As regards the two examined Slovenian counties, they possess 20.1% of the 
branches and 20.9% of the ATMs in Slovenia. Here, too, the larger settlements (es-
pecially Maribor) are overrepresented. There are only two settlements without a 
bank. Beside Maribor, Murska Sobota and Pluj have more than ten branches, while 
at the other settlements of the Mura and Drava Regions one or two branches or 
offices can be found. The presence of the headquarters of four big banks, namely, 
Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor, Postna Banka, Probanka and Raiffeisen Banka also 
contributes to the “overweight” of Maribor. Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor is the 
second largest bank in Slovenia. 
The two studied counties are similar with regard to their networks of both 
branches and ATMs. At the same time, while Podravska region is above the national 
average, Pomurska region is below it in both respects. In the longer run, the 95 
branches and 281 ATMs in 2012 in Drava district are the result of continual growth: 
the number of branches started to grow from 76 in 1997, then following the 2008 
decline it grew again. Developments in Mura district were similar: the 36 branches 
in 1997 grew to 46 by 2007, then there was a decline to 40 as a consequence of the 
crisis, to become 41 in 2012 (Banka Slovenija 2012). 
In addition to the composition of the networks of branches, their accessibility is 
also important. It is a generally accepted view that services should be concentrated 
and so they cannot be accessed at every settlement. This greatlycontributes to the 
inter-settlement relations in societies of our time (Beluszky–Győri 2004). It might 
be suitable to study the network density of the territorial units in questionin the case 
of branch networks (Table 4). 
First let us compare the data at country level. Both the Croatian (3385) and the 
Slovenian (3045) values are similar to the Hungarian (3220) one, however, all of 
them are lagging behind the West European data (Austria 850, Switzerland 1200, 
Germany 1600) (Kovács 2011). The high values indicate that branch networks 
should be developed in both countries. This holds true even if one can recently 
witness shrinking networks everywhere as a consequence of the crisis. 
First let us compare the data at country level. Both the Croatian (3385) and the 
Slovenian (3045) values are similar to the Hungarian (3220) one, however, all of 
them are lagging behind the West European data (Austria 850, Switzerland 1200, 
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Table 4. Density of bank branches and ATMs in South Pannonia 
 Branch network density 
(population per branch) 
ATM density 
(population per ATM) 
Zagreb city and county 1,055 280 
Krapina-Zagorje 4,430 1,429 
Varaždin 3,999 1,323 
Koprivnica-Križevci 3,503 1,675 
Medimurje 4,215 1,388 
Sisak-Moslavina 4,661 1,554 
Bjelovar-Bilogora 4,436 1,663 
Vitrovitica-Podravina 3,142 2,069 
Požega-Slavonia 3,121 1,561 
Slavonski Brod-Posavina 5,286 2,233 
Osijek-Baranja 3,589 1,525 
Vukovar-Srijem 5,984 1,678 
Croatian South Pannonia 2,808 903 
Croatia 3,385 1,078 
Podravina 3,404 1,151 
Pomurska 2,916 1,150 
Slovenian South Pannonia 3,257 1,150 
Slovenia 3,045 1,114 
Source: Compiled by the author on the basis of 2012 data from Hrvatska Narodna Banka and 
Banka Slovenija. 
Germany 1600) (Kovács 2011). The high values indicate that branch networks 
should be developed in both countries. This holds true even if one can recently 
witness shrinking networks everywhere as a consequence of the crisis. 
First let us compare the data at country level. Both the Croatian (3385) and the 
Slovenian (3045) values are similar to the Hungarian (3220) one, however, all of 
them are lagging behind the West European data (Austria 850, Switzerland 1200, 
Germany 1600) (Kovács 2011). The high values indicate that branch networks 
should be developed in both countries. This holds true even if one can recently 
witness shrinking networks everywhere as a consequence of the crisis. 
In Slovenia the average value of the two studied counties is similar to the national 
average in respect of branch density. The higher value of Drava district which has 
more branches, compared to that of Mura district, is due to its about three times as 
high population with twice as big network of branches. The network density value 
in Slovenian South Pannonia is higher than the national average. 
As regards ATM density, the two countries have similar national values. At 
county level, the degree of difference in the case of Zagreb and its environs is salient 
(280), while the deviation among the other Croatian counties is only one third of 
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that in the case of branch network. The two counties are similar in respect of ATM 
density and are close to the national average (Kovács 2013). 
In addition to analysing the branch network, it is also worth studying the ratio of 
employment in the examined territorial units within the financial services sector 
(Figure 1). Some trends are discernible in the Figure. On the Croatian side 
employment level is lower in the counties surrounding the capital city of Zagreb, 
which is presumably due to the high number of people commuting to the capital. We 
can find medium level employment in the Croatian counties near the Hungarian 
border because of the significant towns there (Osijek, Vukovar, Čakovec) (Kovács 
2014). On the Slovenian side employment in these two regions is affected both by 
the number of branches in Drava district, which is greater than in Mura district, and 
also by the fact that four commercial banks have their headquarters in Maribor. 
 
Figure 1. Employment in financial services in the examined regions in 2011 (%) 
Source: Based on the author’s own calculations. 
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Some Features of the Insurance Sector in South Pannonia 
In Croatia the insurance sector is even more concentrated than the banking system. 
All of the insurance companies active in Croatia have their headquarters in Zagreb. 
It goes without saying that the branch network is extensive here too, the 38 
insurance (17 life, 20 “other”, and 1 reinsurance) companies have a network of 218 
branches. The insurance market is much smaller than the banking one, the assets of 
the life insurance segment, for example, were 155.5 million, those of the “other” 
segment 496.5 million euros in the first half of 2012 (HANFA 2012a). 
On the Slovenian part of South Pannonia we can find the headquarters of two 
universal insurance companies, both of them in Maribor. From among the 21 
companies in Slovenia, Zavarovalnica Maribor d.d. ranked third in life insurance and 
fourth in other than life insurances, while GRAWE Insurance ranked seventh and 
ninth, respectively, in 2012. Market concentration is high, the share of the five 
biggest insurance companies is 76.75%, and the biggest Zavarovalnica Maribor has 
12.84% (Agencija za zavarovalni nadzor 2012). 
Summary 
There is sharp contrast in South Pannonia between its two territories belonging to 
Croatia and Slovenia, respectively, as regards their financial markets. The big dif-
ferences can be discerned in the extension of the banking network, the location of 
the bank headquarters, and in network density. The central counties in Croatia have 
higher indicator values, that is, they are in a better position, than the two examined 
Slovenian areas. 
The contrast is similar in their centralised insurance markets, as all the head-
quarters of the insurance companies in Croatia can be found in South Pannonia, 
while in Slovenia only two insurance headquarters are located in South Pannonian 
territory. 
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THEORETICAL COMMENTS ON THE CONCEPT 
OF TERRITORIAL CAPITAL 
Ákos Bodor*– Zoltán Grünhut 
Introduction 
Although the model of territorial capital elaborated by Roberto Camagni, professor 
at Politecnico di Milano, was published just a few years ago in a volume edited by 
Capello et al. (2008), nowadays his concept seems to become a theoretical milestone 
of regional studies.1 Moreover, it outgrows the character of a scientific theory, it is 
an applied model for conceptualising the development policy of the European Union 
(EU), in order to help planners and strategy-makers. The model of territorial capital 
is a methodological approach which is useful in analysing more scientifically the 
goals and directives of the EU policies on territorial competitiveness, territorial 
cohesion, local and regional sustainable economic growth as well as on innovation-
capacity building. At the same time, the concept is in harmony with the theoretical 
pillars of the EU’s development policy, such as “endogeny-based” progression, the 
favouring of place-based approaches and the facilitation of bottom-up capability 
strengthening. Thus, it is unable to keep appropriate distance from the mainstream 
policy directions. 
Besides the model having a growing role in EU development policy practices, 
there are an increasing number of empirical studies based on this concept, and not 
just with the aim to aggregate local-regional resources generally in accordance with 
the facilitation of economic growth, prosperity and well-being, but also with more 
specific goals. For instance, Casi and Resmini (2012) used the theory of Camagni to 
measure the capacity of different regions to attract foreign direct investments; 
Capello, Caragliu and Nijkamp (2009) analysed the relation between knowledge-
building and territorial resources; Brasili et al. (2012) and Mazzola et al. (2012) fo-
                                                                        
* Ákos Bodor’s research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-
financed by the European Social Fund in the framework of TÁMOP 4.2.4. A/1-11-1-2012-
0001 ‘National Excellence Program’. 
1 Our paper focuses solely on Camagni’s concept because, on the one hand, the other related 
territorial capital theories are based on his model and just try to improve its side aspects, 
while on the other hand, they are undoubtedly less comprehensive and systematic. 
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cused on the interactions between regional capabilities and the ability to compen-
sate the negative impacts of the economic recession, while Kyvelou et al. (2012) 
compared the level of territorial capital and the number of green power, cleantech 
investments. In Hungary, Tóth (2011) measured the specificities of the middle-sized 
cities by this model, while Jóna (2013a) analysed territorial resources at the NUTS 
4 level. Camagni’s concept had an important role in two ESPON projects as well 
[EDORA – European Development Opportunities for Rural Areas (2010); and 
ATTREG – The Attractiveness of European Regions and Cities for Residents and Visi-
tors (2013)]. 
Despite the ever-growing interest in the territorial capital approach, until now 
there has been no comprehensive, theoretic-centric critical analysis of Camagni’s 
model, just some additional remarks, mainly on methodological aspects. In the 
course of reviewing the empirical studies we also realised some methodological 
challenges, like e.g. the excessive quantitative orientation of the model and the 
problem of missing qualitative validation, a control mechanism which could be 
useful in connection with specific resources and goods (such as social capital), or the 
lack of dynamism that makes data processing very static without taking into account 
tenders. Of course, the questions of measurability, adequacy and actuality, as well as 
the always problematic use of indicators deserve special discussion in each case. 
This paper does not intend to test the practical applicability of the model, rather 
it concentrates on theoretical comments and their significance. First Camagni’s 
concept is presented, then the main remarks according to the two basic components, 
the “traditional square” and the “innovative cross”, are specified. Following this, the 
relations between these matrix components are analysed, and a partly revised, “re-
dimensioned” illustration of the model is proposed. Finally, the paper makes 
comments on the embeddedness of this concept into EU development policy. 
Camagni’s Territorial Capital Concept 
Camagni (2009) created a three-by-three matrix in order to aggregate the elements 
of territorial capital figuring in his conception (Figure 1). According to his idea, the 
nine cells of the model encompass all potential and relevant resources of a territory. 
In this huge challenge the author invokes the help of two traditional aspects of eco-
nomic literature – rivalry and materiality – in order to classify the collected ele-
ments.  
Following the common interpretation of rivalry, Camagni distinguishes public 
goods from private goods. Between the “pure” public and private categories are 
located the impure public goods and the club goods as a third intermediate category 
in the rivalry dimension. The characteristics of public goods are that individuals 
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Figure 1. The theoretical taxonomy of the elements of territorial capital 
Source: Camagni 2009, 123. 
cannot be excluded from their use, as their use by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others. In the case of intermediate goods, one of these premises is not 
satisfied. Cells at the bottom of Figure 1 are the pure public goods and going up 
vertically we can find increasingly rivalry goods. 
Materiality, which is the other arranging dimension of the model, changes in the 
horizontal direction. We can find the so-called tangible (hard) goods in the left cells. 
The left lower corner consists of the elements of infrastructure, natural and cultural 
resources as well as material public goods (A). In Camagni’s view these goods form 
the basis of the general attractiveness of a local territory, and they can produce ex-
ternalities which enhance the profitability of local activities. One step up along the 
rivalry axis, the tangible goods with impure characteristics are located (B). These 
are proprietary networks in transport, communication and energy; and collective 
goods made up of a mix of public and privately owned goods like urban and rural 
landscape, or the complementary assets defining a cultural heritage system. Private 
fixed capital stock and its pecuniary externalities as well as toll goods are listed 
among tangible private goods (C).  
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Public goods with mixed (hard and soft) features are the following (G): 
Agencies for R&D transcoding - Transfer organisations, operating in the field of 
knowledge accumulation and diffusion, mainly in the form of public agencies facili-
tating interaction among actors. Camagni sees the importance of these agencies in 
their “mission to create a common language and shared understanding” among the 
different players. 
Receptivity enhancing tools – According to the short description of this category, 
receptivity is an ability to extract the highest benefit from access to places, services 
or information.2 
Connectivity – This notion refers to the “conscious” exploitation of geographical 
proximity which allows the actors to collect information and to organise transac-
tions effectively.  
Agglomeration and district economies – Cities and industrial districts play a key 
role in Camagni’s concept. He conceives them on the basis of their important simi-
larities in theoretical terms in spite of their geographical and economic differences. 
Such common features are proximity and high density of activities, concentration of 
social overhead capital, density of interaction, high cohesion and a sense of belong-
ing. According to Camagni, these similarities reinforce different economic ad-
vantages like the reduction in transaction costs and cross-externalities.3 
The cell in the centre of the matrix (H) contains mixed goods of both dimensions. 
One of them is co-operation networks, which category has two additional subcatego-
ries: 
1. strategic alliances in R&D and knowledge, and 
2. p/p partnerships in services and schemes. 
The other component of this cell is governance on land and cultural resources. 
Camagni describes the new forms of governance as “a field characterized by both 
market failures and government failures, but also by huge risks of contradictory 
strategies and undesirable outcomes if individual, piecemeal, non-cooperative pri-
vate decisions are not controlled” (Camagni 2009, 128). Relational private goods (I) 
are private goods and mixed goods in the dimension of materiality. They are “crucial 
services with a relational nature and supplied entirely by the market: for example, 
when firms search for external partners and suppliers (through financial institu-
tions or specialized consultancy agencies), or in the cases of technological transfer, 
                                                                        
2 It should be noted that there is inconsistency between the category name and its short de-
scription, as “tools” and “abilities” are two totally different things. 
3 It is not easy to find any differences between the subjects of the last two categories (connec-
tivity and agglomeration/district). 
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partnership and diffusion” (Camagni 2009, 128). University spin-offs also belong to 
this cell.  
On the right side of the matrix we can find intangible (soft) components. In the 
lowermost cell social capital (D) as a pure public good is located. The author created 
an extra figure in order to explain this notion (Figure 2). In this figure, there are also 
two dimensions one of which differentiates the micro and macro aspects of social 
capital. The function of micro-macro dichotomy is to distinguish “elements directly 
involving single individuals from those of the system”. The other dimension sepa-
rates the formal and informal components of social capital. 
Intermediate goods from rivalry aspects are named as relational capital (E) and 
include the following elements: capability of co-operation and collective action, as 
well as collective competencies. 
According to Camagni’s argument, the difference between social capital and re-
lational capital is the following: “While it may be argued that a social capital exists 
wherever a society exists, ‘relational’ capital may be interpreted as the set of 
bilateral and multilateral linkages that local actors have developed, both inside and 
outside that local territory, facilitated by an atmosphere of easy interaction, trust, 
shared behavioural models and values.” (Camagni 2009, 127). 
Pure private and intangible goods are human capital (entrepreneurship, crea-
tivity, private know-how) and pecuniary externalities in terms of advanced private 
services (F). 
 
Figure 2. Dimensions, forms and functions of social capital 
Source: Camagni 2009, 126. 
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 “Traditional Square”– The Problem of Social Capital 
Camagni evaluates the four corner-classes of the matrix – high and low rivalry, tan-
gible and intangible goods – as traditional, often cited sources with moderate nov-
elty for scientific interest. They are called, therefore, “traditional square” (Figure 3). 
Indeed, the contents of these cells refer to the classic material capital explanations 
(A and C) on the one hand, and on the other, they aggregate relatively accepted types 
of capital, such as human (F) or social (D) capital. 
 
Figure 3. The position of “traditional square” and “innovative cross” in the matrix 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on Camagni 2009. 
However, social capital is not a generally accepted concept. Its definition, ele-
ments, function and operationalisation have been highly debated up to this day. 
Questions and doubts have been raised relatively early in connection with the theo-
retical and empirical application of the concept (e.g. Portes 1998, Sabatini 2005). 
Nevertheless, there is consensus among different authors in the most important fun-
damentals, namely, that social capital is of a “relational nature” and works through 
individual/social relations and their networks. Its essential contribution to demo-
cratic political systems and market economies is also not disputed (Orbán – Szántó 
2005). 
The significant differences in conceptualising social capital become clear by 
overviewing the statements of three classical authors (Bourdieu, Coleman and 
Putnam). 
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According to Bourdieu (1998) social capital means efforts made by individuals 
in order to form social networks. Social capital is a private asset which allows its 
owner to reach his/her own personal goals. Bourdieu considers social capital as the 
basis of social reproduction. It refers to both the material and the symbolic re-
sources which individuals and groups use in the process of reproduction. Economic, 
cultural and social capitals are the three main ways in which resources can be accu-
mulated, and the positions of the individuals in society are actually determined by 
them. The ability of families and different groups is crucial in transferring symbolic 
goods of cultural and social capital into economic capital. The way in which this 
transfer happens is socially and historically determined.  
Coleman (1998) also emphasises the beneficial effects of social capital for the 
individual, however, he shows its public good nature too. Coleman claims that social 
relations characterise the social structure within which individuals act. He was con-
vinced that the analysis of the formation of social capital provided a middle way be-
tween the rational choice and the social-norm perspective.  
Neither Bourdieu’s theory nor Coleman’s established social capital firmly in the 
academic and public discourse. The rapid diffusion of the concept was due to Put-
nam’s works (1993, 2000). In his view, social capital is a collective asset, a cultural 
phenomenon in contrast with the traditional types of capital. It includes both the 
ability to act collectively and trust in public institutions, which are features of big 
communities (nations or regions).  
The above-mentioned classical approaches give a picture about the most im-
portant conceptual differences in the interpretations of social capital, the basis of 
which is the dichotomy between the individual versus the collective.  
Despite the ambiguity concerning social capital, Camagni uses this theory as a 
cornerstone in his territorial capital model. He clearly follows Putnam’s interpreta-
tion, but in his territorial capital model the whole spectrum of the elements of social 
capital can be found. The elements originating from the collective aspect are often 
“hidden” and renamed, and located beyond the border of the “traditional square”. 
The “Innovative Cross” 
The intermediate classes of the matrix represent “more interesting and innovative 
elements on which new attention should be focused”, as Camagni compares these 
cells with the “traditional square”. The resources of the “innovative cross” typically 
merge hard and soft,  material and service elements “which indicate a capacity to 
translate virtual and intangible elements into effective action, cooperation, public–
private partnership, supply of services; a capacity, that is, to convert potential rela-
tionality into effective relationality and linkages among economic agents” (Camagni 
2009, 121). This definition is rather ambiguous and raises the question: which are 
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the relevant resources according to Camagni? Are they the more or less material 
elements (tools, methods), or the immaterial resources (capacity) – behind the “half-
material” goods – that govern their operation? 
This duality is traceable when we look at cell “B” which contains “the most tan-
gible” goods of the innovative matrix. Here – in the case of urban/rural landscape 
and cultural heritage – Camagni draws attention to the danger of the free-rider prob-
lem and the short-term, opportunistic behaviour of some users or property owners. 
In this context he remarks that “the long-term advantage of cooperative behaviour 
is clear; but awareness of this fact depends on the cultural and economic homoge-
neity of the property owners” (Camagni 2009, 124). For the sustainable exploitation 
of local resources “a strong sense of belonging and territorial loyalty coupled with a 
far-sighted business perspective and the social stigmatization of opportunistic be-
haviour” are necessary (Camagni 2009, 124). The further argument refers back to 
his own earlier work (Camagni 2004) in which the concept of “milieu effect” was 
elaborated. The “milieu effect” may result in favourable collective action, easy 
public-private agreements and fruitful local synergies. Here Camagni uses “milieu 
effect” as a synonym of the above-mentioned desirable social attitudes (sense of be-
longing and loyalty). Finally he claims that in this case “the milieu itself may be the 
true territorial capital” and puts the following remark in brackets: “(see typology e 
in the taxonomy)” (Camagni 2009, 124). Typology “e” means relational capital in his 
taxonomy. 
Based on these arguments, social resources (in the form of public goods) seem 
to be required for the right exploitation of tangible goods. These resources are called 
relational capital in Camagni’s model. The complex phenomenon of relational capital 
appears in all cells of the horizontal and vertical central axes, that is, relational capi-
tal has a crucial effect on all aspects of the “innovative cross”. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to separate relational capital from social capital in 
Camagni’s concept. Despite the different names and cells, the elements used are the 
same: trust, shared values and behavioural patterns on the one hand, and relations, 
co-operation and collective action (developed on the basis of the previous group of 
elements) on the other hand. The use of the term relational capital, its formal sepa-
ration from social capital, and its location among the impure public goods could be 
a possibility of taking into account the private aspects of these phenomena. 
However, this remains an illusion. 
The question is: what could be the aim of this “re-labelling”? Why does Camagni 
put relational capital into the “innovative cross”, while social capital into the “tradi-
tional square” in the case of the same phenomena? One of the possible reasons could 
be the strong policy orientation of his territorial capital concept. In the “innovative 
cross” there are several “policy-close” tools and methods requiring scientific verifi-
cation so that they could be used universally. Probably, this is the main aim of 
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Camagni. Relational capital, a more neutral and less embedded term, may suggest 
that creating its components can be a rapid and easy process. But, unfortunately, 
this is not so easy. The interdisciplinary results and experiences in social capital re-
search cannot confirm this optimistic view, therefore, Camagni’s decision about re-
labelling is understandable.  
At the same time, we have to stress that social capital can contribute to both 
“public good” and “public bad”. The negative aspect is included in all theoretical 
approaches, but not with the same importance. The following definition is worth 
noting: “I define social capital as producing positive returns to individuals within 
social networks, even though those outside these networks may be subject to nega-
tive externalities” (Warren 2008, 126). In this sense, bad social capital belongs to 
those social relations which produce negative externalities. Of course, this may 
occur anywhere, but in certain situations a stable system of negative externalities 
may also evolve. In these cases the social capital based on trust, reciprocity and net-
works produces corruption, expensive and biased development policy practices, re-
sulting in low performance in the public and non-profit sectors, and usually also in 
serious democratic deficit. Consequently, social relations are not “good” or “bad” in 
themselves, their nature always depends on the broader context. 
Relations between “Traditional Square” and “Innovative Cross” 
In Camagni’s model low and high rivalry, tangible and intangible goods at the four 
corner cells all represent factors which are classical resources according to the tra-
ditional economic view. By analysing these elements of territorial capital, we can 
learn more about the population and the prosperity chances of a given area, the 
living conditions and standards, as well as the individual and the community aspects 
of social development; in other words, about the features of welfare and well-being. 
The resources of the “traditional square” are pillars of the theory primarily because 
of these attributions, as without measuring them accurately, the goods of the “inno-
vative cross” cannot be evaluated realistically. The number of networks and co-
operation, the rate of collective actions, the existence of knowledge- and technology-
transfer channels and programmes, the flow of information, the functioning of 
proximity relations, as well the p/p-partnerships and the different kinds of 
governance mechanisms are in themselves not enough to objectively assess the real 
resources of a territory and its population. The factors mentioned above are mostly 
development policy practices, many of them can be created through external inter-
ventions even without existing and organically improving local-regional potentials, 
capacities and capabilities. That is why these indicators are not accountable without 
the goods of the “traditional square”. But if we accept this criterion, we also have to 
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recognise that the resources of the “innovative cross” are only relative, while the 
goods of the four corner cells are absolute elements of territorial capital. 
To develop exclusively the resources of the “traditional square” may also be logi-
cally appropriate by improving the goods of the “innovative cross”, however, the 
intention to strengthen just the latter is misleading, and may even be dangerous. The 
simple reason for this is that the factors in the horizontal and vertical central axes 
are mostly practices, methods, mechanisms and organisational structures which can 
only function properly if an innovative, cohesive, collaborative and adaptive local-
regional milieu with strong identity and fruitful relational culture built on trust 
endogenously promotes this. However, if these resources are almost exclusively 
development policy instruments, furthermore, many of them – as already men-
tioned – can be created through external interventions based on the support of the 
local (political, business and social) elite, it is a mistake to think that the improve-
ment of these goods necessarily contributes to the elements of territorial capital at 
the four corner cells which represent the potentials of the whole area and its popu-
lation. 
That is why we find it justifiable to rethink Camagni’s model, and propose to in-
clude a third dimension which is able to involve the horizontal and vertical separa-
tion of the resources according to their absolute and relative character (Figure 4). 
This recommendation could be particularly important from a methodological point 
of view, as it would introduce a kind of scaling between the matrix elements, be-
tween the indicators of the “traditional square” and the “innovative cross”. 
 
Figure 4. The “re-dimensioned” matrix of territorial capital 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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Impacts of Embeddedness into EU Development Policy 
Camagni’s model has a clear development policy approach which is quite evident if 
we think over the evolutionary process of his theory. The concept of territorial capi-
tal was a methodological instrument as interpreted in both the OECD’s and the EU’s 
development policy practices. Although Camagni’s reconceptualised, undoubtedly 
more scientific and more systematised model has deservedly become an important 
approach of regional studies, its roots are still strong. This explains the dual charac-
ter of his theory: it is applicable to scientific research and development policy plan-
ning as well as to strategy-making. However, because of the adaptation benefits, it 
has an irresolvable normative-descriptive dichotomy. 
This can clearly be observed when we inspect the categories of resources in the 
matrix. Many of the goods in the “innovative cross” are not neutral factors, as the 
model exactly determines what type of partnerships, networks, collective actions, 
knowledge- and technology-transfer channels, proximity relations, etc. should 
emerge and evolve. At the same time, in the case of the “traditional square”, the 
indicators are less detailed. There is no orientation point in the matrix as to what 
kind of infrastructural, human, social or private fixed capital would be more 
favourable for territorial development, cohesion and competitiveness. Only the 
elements in the horizontal and vertical central axes have this normative character, 
obviously because many of them are development policy instruments. 
The norms, objectives and directives of EU regional policy are – sometimes more, 
sometimes less – committed to the harmonisation of exogenous and endogenous 
growth strategies, with preference to the latter type of capacity- and capability-
building. This approach definitely requires the acceptance of the principle that every 
territory has its own potential to improve. Camagni’s model cannot break away from 
this development policy framework, and therefore its objective character is 
questionable in several respects. 
First, according to his theory, if we can measure any kind of resources in relation 
to the matrix categories, we have to consider them as goods, potentials for improve-
ment. As the elements of the four corner cells are infrastructural, environmental, 
cultural, human, social and private fixed capital factors, thus every territory has such 
resources. For an efficient measurement it is necessary to aggregate the local-
regional specialities. The real challenge is that the model does not correlate these 
factors, so from the data of a given area alone we cannot assess its territorial capital. 
According to the methodological approach of the concept, we have to compare 
selected areas and their resources; thus a quasi factor-ranking shows us the local-
regional potentials for improvement. Therefore, Camagni’s theory aims to find 
endogenous possibilities of growing and developing, but it determines territorial 
capital by comparing internal resources to external ones, and totally ignores the 
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positive or negative impacts among the internal factors. Of course, these local-
regional potentials could be real ones, but the model is surely unable to measure 
them in a given territorial context. 
The ignorance of “goods” of a negative nature is another important issue con-
cerning the inaccuracies of the concept. Of course, many of the matrix categories are 
undoubtedly auspicious resources, but the literature of social capital is rich in 
research results about the negative impacts. And if we recall the comment above 
that the concept does not really distinguish social and relational capital, and further-
more, the latter one is related to the resources of the “innovative cross” in different 
forms, it is obvious that this model of territorial capital cannot be applied in complex 
scientific approaches. 
Conclusion 
Despite the continuously increasing interest of both scientific and development 
policy approaches in the concept of territorial capital, the theoretical foundations of 
its model are questionable. Although the intentions and aims behind this model, like 
the aggregation, classification and systematisation of the local-regional resources as 
well the endeavour to precisely define endogenous potentials for improvement are 
absolutely correct, more scientific discourses should be carried out on the model 
and its applicability. The present form of the territorial capital concept is unable to 
provide a stable theoretical basis for either scientific analyses or policy 
interventions. The main reasons for this problem are in the individual elements of 
the matrix as well as in the relations of these elements to each other. These are the 
main issues which have motivated us to write this paper, and our comments on the 
necessity of “re-dimensioning” the model, of making distinction between the 
absolute and the relative resources, as well as of reinterpreting social capital in the 
matrix. 
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